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The common law doctrine ofrespondeat superior provides that a principal
is liable for its agents' unauthorized torts committed within the scope of
employment. Until recently, respondeat superior liability had been generally
applied in section 10(b) actions under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
However, several courts and commentators now believe that the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Central Bank of Denver-that no aiding and abetting
cause of action exists under section 10(b)-means that respondeat superior
liability cannot survive either. This Article argues that imposition of respondeat
superior liability for violations of section 10(b) remains consistent with
Congress's intent in enacting the statute. The plain words of the statute, which
define "person" to include a company, which can be liable only on agency
principles, clearly indicate that Congress assumed that common law's
respondeat superior liability would apply under section 10(b). Respondeat
superior liability promotes market efficiency and ensures that companies will
use care in selecting and monitoring employees. Courts should continue to
apply respondeat superior liability under section 10(b) in order to foster
consistency among securities statutes.
"We have got to keep in mind all the time the people who purchased these
stocks and securities and who have lost everything. "I
"After all, I can only repeat, it is a principle that runs all through the law that
we are responsible for the acts of our agents. " 2
"/T]here is now a consensus among those Americans who think about tort law
that vicarious liability is an essential element in the tort system. Any idea of
* University Distinguished Teaching Professor and Ed and Molly Smith Centennial
Professor of Business Law, Graduate School of Business, University of Texas.
I Federal Securities Act: Hearings on H.R. 4314 Before the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong. 9124 (1933) [hereinafter Federal Securities Act Hearings]
(statement of Huston Thompson, a drafter of the original bill).
2 Id. at 122 (statement of Ollie N. Butler, Dep't of Commerce). These hearings
concerned the "Thompson Bill." See H.R. 4314, 73d Cong. (1933). Although the Thompson
Bill was later discarded and did not provide the basis for either the 1933 or the 1934 Acts, it
is clear that the Senators and Representatives who debated the bills that were eventually
enacted into law were well versed regarding respondeat superior.
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repealing vicarious liability would seem to us preposterous, inconceivable. ",3
Over the past twenty years commentators and courts have carried on a
running debate regarding whether respondeat superior liability should be
recognized under the most important of all federal securities law liability
provisions, section 10(b)4 and Rule lOb-55 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. Although most commentators argued against recognition of such liability
on grounds that the 1934 Act's provision in section 20(a)6 for "controlling
3 Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fwudamental Issue of Employer Vicarious
Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1739, 1745, 1767 (1996) (expressing some doubts, nonetheless,
about the persuasiveness of the rationales offered for such liability).
4 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994) [hereinafter section 10(b)]. This section provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
Id.
5 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1997) [hereinafter Rule lOb-5]. This Rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
Id.
6 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1994) [hereinafter section 20(a)]. Section 20(a) provides:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any
provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable
jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person
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person" liability is the sole proper means of imposing secondary liability,7 the
lower courts eventually joined nearly unanimously in the view that respondeat
superior liability should be recognized under the implied cause of action of
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.8 The Supreme Court upset this apple cart in 1994
to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person acted in good
faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or
cause of action.
Id.
7 See William J. Fitzpatrick & Ronald T. Carman, Respondeat Superior and the Federal
Securities Laws: A Round Peg in a Square Hole, 12 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 36 (1983)
("[R]espondeat superior should not be available to either civil litigants or the [SEC] in actions
which allege violations of the federal securities laws."); James Duggan, Note, The Brooding
Omnipresence of the Federal Common Law: The Evisceration of the Controlling Persons
Provisions of the Federal Securities Acts, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 472, 488 (1981) (controlling
person provisions are the only legitimate means of imposing secondary liability under the
federal securities laws); Dennis H. Johnston, Note, Vicarious Liability of Controlling Persons
Under the Securities Acts, 11 LOYOLA L.A. L. REv. 151, 181 (1977) (controlling person
provisions have supplanted common law agency theories); Douglas A. Marshall, Comment,
A Comparison of Control Person Liability and Respondeat Superior: Section 20(a) of the
Securities and Exchange Act, 15 CAL. W. L. REv. 152, 173 (1979) (exclusivity of section
20(a) is consistent with legislative intent and policy); Margot A. Metzner, Note, The
"Controlling Persons" Liability of Broker-Dealers for Their Employees' Federal Securities
Violations, 1974 DuKE L. J. 824, 843 ("controlling person provisions... have excluded
agency liability"); Diana L. Reed, Note, Third Circuit Adopts Limited Use of Respondeat
Superior as Means of Imposing Secondary Liability Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934-
Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 629 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied 102 S. Ct. 427
(1982), 55 TEMP. L. Q. 238, 261 (1982) ("section 20(a) is the exclusive means to impose
secondary liability for violations" of the 1934 Act); J. Christopher York, Comment,
Vicarious Liability of Controlling Persons: Responde=t Superior and the Securities Acts-A
Reversible Consensus in the Circuits, 42 EMORY L.J. 313, 356-58 (1993) (arguing that
Supreme Court precedent mandates exclusion of respondeat superior as a source of liability).
But see John J. Musewicz, Vicarious Employer Liability and Section 10(b): In Defense of the
Common Law, 50 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 754, 811 (1982) ("[S]ection 20(a) should supplement
rather than preempt common-law employer-liability principles."); Kenneth I. Levin,
Comment, The Controlling Persons Provisions: Conduits of Secondary Liability Under
Federal Securities Law, 19 ViLL. L. REV. 621, 643 (1974) (control person provisions were
meant to supplement common law agency theories of secondary liability); William J. Seiter,
Note, Rule 10b-5 and Vicarious Liability Based on Respondeat Superior, 69 CAL. L. REv.
1513, 1537 (1981) ("[R]espondeat superior should be permitted to coexist with section 20(a)
as a source of secondary liability for violations of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.").
8 Except for the D.C. Circuit, which has decided no relevant cases, and the Eleventh
Circuit, which also has not had a chance to pass on the issue (and therefore presumptively
follows the pre-1981 precedent of the Fifth Circuit), only the Third and Fourth Circuits did
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when it held in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver9 that
no aiding and abetting cause of action exists under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5. Although the Central Bank majority did not expressly address other forms of
secondary liability such as respondeat superior, there are several indications
that Central Bank presages their demise: (1) Justice Stevens's dissent in Central
Bank concluded that the majority opinion's logic would lead to elimination not
just of aiding and abetting, but of all forms of secondary liability, including
respondeat superior and conspiracy; 10 (2) Professor Fischel's classic article on
secondary liability, 11 which the Central Bank majority found sufficiently
not fully embrace respondeat superior in the pre-Central Bank era. Thus, the following cases
are representative of circuit court rulings that section 20(a) did not displace respondeat
superior in section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 litigation:
First Circuit: In re Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc., 784 F.2d 29, 32-35 (1st Cir. 1986).
Second Circuit: Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir.
1980).
Fifth Circuit: Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1119
(5th Cir. 1980).
Sixth Circuit: Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690, 695 (6th Cir. 1976).
Seventh Circuit: Henricksen v. Henricksen, 640 F.2d 880, 887 (7th Cir. 1981).
Eighth Circuit: Commerford v. Olson, 794 F.2d 1319, 1323 (8th Cir. 1986).
Ninth Circuit: Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1577-78 (9th Cir.
1990) (en banc).
Tenth Circuit: Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., 502 F.2d 731, 739-41 (10th Cir. 1974).
The Third Circuit has resisted the application of respondeat superior, but has created
exceptions for situations in which the defendant had a "special duty" to supervise the
wrongdoer. See, e.g., Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 181 (3d Cir. 1981)
(accounting firm defendant); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 884-86 (3d Cir. 1975)
(broker-dealer defendant). Indeed, one commentator has suggested that the effect of the
exceptions was to replace the Rule. See Patrick W. Foley, Note, Vicarious Liability
Respondeat Superior Applicable in Cases Involving High Fiduciary Duties Despite
Controlling Persons Provision of Securities Exchange Act-Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649
F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981), 12 S~roN HALLL. REv. 353, 366-67 (1982).
The Fourth Circuit has also resisted application of respondeat superior. See, e.g.,
Carpenter v. Harris, Upham & Co., 594 F.2d 388, 394 (4th Cir. 1979). The court, however,
does not explicitly overrule those earlier cases that have embraced it. See, e.g., Carras v.
Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 260-61 (4th Cir. 1975); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d
1124, 1130 (4th Cir. 1970).
9 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
10 See id. at 200, 201 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (concluding that decisions
recognizing conspiracy and respondeat superior under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 "appear
unlikely to survive the Court's decision").
11 See Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act
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persuasive as to the aiding and abetting issue to cite it several times, 12 called not
only for the end of aiding and abetting liability under section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5, but also for the abolition of respondeat superior liability; 13 (3) virtually
every post-Central Bank commentator addressing the issue has predicted the
extinction of respondeat superior liability; 14 (4) almost every court to address
of 1934, 69 CAL. L. REV. 80, 111 (1981) (arguing that the logic of Supreme Court precedent
mandated elimination of theories of secondary liability not expressly provided for by
Congress).
12 See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 169, 184, 191. Not only did the Court cite Fischel's
article three times, it also seemingly drew its mode of analysis (examine statutory language,
then statutory framework, then legislative history, then policy arguments) from Fischel's
article. See id. at 169-91; Fischel, supra note 11, at 94-102.
13 Fischel, supra note 11, at 88, 97-99, 107, 111.
14 See, e.g., Alan R. Bromberg, Aiding and Abetting: Sudden Death and Possible
Resurrection, 27 REV. SEc. & COMMOD. REG. 133, 137-38 (1994) (apparently agreeing with
Justice Stevens's dissent that respondeat superior is no longer viable under the reasoning of
Central Bank); Thomas 0. Gorman, Who's Afraid of 10b-5? The Scope of a Section 10(b)
Cause of Action After Central Bank of Denver, 22 SEC. REG. L.J. 247, 257 (1994) (Central
Bank "must be read as a death knell for the application of all forms of common-law secondary
liability in section 10(b) cases."); Joel Seligman, The Implications of Central Bank, 49 Bus.
LAw. 1429, 1435 (1994) ("[Ihere also would appear to be no principled basis for not
extending the logic of Central Bank to prohibit other implied... liability claims under section
10(b) such as those involving respondeat superior.") [hereinafter Seligman, Central Bank];
Marc I. Steinberg, The Ramifications of Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions on Federal
and State Securities Regulation, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 489, 497 n.55 (1995) ("The
Court's decision should also preclude use of the common law theories of conspiracy and
respondeat superior."); Marc I. Steinberg & John Fletcher, Compliance Programs for Insider
Trading, 47 SMU L. REv. 1783, 1786 n.13 (1994) (Central Bank's holding "arguably
impl[ies] the rejection of respondeat superior under the federal securities laws."); Lisa Klein
Wager & John E. Failla, Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N.A.-The Beginning of an End, or Will Less Lead to More?, 49 Bus. LAw. 1451, 1462
(1994) ("Mhe viability of any precedent applying such common law principles [as
respondeat superior] ... certainly must be questioned, if not rejected out of hand, after the
decision in Central Bank."); Sean G. Blackman, Note, An Analysis of Aider and Abettor
Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Central Bank of Denver
v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 27 CONN. L. REv. 1323, 1372 (1995) ("[Ut is clear
that... respondeat superior... will now be treated as suspect by the courts."); Nathan F.
Coco, Comment, Has Legislative History Become History?: A Critical Examination of
Central Bank of Denver N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 20 J. CORP. L. 555,
569 (1995) ("[]t is unlikely that respondeat superior or conspiracy claims will survive Central
Bank."); Carrie E. Goodwin, Note, Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank: Not Just the End of
Aiding and Abetting Under Section 10(b), 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1387, 1425 (1995)
(Post-Central Bank "actions based on common-law vicarious liability should no longer exist
when the defendant is able to comply with section 20(a)'s good-faith defense."); Anthony J.
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the issue of whether Central Bank's logic compels elimination of conspiracy,
another secondary liability theory under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, has held
that it does;15 and (5) finally, although the lower courts are split, at least five
courts have cited Central Bank in either specifically ruling or intimating that
respondeat superior is no longer a viable means of imposing liability in section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 cases. 16
Thus, continued recognition of respondeat superior liability under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is truly in peril. The inconceivable is being conceived,
Jorgenson, Comment, Securities Law: Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank
of Denver, N.A.: The Supreme Court Abolishes Aiding and Abetting Liability Under Section
10(b): The End of an Era, or a Break in the Action?, 47 OKnA. L. REv. 641, 672 (1994)
(respondeat superior is "at risk" after Central Bank); John Kalmbach, Note, Central Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver: Rethinking Established Section 10(b) Doctrines, 55
LA. L. REv. 1009, 1019-20 (1995); John F. Olson et al., The End of the Section 10(b) Aiding
and Abetting Liability Fiction, INSiGHms, June 1994, at 3, 6 (Central Bank's "reasoning
appears to spell the end to all forms of implied secondary liability under section 10(b),
including... respondeat superior."). But see Nicole Miller, Note, The Judicial Rejection of
Aiding and Abetting Civil Liability Under Section 10(b): Will Central Bank of Denver Spell
the End of the Implied 10(b) Cause ofAction?, 1995 UTAH L. REv. 913, 933-34 ("The future
of respondeat superior under section 10(b)[ ] seems relatively secure.").
15 See, e.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Bell, No. 94-56468, 1996 WL
26925, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 23, 1996) (holding that Central Bank also renders conspiracy
inactionable); In re Glenfed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 60 F.3d 591, 592 (9th Cir. 1995) (same);
Phillips v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 933 F. Supp. 303, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same); In re
Faleck & Margolies, Ltd., Nos. 89 Civ. 8548 (SWK) and 90 Civ. 356 (SWK), 1995 WL
33631, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 1995) (same); Kidder Peabody & Co. v. Unigestion Int'l
Ltd., 903 F. Supp. 479, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (same); In re Medimmune, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
873 F. Supp. 953, 964 n.8 (D. Md. 1995) (same); In re MTC Elec. Techs. Shareholders
Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 981-82 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (same); Pitten v. Jacobs, 903 F. Supp.
937, 950 (D.S.C. 1995) (same); SEC v. United States Envtl., Inc., 897 F. Supp. 117, 119-20
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (same); Van De Velde v. Coopers & Lybrand, 899 F. Supp. 731, 738 (D.
Mass. 1995) (same); Upton v. McKerrow, 887 F. Supp. 1573, 1580 (N.D. Ga. 1995)
(same); In re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 855 F. Supp. 1086, 1098 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (same).
But see In re Towers Fin. Corp. Noteholders Litig., 936 F. Supp. 126, 129-30 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (distinguishing between conspiracy and aiding and abetting and refusing to hold that
Central Bank, which did not directly address conspiracy claims, necessarily ended them). See
generally Edward Brodsky, The Conspiracy Question Revisited: The Scope of § 10(b), N.Y.
L.J., Sept. 11, 1996, at3 (arguing that Towers was wrongly decided).
16 See Tranchina v. Howard, Weil, La Bouisse, Friedrichs, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12361 at *14 (E.D. La. Aug. 18, 1997); In re Fidelity/Micron Sec. Litig., 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13616 at *16 (D. Mass. Apr. 24, 1997); ESI Montgomery County, Inc. v.
Montenay Int'l Corp., No. 94 Civ. 0119, 1996 WL 22979, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 1996);
In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 169 F.R.D. 598 (D.N.J. 1996); Pitten
v. Jacobs, 903 F. Supp. 937, 950 (D.S.C. 1995).
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and the preposterous is being implemented. If other lower courts also extirpate
respondeat superior liability under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, making the
predictions of Justice Stevens and the commentators come true, a momentous
shift in settled law will occur and Central Bank's impact will be much greater
than it first appeared. 17
Think of it! Without respondeat superior liability, it is arguable that no
longer will accounting firms be proper Rule lOb-5 defendants (only individual
accountants), no longer will law firms be appropriate Rule lOb-5 defendants
(only individual lawyers), and no longer will corporations be sued for securities
fraud (only their employees). The importance of such a potential development
is difficult to overstate. 18 Such a sea of change in the law demands attention. 19
17 The author has noted and largely agreed with many of the criticisms leveled at the
majority opinion in Central Bank. For a summary of some of the more salient criticisms of
the Central Bank holding, see Robert A. Prentice, Locating That "Indistinct" and "Virtually
Noneristent" Line Benveen Primary and Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b), 75 No.
CAR. L. REv. 691, 709-11 (1996).
The author has also somewhat optimistically predicted that Central Bank will have little
impact if the lower courts properly construe the concept of primary liability under section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Id. at 716-80. Whether or not this is correct depends upon whether the
author's belief that primary liability should be broadly conceived gains acceptance
notwithstanding the fact that it is arguably inconsistent with the tone of the Supreme Court's
majority opinion in Central Bank.
18 Professor Seligman has indicated that the loss of respondeat superior liability would
not be a major loss to securities law enforcement because controlling person liability under
section 20(a) would still exist and because most respondeat superior cases have involved
broker-dealers whose contracts with customers now almost universally call for arbitration
rather than litigation. Seligman, Central Bank, supra note 14, at 1436.
Professor Seligman's first argument overlooks the fact that Congress enacted the
controlling person provisions merely as a supplement to reach defendants that could not be
reached under common law agency principles such as respondeat superior. See infra notes
389-410 and accompanying text. Many, perhaps most, section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
defendants-corporations, law firms, accounting firms-have been reached through
respondeat superior. Such firms do not in any realistic way "control" their wrongdoing
agents; rather, it is the agents that "control" the principal. See infra notes 346, 429.
Elimination of the respondeat superior theory of secondary liability could have tremendous
repercussions.
Professor Seligman's second argument assumes that because the most vigorous litigation
regarding the propriety of respondeat superior liability in light of the arguably exclusive
nature of the controlling person provisions has occurred in broker-dealer cases, those are the
only important cases. The fact is that it is only in broker-dealer cases that the issue has been
heavily litigated. See infra note 44. In lawsuits against corporations, law firms, and
accounting firms, it has been widely assumed, and rightly so, that respondent superior
liability applied. See infra note 42.
19 This is especially true because Central Bank's holding may cause many plaintiffs to
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This Article makes a case for the continued recognition of respondeat
superior liability under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Part I provides basic
background material, setting the stage for analysis. In particular, it discusses the
Supreme Court's most recent approach to answering such questions, as
explicated in Central Bank.
Part II follows the Central Bank mode of analysis to address the first key
question underlying this Article: Other things being equal, whether respondeat
superior liability should be recognized under section 10(b) and Rule l0b-5. In
substantial part, the issue will be whether there are good and sufficient reasons
to distinguish respondeat superior liability from aiding and abetting liability so
that the former should not suffer the latter's unkind fate in the wake of Central
Bank.
Part I addresses the second key question in this Article. It recognizes that
other things are not equal given the existence of section 20(a) and seeks to
answer the question of whether its controlling person provision should, in a
post-Central Bank world, be construed to provide the sole means of imposing
secondary liability under the 1934 Act.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 Generally
Section 10(b) makes it unlawful to commit manipulative or fraudulent acts
in the purchase or sale of securities in violation of SEC-promulgated rules. Rule
10b-5 makes it illegal, among other things, "[t]o make any untrue
statement... or to omit to state a material fact... or... [t]o engage in
any.., course of business which operates ... as a fraud or deceit upon any
person." 20 These are "sweeping words." 21 Given the litigation it has generated
over the past thirty years or so,22 section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 are the most
cast as respondeat superior claims those causes of action that they previously would have
labeled as aiding and abetting. See Glen Shu, Comment, Take a Second Look: Central Bank
After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 Hous. L. Rnv. 539, 570
(1996).
20 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997). For a discussion of the basic elements of a section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 cause of action, see generally Robert A. Prentice & John H. Langmore,
Beware of Vaporware: Product Hype and the Securities Fraud Liability of High-Tech
Companies, 8 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1, 20-62 (1994).
21 Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 303 (1993)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
22 See Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal
Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 HAiv. L. Rv. 961, 965 (1994) ("The
private right of action implied under Rule lOb-5 has become civil plaintiffs' primary weapon
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significant securities antifraud provisions in the United States (or elsewhere). 23
B. Respondeat Superior
The general rule is and has long been that "a master is liable for the
unauthorized torts of his servant if committed while the servant is acting within
the scope of his employment." 24 Also known as "vicarious liability,"
respondeat superior liability25 is strict in nature, requiring no fault on the part
of the master. 26
The term respondeat superior is often restricted to the employer-employee
in their battle against securities fraud. Plaintiffs in class action securities fraud cases have
claimed billions of dollars of damages for violations of the implied Rule lOb-5 private right.")
(footnote omitted).
2 3 See Nat Stem, The Constitutionalization of Rule lOb-5, 27 RUTGERs L.J. 1, 1 (1995)
("Rule lOb-5 is probably the most familiar and most frequently invoked securities
regulation.") (footnote omitted); Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REv. 385, 463 (1989-1990) (observing that lOb-5 "has
been given extraordinary prominence, almost eclipsing everything else as a source of federal
securities law at least in the courts.").
24 HAROLD Grur REUSCHIN & WnmuAm A. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
AGENCY AND PARTERsH[P 101 (1979).
25 See RESrATEE (SECOND) OF AGENCY (1958). The Restatement breaks the subject
of a master's vicarious liability for the torts of its agents into two broad categories. First,
section 219's status-based respondeat superior provision states that "[a] master is subject to
liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their
employment." Id. at § 219. Second, there are two provisions-section 257
(misrepresentations of others) and section 261 (fraud by agents)-that impose vicarious
liability on an "apparent authority" basis. See id. at §§ 257, 261.
Section 257 states that "[a] principal is subject to liability for loss caused to another by
the other's reliance upon a tortious representation of a servant or other agent, if the
representation is: (a) authorized; (b) apparently authorized; or (c) within the power of the
agent to make for the principal." Id. at § 257. Section 257(c) goes beyond both actual and
apparent authority and is thus a fairly naked example of pure enterprise liability. See, e.g.,
Celtic Life Ins. Co. v. Coats, 885 S.W.2d 96, 98-99 (Tex. 1994).
Section 261 provides that "[a] principal who puts a servant or other agent in a position
which enables the agent, while apparently acting within his authority, to commit a fraud upon
third persons is subject to liability to such third persons for the fraud." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 261 (1958).26 See FOWLER V. HARpER & FLEMlNG JAMES JR., THE LAW OF TORTS 1367-68 (1956)
("[V]icarious liability... is imposed ... in cases where the master has taken all the steps
that reasonable foresight would suggest .... Indeed the court is not even interested in hearing
whether the master exercised his right of control well and prudently."); REuscHLEIN &
GREGORY, supra note 24, at 101.
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relationship.27 However, general agency principles often impose similar
liability upon non-employer principals for the torts of their agents acting within
the scope of authority. 28
Usually the agent must be serving the master's ends for the master to be
liable for the agent's torts. However, where a principal places the agent in a
position to deceive third parties by apparently acting within the principal's
authority, the principal is also liable to the third party on an agency basis, even
if the agent was acting for the agent's own purposes. 29 The Supreme Court
itself has noted that "a principal is liable for an agent's fraud though the agent
acts solely to benefit himself, if the agent acts with apparent authority." 30
This Article uses the term respondeat superior to cover all three of these
well-established categories of agency liability. 31 A broader term like "agency
liability" might be more precise, but the terms are often used interchangeably, 32
and the phrase respondeat superior seems to be more generally used by
courts. 3 3
Many rationales have been given for imposing strict respondeat superior
liability, and these will be discussed at various places later in this Article.34 The
most important point to remember at this stage is that the rationales have been
27 See BALLmNTINE'S LAw DICrIoNARY 1106 (3d ed. 1969).
28 Principals are usually not liable for the torts of independent contractors that they hire
unless extrahazardous activities or nondelegable duties are involved. See Voigts v. Bmtoco
Eng'g & Constr. Co., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 87, 89, 105 (Ct. App. 1996); MBank El Paso v.
Sanchez, 836 S.W.2d 151, 153 (Tex. 1992).
29 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 261, 262 (1958).
30 American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 566
(1982).3 1 These rules of liability are not controversial. They are quite well established and
ubiquitously applied in American jurisprudence. For a slightly more detailed summary of
them, see York, supra note 7, at 324-28.
32 See William H. Kuehnle, Decision on Vicarious Liability Moves 9th Circuit to
Mainstream, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 18, 1991, at 33 ("Agency liability [is] often called respondeat
superior liability .... [and it makes one liable when one's employee commits a tort while
working within his or her scope of employment (master-servant liability) or when one's agent
commits a tort while acting with the apparent authority of the principal (apparent authority
liability).").
33 See York, supra note 7, at 324 ("Courts often fail to distinguish the nuances of agency
theory, content to label most common law actions 'respondeat superior.'") (footnotes
omitted).
34 Because the principal may well be blameless in respondeat superior cases, significant
policy reasons must be (and have been) located in order to impose liability. In apparent
authority cases, liability is based on the notion that people should be held responsible for the
results flowing from their objective manifestations of conduct, regardless of their subjective
intentions. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 cmt. d (1958).
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found so persuasive over the last couple of centuries that the doctrine of
respondeat superior is simply universal in Western jurisprudence. 35 It is, in the
words of Professor Langevoort, "a foundational element of tort law." 36
C. Section 20(a) and "Controlling Persons"
Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which is patterned
upon a similar provision in section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, 37 imposes
vicarious joint and several liability for securities fraud on "controlling persons"
for the conduct of those they control, unless the controlling persons act in good
faith and do not induce the controlled person's conduct.38 Once the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case that defendants controlled the wrongdoers, the
burden of proof shifts to the defendants to prove that they acted in good faith. 39
The good faith defense available to controlling person defendants creates an
important distinction between this form of secondary liability on the one hand,
and respondeat superior with its strict liability on the other.40
35 See generally Robert Neuner, Respondeat Superior in the Light of Comparative Law,
4 IA. L. REv. 1, 1 (1941) (comparing United States, English, French, German, Austrian,
and Czech law); Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1745 (noting that vicarious employer liability is
fully implemented in England, France, and Canada, but has some limitations in Germany and
Japan); E. Fabre Surveyer, A Comparison of Delictual Responsibility in Law in the Countries
Governed by a Code, 8 TuL. L. Rav. 53, 63-66 (1933-1934) (discussing forms of agency
liability in France, Italy, Egypt, Spain, Panama, and Canada).
36 Donald C. Langevoort, Words from on High About Rule 10b-5: Chiarella's History,
Central Bank's Future, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865, 894 (1995).
37 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1994) [hereinafter section 15]. It provides:
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, or who,
pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or understanding with one or more other
persons by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls any person liable
under sections [11] or [12] of this title, shall also be liable jointly and severally with and
to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled
person is liable, unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground
to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled
person is alleged to exist.
Id.
38 See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1994) [hereinafter section 20(a)].
39 See SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1473 (2d Cir. 1996); Marbury
Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir. 1980); Gordon v. Burr, 506 F.2d
1080, 1086 (2d Cir. 1974).
40 Courts interpret the good faith defenses of section 15 and section 20(a) to be
functionally identical, see Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1578 (9th Cir.
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D. The Controlling Persons or Respondeat Superior Debate
Respondeat superior has been applied in section 10(b) cases as long as the
implied cause of action has been recognized. Indeed, the seminal case implying
the section 10(b) cause of action, Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,41 held a
corporate defendant potentially liable. Many cases throughout the 1940s and
1950s similarly applied the doctrine of respondeat superior liability, seemingly
without giving it a second thought.42 However, in 1967, the Ninth Circuit, in
Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co.,43 began holding that the controlling
person provision of section 20(a) provided the exclusive form of vicarious
liability under the 1934 Act.44 The basic reasoning of the line of cases that
arose from Kamen was that recognition of respondeat superior with its
imposition of liability upon even faultless principals is impermissibly
inconsistent with the express provision of a good faith defense for controlling
persons in section 20(a).
As noted earlier, many commentators agreed with the Kamen holding,45
1990) (en banc) (a defendant has "the same good faith defense available to it under § 15 as it
has under § 20(a)-). Section 15(a), however, seems to use an objective reasonable person
standard while section 20(a) seems to impose a subjective standard geared to the particular
defendant's state of mind. See Nancy C. Staudt, Note, "Controlling" Securities Fraud:
Proposed Liability Standards for Controlling Persons Under the 1933 and 1934 Securities
Acts, 72 MINN. L. REv. 930, 939 (1988) (contrasting the two provisions).
41 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
42 See, e.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369, 370, 373 (3d Cir. 1956)
(corporate defendant); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 786-87 (2d Cir.
1951) (same); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14, 24
(W.D. Ky. 1960) (same); Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954,
964 (N.D. M11. 952) (same); Robinson v. Difford, 92 F. Supp. 145, 149 (E.D. Pa. 1950)
(same); Hawkins v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104, 123 (W.D.
Ark. 1949) (partnership defendant). Even the cases exonerating corporate defendants for other
reasons assumed the applicability of respondeat superior. See, e.g., Smith v. Bear, 237 F.2d
79, 88 (2d Cir. 1956) (partnership defendant); Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701, 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (corporate defendant), aff'd, 198 F.2d 883 (2d
Cir. 1952).
The SEC has similarly applied respondeat superior. See, e.g., In re Cady, Roberts &
Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961); In re H.F. Schroeder & Co., 27 S.E.C. 833, 837 (1948).
43 382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1967).
44 Kamen's holding was anything but clear. The court never explicitly concluded that the
controlling person provision of section 20(a) is the exclusive means of imposing secondary
liability under the 1934 Act. See Kamen, 382 F.2d at 694-97. What is important, however, is
that later courts interpreted the Kamen opinion as so holding. See, e.g., Zweig v. Hearst
Corp., 521 F.2d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 1975).
45 See supra note 7.
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and it gained limited acceptance in the lower courts. However, twenty-four
years after Kamen the Ninth Circuit finally threw in the towel46 and joined the
large majority of other circuits in rejecting the Kamen exclusivity rationale and
recognizing respondeat superior as another viable means of imposing vicarious
liability in section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 cases. 47
E. Central Bank and Its Holding
In Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,48 the
Supreme Court did not directly address either respondeat superior or section
20(a). Nonetheless, its ruling on another form of secondary liability, aiding and
abetting, necessarily had significant implications for both. Without repeating the
copious summaries and commentaries on Central Bank already extant, 49 its
46 See Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1576-78 (9th Cir. 1990) (en
banc).
47 See supra note 8.
48 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
49 In addition to the articles and notes cited supra note 14, see, e.g., James D. Cox, Just
Desserts for Accountants and Attorneys After Bank of Denver, 38 ARiz. L. REv. 519, 519-45
(1996); Ann Maxey, Competing Duties? Securities Lawyers' Liability After Central Bank, 64
FORDHAM L. REv. 2185, 2204-27, 2237 (1996); James D. Redwood, Toward a More
Enlightened Securities Jurisprudence in the Supreme Court? Don't Bank on It Anytime Soon,
32 Hous. L. REV. 3, 4-65 (1995); David S. Ruder, The Future of Aiding and Abetting and
Rule 10b-5 After Central Bank of Denver, 49 Bus. LAw. 1479, 1482-87 (1994); David J.
Baum, Comment, The Aftermath of Central Bank of Denver: Private Aiding and Abetting
Liability Under Section 10(b) and Ride 10b-5, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1817, 1833-52 (1995);
Stephen H. Brown, Note, Central Bank: The End of Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 46 MERcER L. REV. 1515, 1515-26 (1995); Craig J.
Concannon, Note, Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank: The End of Aiding and
Abetting Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 14 ST. Louis
U. PuB. L. REv. 679, 681-700 (1995); Scott M. Murray, Comment, Central Bank of Denver
v. First Interstate Bank of Denver: The Supreme Court Chops a Bough from the Judicial Oak:
There Is No Implied Private Remedy to Sue for Aiding and Abetting Under Section 10(b) and
SEC Rule 10b-5, 30 NEw ENG. L. REv. 475, 501-45 (1996); Jeffrey D. Snavely, Note,
Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank: Will the Death of the Salesman Stop the Selling?, 26 U.
TOL. L. REv. 695, 707-24 (1995); Susan E. Springer, Note, Central Bank v. First Interstate
Bank and the Demise of Section 10(b) Private Aiding and Abetting Liability: Opting for a Rule
of Economic Efficiency, 4 GEo. MASON L. REv. 213, 227-50 (1995); JoErin O'Leary,
Recent Decision, Securities Regulation-Central Bank, Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank
of Denver, N.A., 33 DUQ. L. REv. 1053, 1053-71 (1995); Edward Brodsky, Aiding and
Abetting Claims Under Rule 10b-5, N.Y. L.J., June 14, 1995, at 3; Roberta S. Karmel,
Implications of the 'Central Bank of Denver' Case, N.Y. L.J., June 16, 1994, at 3; John
F.X. Peloso & Stuart M. Samoff, What Now for Aider and Abettor Liability?, N.Y. L.J.,
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essential holding was that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and
abetting claim under section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 because, most importantly, the
statutory text does not explicitly provide for it.50 That holding alone does not
bode well for recognition of other forms of secondary liability that, like
respondeat superior, are not mentioned in the text of the statute. Naturally,
deeper analysis is needed and perhaps the most important product of Central
Bank is the majority's current thinking regarding the proper approach to
answering questions about the scope and meaning of section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5.
The process explicated by the Court seems to have the following steps.
First, the issue presented must be categorized. The Court stated that its prior
analysis had turned on whether the question presented regarded (1) the scope of
conduct prohibited by section 10(b), or (2) given a violation of section 10(b),
the elements of liability in the implied section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 cause of
action.51
Second, once the issue is categorized, the proper mode of analysis must be
applied. The Court stated (inaccurately)52 that when it previously had decided
June 16, 1994, at 3.
50 See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 177. To be slightly more thorough, the Court held that
not only does the text of the statute not mention secondary liability, but also the following:
(a) no express liability provision in either the 1933 or the 1934 Acts includes an aiding and
abetting cause of action, id. at 179; (b) legislative developments occurring after passage of the
Act do not clearly indicate that Congress wished aiding and abetting liability to exist, id. at
185-88; (c) policy arguments do not demonstrate that elimination of aiding and abetting
liability would lead to results "so bizarre" as to override the clarity of the text, id. at 188-90;
and (d) imposition of aiding and abetting liability cannot be based on the general federal
criminal aiding and abetting law (18 U.S.C. § 2), id. at 190-91.
51 See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 172.
5 2 In point of fact, the Court had previously used broader means of statutory
interpretation in determining questions regarding the scope of conduct prohibited by section
10(b). See Bromberg, supra note 14, at 136 n.28 and accompanying text. Indeed, Professor
Fallone has accurately noted:
Perhaps the most damning criticism of the Supreme Court's majority opinion in [Central
Bank] is that it attempts to recharacterize earlier precedent in order to conform it with a
newly announced-and very different-method of interpreting Section 10(b). At most,
the Supreme Court's decision represents an unjust attempt to redefine legal rights
available to defrauded investors in light of current judicial attitudes. At the very least,
judicial candor requires that the majority recognize a major shift in its method of
statutory analysis involving securities fraud.
Edward A. Fallone, Section 10(B) and the Vagaries of Federal Common Law: The Merits of
Codifying the Private Cause of Action Under a Structuralist Approach, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV.
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issues regarding the scope of conduct, the text of the statute had controlled its
analysis. 53 However, when it had decided questions regarding the elements of
liability, the Court had been required to infer how the 1934 Congress would
have addressed the issue had an express cause of action been included in the
1934 Act.54
Third, even if the text does control the analysis and does give a clear
answer to the scope of conduct question presented, the Court may bolster its
conclusion by attempting to infer how the 1934 Congress would have addressed
the issue had there been an express cause of action.55 Functionally, this allows a
court handling an elements of liability issue to engage in the same analysis it
would have used had it been handling a scope of conduct issue, after skipping
analysis of the wording of the statute. Using the 1934 Act's express causes of
action as a model are the preferred means of inferring the intent of the 1934
Congress in this regard. 56
Fourth, the Court may examine legislative history and other evidence of
congressional intent. Although such evidence is technically irrelevant to analysis
supposedly controlled by the text of the statute, the Court virtually always
considers it in interpreting federal statutes, 57 especially securities statutes, 58 and
did so in Central Bank.59 In relation to determining congressional intent,
Central Bank announced, congressional reenactment of statues previously given
certain interpretations by the courts and congressional failure to enact laws are
not especially helpful indicators. 6°
Fifth, again despite arguable irrelevance to the task of inferring
71, 95.
53 See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 173.
54 See id. at 178 (citing Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508
U.S. 286, 294 (1993)).
55 See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 178.
56 See id.
57 See Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the
1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 195 (1982-1983) ("No occasion for
statutory construction now exists when the court will not look at legislative history.");
Stephanie Wald, The Use of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation-Cases in the 1992
U.S. Supreme Court Term; Scalia Rails but Legislative History Remains on Track, 23 Sw. U.
L. REV. 47, 49 (1993) (case-by-case illustration).
58 See Randall W. Quinn, The Supreme Court's Use of Legislative History in
Interpreting the Federal Securities Laws, 22 SEC. REG. L.J. 262, 265 (1994) (finding, as of
the end of 1992-1993 term, fifty-three Supreme Court cases referring to legislative history in
interpreting federal securities statutes).
59 See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 183-85.
60 See id. at 185-87. The Court admitted that its previous holdings in this area were
quite inconsistent. Id. at 187.
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congressional intent, a court may examine policy arguments. In Central Bank,61
as in other securities cases,62 the Court displayed its predilections regarding
policy issues.63
F. Lower Court Responses
Surprisingly, as of this writing few cases since Central Bank have directly
ruled on its implications for the continued viability of respondeat superior under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Those that have ruled have split on the issue.
1. Cases Eliminating Respondeat Superior Liability
Judge Carter of the Southern District of New York became the first judge
to begin to make Justice Stevens's prognostication about the demise of
respondeat superior come true when he ruled in ESI Montgomery County, Inc.
v. Montenay International Corp.64 The case involved the purchase by ESI of a
limited partnership interest constituting a 72% interest in a limited partnership
that owned and operated a waste-to-energy facility. Defendants included the
following: (a) Montenay Energy Resources of Montgomery County, Inc.
("MERMCI"), general partner of the limited partnership, (b)Montenay
International Corporation ("MIC"), 100% owner of MERMCI and 28% owner
(through related entities) of the limited partnership, and (c) Montenay
Montgomery Trust ("MMT"), a common law trust created for the benefit of
MIC and its affiliated companies, which was a limited partner until ESI's
purchase. After the purchase, ESI claimed in a section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
action that it had been defrauded in the negotiations by false statements
regarding the limited partnership's financial status, liabilities, and tax basis.
MERMCI moved for dismissal on grounds that it did not make material
61 Id. at 188-90 (stressing disadvantages of securities litigation).
62 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737-55 (1975) (Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion displaying an overtly hostile attitude toward securities fraud
litigation).63 The following chart seems to capture the Supreme Court's current thinking regarding
the order of analysis after the type of issue presented is determined:
Scope of Conduct Elements of Liability
Statutory Text 1
Inference From Other Statutes 2 1
Legislative History 3 2
Policy Considerations 4 3
64 No. 94 Civ. 0119 (RLC), 1996 WL 22979, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 1996).
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misrepresentations and omissions to ESI, noting that it was not a party to the
contract. ESI argued the MERMCI should nonetheless be held liable, alleging
"that three officers of MERMCI led the negotiations for sale of the partnership
interest to ESI and repeated orally and in writing to ESI the
misrepresentations. '65 However, Judge Carter held that these allegations did
not implicate MERMCI as a corporation because Central Bank's reasoning
eliminated all forms of secondary liability, including those based on respondeat
superior.66
The second case holding that Central Bank eliminated respondeat superior
liability was In re Prudential Insurance Co. of America Sales Practices
Litigation.67 The suit was brought against Prudential by policyholders who
alleged that they were induced by various false representations to purchase
variable appreciable life insurance policies. Although common law fraud and
other claims survived, the trial judge dismissed the section 10(b) and Rule lOb-
65 See id. at *1, 2.
66 See id. at *3. Judge Carter nonetheless refused to dismiss MERMCI from the suit,
holding it potentially liable on a second theory. The reasoning is somewhat peculiar and
contradictory. Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires, of course, that all
averments of fraud be stated with particularity. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Under the "group
pleading" rle, see Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1986), a plaintiffs allegations
of fraud pass muster for specificity even without showing a specific connection between a
particular defendant and the false representations so long as the defendant is an insider or
affiliate participating in the transaction. Id. at 55. The "group pleading" rule is intended to aid
plaintiffs in stating claims against officers and directors of companies who are actively
involved in running those companies on the assumption that discovery will likely turn up
evidence that such active parties were involved in the false statements. See ES, 1996 W.L
22979, at *3. Judge Carter believed that there are two requirements for application of the
'group pleading" doctrine: (a) that defendant is an insider or affiliate participating in the
transaction, and (b) "that the complaint alleges particular facts demonstrating the knowledge
of defendants at the time the statements were false." Id. at *4. The second requirement stems
from the Second Circuit's ruling in DiVittorio v. Equidyne Extractive Indus., Inc., 822 F.2d
1242, 1248 (2d Cir. 1987). See ESI, 1996 WL 22979, at *4.
Judge Carter held that the first requirement was met because MERMCI was an indirect
subsidiary and therefore an "affiliate" of MIC. Judge Carter held that the second element of
the "group pleading" doctrine was also met because Sandner, an officer of MERMCI and
MIC, had made a misrepresentations to ESI, demonstrating "that the defendants knew that
their statements were false at the time the statements were made." See id. at *4-5.
Thus, Judge Carter held that the knowledge of an officer of MERMCI could be imputed
to MERMCI for purposes of satisfying the "group pleading" rule of section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5, but that that same officer's misrepresentations could not be imputed to MERMCI for
respondeat superior purposes. See id. at *5. The judge did not explain the obvious
inconsistency. In either event, MERMCI could "act" and "know" only through its officers.67 No. 1061, CIV. A. 954704, 1996 WL 908944 (D.N.J., June 7, 1997).
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5 claim on grounds that Central Bank had eliminated respondeat superior
liability and therefore Prudential could not be liable for its agents' actions.
In April of 1997, Judge Steams in Massachusetts also held, in an interesting
case involving the alleged manipulation of Micron Technologies stock by
principals of the Fidelity Magellan Fund, that Central Bank had eliminated
respondeat superior liability. 68
2. Cases Continuing to Recognize Respondeat Superior Liability
At least two courts have refused to hold that Central Bank eliminated
respondeat superior liability under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 69 In Pollack
v. Laidlaw Holdings, Inc.,70 the court essentially held that agency liability is
more strongly established under traditional federal law than aiding and abetting
liability and therefore should not be lightly eliminated.71 And in Seolas v.
Bilzerian,72 Judge Winder in Utah followed Pollack for several well-articulated
reasons. 73 The remainder of this Article will demonstrate that these courts have
it right.74
68 In re Fidelity/Micron Sec. Litig., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13616, at *16 (D. Mass.
Apr. 24, 1997). A fourth court has indicated in dicta that it agreed that Central Bank spelled
the end of respondeat superior liability. Pitten v. Jacobs, 903 F. Supp. 937, 950 (D.S.C.
1995). And a fifth court has indicated that although it "agree[d] philosophically" with the
defendant's argument that Central Bank's reasoning foreclosed respondeat superior liability in
Rule 10b-5 cases, it felt bound by pre-Central Bank Fifth Circuit precedent to the contrary.
See Tranchina v. Howard, Weil, La Bouisse, Friedrichs, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12361
at *14 (E.D. La. Aug. 18, 1997).
69 In AT&T Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1429-32 (3d
Cir. 1994), the court in a Ianham Act case discussed the impact of Central Bank's reasoning
in contexts outside securities law and concluded that it did not mandate the extinction of
respondeat superior in those other contexts.
70 No. 90 Civ. 5788 (DLC), 1995 WL 261518, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 1995).
71 See id. at *17. By so holding the court bolstered Langevoort's argument that a
Supreme Court attempt to revolutionize the law in Central Bank may well be stymied by
lower court resistance. See Langevoort, supra note 36, at 867 (predicting that lower court
inertia will prevent the pendulum from swinging as far as the tone of the majority opinion
might indicate).
72 951 F. Supp. 978 (D. Utah 1997).
73 See id. at 981-84.
74 See Riggs v. Schappell, 939 F. Supp. 321, 325-29 (D.N.J. 1996). In Riggs, the court
seemed to assume that pre-Central Bank Third Circuit law was still viable. As noted earlier,
the Third Circuit had been one of the few jurisdictions hostile to respondeat superior liability,
and even it had created some exceptions. Still, the Riggs opinion was very suspicious of the
respondeat superior and other agency theories, but apparently held ultimately that even if they
did apply, their elements were not present in this case.
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II. CENTRAL BANK AND RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
This section deals with the first of two intertwined issues that were raised in
the introduction: Ceteris paribus, should respondeat superior be recognized
under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5? That is, are there good and sufficient
reasons to distinguish respondeat superior liability from aiding and abetting
liability so that the former need not be undone by Central Bank's reasoning?
The resolution of this issue is inextricably interwoven with the question of
whether section 20(a)'s controlling person provision should be construed to
provide the exclusive means of imposing secondary liability under the 1934
Act. Nonetheless, most of the direct discussion of that issue is reserved for
Part 111.
A. Categorize the Issue
Central Bank first requires a determination of whether a scope of conduct
issue or an elements of liability issue is presented.
1. Scope of Conduct Issue
a. General Discussion
As shall soon be explained, the availability of respondeat superior liability
presents, in the Supreme Court's taxonomy, an elements of liability issue rather
than a scope of conduct issue. However, Fischel has seemingly assumed that
the respondeat superior doctrine relates to scope of conduct and, based on that
assumption, has argued in favor of its abolition that scienter is a requisite
element of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability75 based on the Supreme
Court's holding in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.76 From that holding, Fischel
argued that respondeat superior liability, along with other forms of secondary
liability, must disappear. 77 This argument must be taken particularly seriously,
because, as noted earlier, the Central Bank opinion cited Fischel's article three
separate times. 78
Nonetheless, there are several reasons to reject Fischel's argument. First,
as noted above and as will be explained in the next section, different questions
are being addressed. That is, to the extent that the somewhat artificial
75 See id. at 193.
76 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
77 Fischel, supra note 11, at 102-11.
78 Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 169, 184,
191 (1994); see also supra note 12.
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distinction between these two categories of issues is maintained, scienter is
actually a scope of conduct issue while respondeat superior presents an
elements of liability issue. 79
Second, the defendant in Hochfelder, as in other Supreme Court cases
involving section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, including Central Bank, was a firm.
Never did the Supreme Court point out that the firm itself did not and could not
act with scienter. The Court's opinion simply assumed that the defendant
accounting firm was liable for any violations by its employees and the key
question was whether the employees acted with scienter or merely with
negligence. Properly read, Hochfelder simply holds that accounting firms will
not be liable for the mere negligence of their employees. In no way, shape, or
form does it hint that accounting firms may escape respondeat superior liability
for the intentional fraud of their agents. Indeed, it unmistakably assumes to the
contrary.
Third, Fischel himself, in arguing that courts should impose secondary
liability upon firms only when they are controlling persons under section 20(a),
posed a hypothetical situation in which a corporate employee directs a fraud
with the knowledge of the board of directors. Fischel approved of imposing
secondary liability on the corporation after imputing the knowledge of the board
to the firm, thus satisfying the scienter requirement.80 How does one impute the
knowledge of the board to the firm? There's only one way-respondeat
supeior or comparable agency principles. Thus, even Fischel concedes a role
for respondeat superior in the enforcement of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
A basic element of common law negligence is lack of due care,81 yet
careful principals are routinely held liable for their agents' carelessness.82 A
basic element of common law fraud is scienter,83 yet blameless principals are
79 Hochfelder holds that a requisite element of a primary violation of section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 is scienter. So do the rules of common law fraud. Then, under each situation, the
next question should be: Once it is established that a primary violation has occurred, who is
liable for it? Application of the respondeat superior doctrine begins with the assumption that a
primary violation has been established and addresses the different issue of responsibility for
that violation. See Xaphes v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 600 F. Supp.
692, 696 (D. Me. 1985) (holding that principal is liable only if the agent's primary liability is
established and the conditions of respondeat superior are met).
80 Fischel, supra note 11, at 107 n.145.
81 See, e.g., Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army, 55 F.3d 827, 851
(3d Cir. 1995) (applying Pennsylvania law, breach of the duty of due care is an essential
element of a negligence cause of action).
82 See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1229-30 (Cal. 1975) (famous
comparative negligence case); Kumkumian v. City of New York, 111 N.E.2d 865, 869
(N.Y. 1953) (noted last clear chance doctrine case).
83 See, e.g., First Interstate Bank of Billings v. United States, 61 F.3d 876, 880 (Fed.
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routinely held liable for their agents' common law fraud. 84 Anyone contending
that Congress meant anything different when it wrote section 10(b) must carry a
heavy burden to provide clear and specific evidence to support that claim.
Fischel has not done so.
b. General Building Contractors
The Supreme Court itself rejected Fischel's argument in another context. In
General Building Contractors Association v. Pennsylvania,85 the Court held
that section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act,86 like section 10(b), could be violated
only by intentional acts "by purposeful discrimination." 87 The Court was
distinguishing section 1981 from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,88
which recognizes disparate impact cases in addition to intentional discrimination
cases. 89 In holding that section 1981, like the Equal Protection Clause, can be
violated only by intentional discrimination, 90 the Court nonetheless clearly
implied that innocent defendants should be held liable on a respondeat superior
basis for the intentional violations of section 1981 committed by their agents. 91
Although section 1981 contains no express provision for respondeat superior,
since General Building Contractors the lower courts have, sensibly, imposed
section 1981 liability upon innocent principals through the respondeat superior
Cir. 1995) (intent to deceive is an element of the tort of fraud); Kansa Reinsurance Co. v.
Congressional Mtg. Corp., 20 F.3d 1362, 1375 (5th Cir. 1994) (same).
84 See, e.g., Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Strickland, 491 So. 2d 872, 874 (Ala. 1985)
(blameless principal is liable for agent's fraud within the scope of authority); Larsen Chelsey
Realty Co. v. Larsen, 656 A.2d 1009, 1021 (Conn. 1995) (same); McCarthy v. Brockton
Nat'l Bank, 50 N.E.2d 196, 201 (Mass. 1943) (same).
85 458 U.S. 375 (1982).
86 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
87 General Bldg. Contractors, 458 U.S. at 389-91.
88 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
89 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (striking down unjustified
educational requirement carrying disparate racial impact).
90 See Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (neutral
law with disproportionate impact does not violation Equal Protection Clause unless it is traced
to a discriminatory purpose); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977) (mere racially disproportionate impact is insufficient for equal
protection violation).
91 See Flanagan v. A.E. Henry Com. Health Servs. Ctr., 876 F.2d 1231, 1235 (5th Cir.
1989) (General Building Contractors "clearly implied that agency principles will apply if
liability is to be imposed against a defendant under section 1981 for the acts of another.").
However, under the facts of General Building Contractors, no agency relationship existed
between the defendants and the wrongdoers so vicarious liability was not warranted. General
Bldg. Contractors, 458 U.S. at 392-95.
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doctrine notwithstanding the lack of bad intent by the defendants. 92
c. Meritor
A similar situation occurs under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Section 706(g) provides that statutory employers must "intentionally" commit
an "unlawful employment practice" in order to be liable for employment
discrimination. 93 Fischel's argument could be lodged here as well; indeed, it
has been noted that because "employers, in the traditional sense of that term,
are most often corporations that act only through employee agents [and
b]ecause a corporation itself cannot commit an unlawful practice, on one
reading of the section, there can be no corporate liability." 94 Yet the courts
have routinely imposed such liability,95 and the Supreme Court, in Meritor
92 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 8 F.3d 1257, 1263 (10th
Cir. 1995) (applying respondeat superior upon private employer for acts of supervisor);
Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1512 (11th Cir. 1989) (corporate
employer held liable); Springer v. Seaman, 821 F.2d 871, 881 (Ist Cir. 1987) (holding
respondeat superior doctrine available against government employer); Hunter v. Allis-
Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1422 (7th Cir. 1986) (deliberate acts of supervisors imputed
to employer); Mitchell v. Keith, 752 F.2d 385, 388-89 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying respondeat
superior in 1981 suit); EEOC v. Gaddis, 733 F.2d 1373, 1380 (10th Cir. 1984) (same);
Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979) (respondeat superior applies to
private employers); Lewis-Keams v. Mayflower Transit, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 1061, 1069
(N.D. Ill. 1996) (same); Yates v. Hagerstown Lodge No. 212, 878 F. Supp. 788, 798 (D.
Md. 1995) (same); Malone v. Schenk, 638 F. Supp. 423,425 (C.D. ]M1. 1985) (same); United
Bhd. of Carpenters, Local Union 1519 v. Backman Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 598 F. Supp.
212, 220 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (same).
The lower courts have also imposed vicarious liability under related statutes, such as
section 1982, see 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1994) and the Fair Housing Act of 1968, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604 (1994), reasoning that between innocent parties the victim of the discrimination should
prevail over the principal of the wrongdoing agent. See, e.g., Chicago v. Matchmaker Real
Estate Sales Cir., Inc., 982 F.2d 1086, 1096-97 (7th Cir. 1992) (section 1982 and Fair
Housing Act); United States v. Incorporated Village of Island Park, 888 F. Supp. 419, 444
(E.D.N.Y. 1995) (Fair Housing Act); Beliveau v. Caras, 873 F. Supp. 1393, 1401 n.5 (C.D.
Cal. 1995) (Fair Housing Act).
93 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (1994) (providing that a respondent who "has
intentionally engaged in ... an unlawful employment practice" may be subject to remedies
under the act).
94 j. Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability in Employment Discrimination Law, 81 VA. L.
Rnv. 273, 287 (1995).
95 See, e.g., Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (in determining
employer responsibility, court would apply Restatement (Second) on Agency provisions),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 569 (1995); North v. Madison Area Ass'n for Retarded Citizens-
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Savings Bank v. Vinson,96 instructed the lower courts to use respondeat
superior and other agency principles to flesh out the liability rules for Title
VII. 97 It did so notwithstanding the fact that the language of Title VII does not
refer to vicarious liability and that the legislative history provides only vague
support for its application. 98
d. Monell
As weak as Fischel's scienter argument is, there is indirect precedent for it
in a completely unrelated area. In Monell v. Department of Social Services,99
the Supreme Court held for the first time that municipalities could be liable
under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.100 Simultaneously, the
Court held that such municipalities could not be liable on a respondeat superior
basis. Instead, they could be liable only when the municipality "under color of
some official policy, 'causes' an employee to violate another's constitutional
rights." 101 The Court stated:
What language cannot be easily read to impose liability vicariously on
governing bodies solely on the basis of the existence of an employer-employee
relationship with a tortfeasor. Indeed, the fact that Congress did specifically
provide that A's tort became B's liability if B "caused" A to subject another to
Developmental Ctrs. Corp., 844 F.2d 401, 407 (7th Cir. 1988) (employer may be held
vicariously liable for supervisor's acts if discrimination of those acts are within the apparent
scope of authority); Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277, 1282 (7th Cir. 1977)
(employer held liable for any discrimination by employee supervisor); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 864 F. Supp. 1552, 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (plaintiff may prove respondeat
superior either directly or indirectly).
Some cases hold that there are two types of vicarious liability under Title VII: (1) strict
liability for conduct of supervisory employees acting within the scope of their actual or
apparent authority; and (2) negligence liability for acts of employees who are merely co-
workers. See, e.g., Hinton v. Methodist Hosp., Inc., 779 F. Supp. 956, 962 (N.D. Ind.
1991). This is consistent with respondeat superior principles because the co-workers who
sexually harass their peers are clearly not acting within the scope of either actual or apparent
authority.
96 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
97 Id. at 72 ("Congress wanted courts to look to agency principles for guidance in this
area.").
98 See Michael J. Phillips, Employer Sexual Harassment Liability Under Agency
Principles: A Second Look at Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 44 VAND. L. REv.
1229, 1258-62 (1991).
99 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
100 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
101 Monell, 436 U.S. at 692.
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a tort suggests that Congress did not intend Sec. 1983 liability to attach where
such causation was absent. 102
Parallels between Fischel's scienter argument and Monell's causation
argument are apparent. However, Monell is easily distinguishable. First, the
Supreme Court stressed the language of section 1983, which is, naturally, quite
different than the language of section 10(b). 10 3 Section 1983 expressly requires
that the person being held liable act under the color of some official policy.
Most tortfeasors employed by municipalities do not so act. If they do act under
official policy, then the municipality is held liable under the "final authority"
doctrine that evolved after Monell. Under this doctrine, a form of liability that
seems to parallel respondeat superior is imposed upon municipalities whenever
the acts of their tortfeasing employees result from a decision made by a
municipal official with final authority to make such decisions. 104 Thus, when a
police officer commits an illegal search, the municipality is liable on an agency
basis if the police officer is following the orders of a municipal official with
"final authority" to authorize such searches and seizures or if the officer is
acting consistently with customary police practices, even if unauthorized, in that
municipality.105
Second, the Supreme Court found in the legislative history of section 1983
clear evidence that Congress rejected elements of vicarious liability by rejecting
a draft that expressly contained such elements and replacing it with another.106
There is no such evidence in the legislative history of section 10(b). 107
Third, and of surpassing importance, the Monell majority believed that
there were constitutional problems involved in imposing liabilities upon bodies
102 Id.
103 Section 1983 reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
104 See City of St. Louis v. Prapotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 122-23 (1988) (plurality opinion).
105 See Steven E. Comer, Note, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: The Rationale
Underlying the FinalAuthority Doctrine, 44 VAND. L. REv. 341,344 (1991).
106 See Monell, 436 U.S. at 692 n.57.
107 No draft of the 1934 Act addressed respondeat superior liability one way or the
other. Its availability was, it appears, simply assumed. See infra notes 208-26.
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of state government that have an obligation to keep the peace. 10 8 Those
constitutional considerations are irrelevant to section 10(b).
Finally, it should be stressed that although the Supreme Court, probably
erroneously, 109 purported to eliminate respondeat superior under section 1983
on the basis of considerations of constitutionality, statutory language, and
legislative history not relevant to section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, the Court could
not bring itself to undermine completely this form of vicarious liability that is so
basic to Western tort law. Therefore, while pretending to eliminate respondeat
superior, the Supreme Court clearly retained it in a limited form with its "final
authority" rule. A municipality does not issue orders carrying "final authority";
its agents do.110 So, the "final authority" rule turns out to be not a substitute for
respondeat superior liability, but simply an artificially constructed limitation
upon it comparable to the common law's "scope of authority" requirement. A
municipality remains liable on a respondeat superior basis for the acts of certain
agents, but not for the acts of others. The artificial nature of the distinction has
created extreme confusion in the lower courts and caused the doctrine to be
heavily criticized."'
In summary, Fischel's argument based on the scienter requirement has
already been rejected by the Supreme Court in many other settings and should
not carry any persuasive power relating to section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
108 See Monell, 436 U.S. at 693.
109 Kramer and Sykes, among others, have lodged persuasive arguments that the
Supreme Court's two primary rationales in Monell, both that based on the language of section
1983 and that based on the legislative history, were fatally flawed. See Larry Kramer & Alan
0. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 1987
Sup. Cr. REv. 249, 255-61; see also Karen M. Blum, From Monroe to Monell: Defining the
Scope of Municipal Liability in Federal Courts, 51 TEMP. L. Q. 409, 413 n.15 (1978)
(arguing that section 1983's legislative history clearly indicates that Congress intended to
impose vicarious liability); Randall R. Steichen, Comment, Municipal Liability Under Section
1983 for Civil Rights Wolations After Monell, 64 IowA L. REv. 1032, 1052 (1979)
("[L]anguage in section 1983 also indicates that Congress intended to hold municipalities
liable for the actions of their employees on a theory closely related, if not identical, to the
doctrine of respondeat superior.").
110 See Kramer & Sykes, supra note 109, at 253:
The problem [with the "final authority" rule] is that municipal action is always-
can only be-carried out by persons employed by the municipality. Municipal liability is
necessarily vicarious, and there is no such thing as "policy" that can make a municipality
directly rather than vicariously responsible for a constitutional tort. "Policy" is merely a
conclusion about which activities by which municipal employees should be vicariously
attributed to the municipality for purposes of Sec. 1983.
111 See infra note 433.
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2. Elements of Liability Issue
Contrary to Fischel's assumption, the availability of respondeat superior
liability really presents an elements of liability issue. Aiding and abetting is a
cause of action that requires a definition of its scope; respondeat superior is a
tort doctrine that allocates loss based on policy considerations.11 2 In malking a
decision whether or not to apply vicarious liability, a court does not attempt to
define the conduct that violates section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Rather, given that
a violation of Rule lOb-5 (and, therefore, necessarily of section 10(b) as well)
has occurred, the courts try to answer the question: Where should the loss lie?
Matters relating to scienter and aiding and abetting are scope of conduct issues
because direct liability and aiding and abetting liability focus primarily upon the
relationship that the defendant has with the plaintiff. However, respondeat
superior and controlling person liability arise out of the relationship that the
defendant has with the primary wrongdoer. Aiding and abetting focuses on the
defendant's conduct; respondeat superior liability turns on the defendant's
status. Therefore, the respondeat superior matter is properly characterized as an
elements of liability issue.113
As examples of elements of liability questions, the Central Bank majority" 4
included issues relating to the proper statute of limitations,1 15 the existence of a
right to contribution,11 6 the existence of a reliance requirement," 7 and the
112 See Goodwin, supra note 14, at 1417 n.159 (citing W. PAGE KEErON, Er AL.,
PROssER AND KEEToN ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69, at 499-500 (5th ed. 1984)); see also
Miller, supra note 14, at 934:
Unlike aiding and abetting and conspiracy, respondeat swerior does not involve a
question of the scope of conduct prohibited under section 10(b). Rather, the principle of
respondeat superior is "a legal maxim that imposes liability on one if another in their
relationship has committed a violation of a certain code of conduct."
Id.
113 See In re Lake States Commodities, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 1461, 1468 (N.D. 111. 1996)
(drawing the same distinction under the Commodities Exchange Act: "respondeat superior is
merely a means of imputing the liability of an agent to its principal; in contrast, the plaintiffs
here ask us to recognize a private cause of action that reaches all who merely aid or abet a
CEA violator.").
114 Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 172
(1994).
115 Id. (citing Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350,
355 (1991)).
1 16 Id. (citing Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286,
290-94 (1993)).
1 17 Id. (citing Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-49 (1988)).
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availability of an in part delicto defense.118 The issue of contribution arises in
cases where violations have been established and the question becomes where
the loss should lie. The statute of limitations becomes an issue where violations
have been established or assumed, and the question becomes whether the loss
should be left with plaintiffs because they were tardy in filing suit.1 19
Respondeat superior becomes an issue in similar circumstances (after a
violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is established or assumed) and
answers similar questions (regarding where the loss caused by the violation
should lie). 120
To return to the contribution comparison, rules of contribution answer the
question: Between two guilty parties, where should the loss lie? Respondeat
superior and other agency theories address the question: Between two innocent
parties, the unknowing principal and the defrauded plaintiff, where should the
loss lie?
Thus, to return to Fischel's scienter argument posed above, one author
made the point several years ago that:
[A]pparent authority and respondeat superior are simply means for allocating
loss between two innocent parties. Seen in this light, agency theories should not
be operative in determining whether a securities violation was committed, but
rather, should function only to allocate loss after the initial finding of violation
has been made. 121
Ultimately, it probably matters little as to which side is more persuasive in
this little debate-within-a-debate. The Central Bank majority drew this artificial
boundary in order to stress the point that although resolution of questions falling
in the second category (elements of liability) requires the Court "'to infer how
118 Id. (citing Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 315-19
(1985)).119 See generally Christopher R. Leslie, Den of Inequity: The Case for Equitable
Doctrines in Rde 1Ob-5 Cases, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1587, 1590-91 (1993) (explaining various
policy grounds for allowing guilty defendant to escape liability on statute of limitations
defense).
120 The same parallels can be drawn between respondeat superior liability and the other
two specific examples given by the Supreme Court-reliance and the in pari delicto defense.
Both become an issue after a Rule lOb-5 violation is established, and both address the
question of where the loss caused by the violation should lie. In Basic, 485 U.S. at 243, the
Supreme Court held, in part, that the injury caused by defendant's Rule lOb-5 violation must
remain with plaintiff if plaintiff cannot prove reliance. In Bateman, 472 U.S. at 306-11, the
Supreme Court held, in part, that an injury caused by defendant's Rule lOb-5 violation must
remain with plaintiff if plaintiff helped create the violation.
121 j. Michael Gottesman, Brokers, Derivative Liability: Does Supervision Make a
Difference?, 41 BROOK. L. REv. 181, 207 (1974).
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the 1934 Congress would have addressed the issue[s] had the 10b-5 action been
included as an express provision in the 1934 Act,"' 122 questions in the first
category (scope of conduct) are answered solely by the text of the statute. 123
Nonetheless, in deciding the first category issue presented in Central Bank, the
Court did what it normally does, and should do, in such cases-pay lip service
to the controlling nature of the statutory language and then proceed to (a)
attempt to infer what the 1934 Congress would have wanted by analyzing other
provisions in the 1934 Act, (b) examine evidence of legislative intent, 124 and (c)
discuss policy implications.
Central Bank implies that there is no need to look at the language of the
statute in an elements of liability issue, presumably because there will be no
guidance there.12 5 This conclusion, however, is clearly erroneous. The
language of the statute can give useful guidance as to both types of issues, as
the next section's discussion illustrates.
B. Statutory Language
It is now a given that statutory language is "[t]he starting point in every
case involving construction of a statute."1 26 The Central Bank majority began
its analysis by noting that nothing in the language of section 10(b) mentions
aiding and abetting, a fact that "bode[d] ill" for plaintiffs. 127 Similarly, the
words respondeat superior do not appear in section 10(b). However, further
analysis of the text of section 10(b) is revealing.
1. "Directly or Indirectly"
Section 10(b) initially provides that it is unlawful for any person "directly
or indirectly" to engage in the prohibited fraudulent or manipulative acts. What
meaning is to be accorded the words "directly or indirectly"? One plausible
122 Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 173 (quoting Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins.
of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 294 (1993)).
123 See id. at 177.
124 For example, in his study of the Supreme Court's use of legislative history in
interpreting the federal securities laws, Quinn found that the Court used legislative history in
both Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991) (for
"ornamental" purposes) and in Basic, 485 U.S. at 245-46 (for substantive purposes). Quinn,
supra note 58, at 266, 269.
125 See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 173.
126 Id. (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976), which quotes
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
127 Id. at 175.
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argument is that these words indicate that Congress meant to reach not only
those who personally commit the fraudulent acts, but also their principals who
act "indirectly" through the wrongdoing agents. Agency principles such as
respondeat superior would be a natural mechanism for reaching those
principals.
The majority opinion in Central Bank indicates that the Supreme Court will
not necessarily accept this interpretation. Although Central Bank never assigned
a meaning to the words "directly or indirectly," leaving open the possibility that
the majority Justices might support a respondeat superor theory, it did make
clear the majority's belief that aiding and abetting was not covered by stating
that "[t]he problem, of course, is that aiding and abetting liability extends
beyond persons who engage, even indirectly, in a proscribed activity; aiding
and abetting liability reaches persons who do not engage in the proscribed
activities at all, but who give a degree of aid to those who do." 128
Reworded to fit the respondeat superior issue, the Central Bank majority
opinion might read that "the problem, of course, is that respondeat superior
liability extends beyond persons who engage, even indirectly, in a proscribed
activity; respondeat superior liability reaches persons who do not engage in the
proscribed activities at all, but who are merely principals of those who do."
The logic of Central Bank does indeed seem to argue for elimination of
respondeat superior liability. The difficulty for anyone maling this argument,
of course, is that it leaves the words "or indirectly" completely devoid of
meaning, which is hardly proper statutory construction. 129 The Central Bank
majority announced what "or indirectly" does not mean, but did not hint at
what it does mean. 130 Central Bank of Denver's reply brief did in fact argue
that the "indirectly" language was simply Congress's method of making
corporations responsible for the actions of their agents, 131 and Justice Breyer
128 Id. at 176.
129 Cy. American Textile Mfr. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 513 (1981) (noting
"well-settled rule that all parts of a statute, if possible, are to be given effect"); Association of
Bituminous Contractors, Inc. v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 853, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (interpreting
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 in a way that gave meaning to the terms
"lessee" and "owner") (citing 2A JABEZ GRIDLEY SurERLAND, STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTON, § 46.06 (4th ed. 1973)).
130 A second reason that the Central Bank majority rejected the "directly or indirectly"
argument is that there are other provisions of the 1934 Act that use the term in a way that
does not necessarily impose aiding and abetting liability, so its use in section 10(b) does not
do so either. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 176 (citing various sections of the 1934 Act: 15
U.S.C. § 78g(f(2)(C) (1994); 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b)(2)-(3) (1994); 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)
(1994); 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1994); 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1994)). This argument is not directly
relevant to the respondeat superior issue.
131 See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 2, Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank
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took the same view when he sat on the First Circuit. 132 Although there is no
direct evidence that this is the case, if one eliminates the possibility, as the
Central Bank majority did, that the "or indirectly" language refers to aiding and
abetting liability, then respondeat superior is the most plausible remaining
explanation for Congress's inclusion of these words in section 10(b).1 33
Fischel has suggested that a plausible interpretation of the "or indirectly"
language is that it can be used to impose liability upon a defendant even though
that defendant does not himself use the jurisdictional means, such as mailing a
letter in interstate commerce 134 In so doing, he cited Professor Jacobs's treatise
on Rule 10b-5.135 Fischer and Jacobs both buried this purported interpretation
in footnotes, perhaps because the phrase "directly or indirectly" clearly
modifies subsection (b)'s "[t]o use or employ.., any manipulative or
deceptive device" language. 136 The drafters clearly meant the words "by use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails" as a
second modifier that also modifies the "to use or employ" language. 137 By any
careful reading, the first modifier ("directly or indirectly") modifies the
provision's main language ("[t]o use or employ"); it does not modify the
second modifier ("by the use of... interstate commerce").
2. "Person"
One term in the text of section 10(b) that was not discussed in Central Bank
is the word "person." The statute prohibits any "person" from committing
fraudulent or manipulative acts. Why is that important? The word "person" is
defined for purposes of the 1934 Act in section 3(a)(9) to include any
of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 172 (1994) (No. 92-854).
132 In re Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc., 784 F.2d 29, 32 (1st Cir. 1986) ("There are
strong reasons for believing that the 'direct or indirect' language of the Securities Act
encompasses this kind of common law agency liability.").
133 See Musewicz, supra note 7, at 778 ("A reasonable interpretation... is that an
employer who employs someone who commits a securities fraud in violation of the 1934 Act
has indirectly violated Rule l0b-5.").
134 Fischel, supra note 11, at 94 n.83.
135 ARNOLD S. JACOBS, THE IMPACt OF RULE 1OB-5, § 3.02(f n.33 (1980).
136 15 U.S.C. § 78j(1)(b) (1994).
137 Of course adverbs are often used to modify other adverbs. H. RAhiSEY FOWLER,
THE L= E BROWN HANDBOOK 198 (2d ed. 1983). However, if Congress had intended
"directly or indirectly" to modify "by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce," it probably would have worded the provision in the following fashion: It shall be
unlawful for any person by the use, directly or indirectly, of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce.
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"company." 138 A company is an artificial entity. 139 It has no "soul to damn"
nor "pants to kick." 140 It cannot physically commit fraudulent or manipulative
acts. It can be liable only on a respondeat superior or some other agency basis
for the fraudulent and manipulative acts of its agents. 141 In so defining this
term, Congress clearly indicated that artificial entities can be liable under
section 10(b) and other 1934 Act provisions.' 42 By using the word "person"
and defining that word to include "company," Congress necessarily put its
stamp of approval upon use of respondeat superior liability and related agency
theories in section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 cases. 143 The presence of the term
"person" was irrelevant to the Central Bank inquiry regarding aiding and
abetting liability, but it provides a powerful argument for respondeat superior
liability. In other words, there is no reason why an inquiry regarding one form
of secondary liability (aiding and abetting) need lead to the same result
regarding a different form of secondary liability (respondeat superior).
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. A & P Trucking Co.144
138 See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (1981).
139 "Company" is defined as "[ulsually, but not necessarily, a corporation, since the
word is inclusive of natural persons; a union of two or more persons for business; a
partnership; a corporation; an association; a joint stock company." BALLEmNE's LAW
DICTIONARY 232 (3d ed. 1969). Thus, the term "company" can include natural persons, but
more typically refers to artificial entities.
140 H.L. MENcKEN, A NEw DICrIONARY OF QUOTAnONS ON HISTORICAL PRINciPI.Es
FROM ANCIENT AND MODERN SOURCES 223 (1942) ("A corporation is a legal fiction [with] no
pants to kick or soul to damn and, by God, it ought to have both!").
141 In an earlier article, see Prentice, supra note 17, at 6, the author assumed that when
a company was held liable for a fraudulent statement issued in its name that its liability was
"primary," as distinguished from the "secondary" liability of aiding and abetting. The
distinction drawn between the primary liability discussed in that article and aiding and abetting
liability is based on conduct. The usage of "primary" is similar to that of the court in Holmes
v. Bateson, 583 F.2d 542 (Ist Cir. 1978).
However, it is impossible for a company that does not exist in physical reality to issue
any statement. Its liability is, of necessity, secondary liability that arises from its status as
principal of the wrongdoing agents. Failure to distinguish between these two concepts of
"secondary" liability can cause confusion. See Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175,
182 n.8 (3d Cir. 1981).
142 In re Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc., 784 F.2d 29, 33 (1st Cir. 1986) ("by explicitly
including corporations in its definition of 'person,'. . . the statute seems to foresee that
corporations will be held liable").
143 See SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 812 (2d Cir. 1975)
("Congress evidently intended that a corporation might be liable in some instances as a
'person'; and this can only be by virtue of agency principles, since a corporation can act only
through its agents.").
144 358 U.S. 121 (1958).
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provides useful guidance. In that case, two partnerships were charged with
violations of a statute that made it criminal knowingly to violate ICC regulations
for the safe transportation of "explosives and other dangerous articles,"
1 45 just
as section 10(b) makes it a civil violation knowingly to violate SEC rules. In
response to the claim that partnerships could not "knowingly" violate any
provision, the Supreme Court pointed out that, as in the 1934 Act, Congress in
the Motor Carrier Act defined "person" to include a "copartnership" and held
that this clearly indicated that Congress intended organizations such as
partnerships to be held criminally liable:
It is argued that the words "knowingly" and "knowingly and willfully" by
implication eliminate partnerships from the coverage of the statutes, because a
partnership, as opposed to its individual partners, cannot so act. But the same
inability so to act in fact is true, of course, with regard to corporations and
other associations; yet it is elementary that such impersonal entities can be
guilty of "knowing" or "willfil" violations of regulatory statutes through the
doctrine of respondeat superior. 146
Thus, although the business entity could not truly violate the law in a
"knowing" way, Congress's decision to define a "person" potentially liable
under the act to include "copartnerships" meant that the partnership could be
held liable on a respondeat superior basis "quite apart from the participation
and knowledge of the partners as individuals." 147 The strong parallels to A & P
Trucking virtually mandate a similar outcome in the section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5 setting.148
Even the Central Bank majority opinion noted, albeit indirectly, that
respondeat superior liability is appropriate in a post-Central Bank world:
The absence of See. 10(b) aiding and abetting liability does not mean that
secondary actors in the securities markets are always free from liability under
the securities Acts. Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or
bank, who employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement
(or omission) [may be liable if all elements of a Rule lOb-5 claim are
present]. 149
Again, such artificial creatures as "entities" or "banks" can be liable only
145 Id. at 121-22 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 835 (1948)).146 Id. at 125 (second emphasis added) (citations omitted).
147 Id. at 126-27.
148 The Court's holding in A & P Trucking clearly deals yet another blow to Fischel's
claim that Hochfelder's scienter requirement is inconsistent with imposition of respondeat
superior liability. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
149 Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191 (emphasis added).
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on a respondeat superior or some other agency basis given that they do not exist
in physical reality to defraud or manipulate. Respondeat superior liability must
exist for this part of the Supreme Court's opinion to make any sense.
SEC interpretations regarding a statute it is charged with administering are
entitled to deference, 150 and the SEC has long applied respondeat superior
under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.1 51 More importantly, the Supreme Court
itself has repeatedly decided section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 cases where the
defendants were entities that could be held liable only on agency principles.
Examples of such cases include the accounting firms in Hochfelder152 and
Huddleston;153 the law firms in Musick, Peeler1 54 and Gilbertson;155 the stock
brokerage firm in Bateman, Eichler;156 the insurance company in Bankers Life
& Casualty;157 the miscellaneous corporations in Blue Chip Stamps,158 Santa
Fe Industries,159 and Basic;160 and the banks in Affiliated Ute161 and in Central
Bank itself. In Affiliated Ute, for example, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he
liability of the bank, of course, is coextensive with that of [its agents] Gale and
Haslem," 162 again enunciating the viability of the respondeat superior
theory. 163
150 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843-45 (1984) (holding that courts should defer to agencies' interpretations of the
statutes they administer if (i) the statutory language does not definitively decide the issue, and
(ii) the agency's interpretation is not manifestly unreasonable. This approach is now known as
the "Chevron doctrine," but it predated that decision as a simple rule of statutory
construction.). See 2A C. DALLAS SANDS, SUTImRLAND STATUToRY CoNsTRucnoN § 49.05
(4th ed. 1973). The Supreme Court paid this doctrine scant attention in the Central Bank case,
see Stem, supra note 23, at 27-28, but had followed it in earlier securities cases involving the
Investment Company Act. See United States v. National Ass'n of See. Dealers, Inc., 422
U.S. 694, 719 (1975); E.I. duPont de Nemours v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 54-55 (1967).
151 See, e.g., Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961); H.F. Schroeder & Co.,
27 S.E.C. 833, 837 (1948).
152 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
153 Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
154 Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286 (1993).
155 Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
156 Bateman Eicher, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Bemer, 472 U.S. 299 (1985).
157 Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
158 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
159 Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
160 Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
161 Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
162 Id. at 154.
163 In Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 409-14 (1962), the Supreme Court assumed the
applicability of agency principles for imposing liability under another 1934 Act provision,
section 16(b), but did not find the factual requisites to be present in that case. See 15 U.S.C.
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One might, of course, argue that the respondeat superior issue was not
directly raised by any of the parties in those cases, but there are two obvious
rejoinders. First, the fact that the issue was not raised in any of those cases
indicates that the availability of respondeat superior liability is so logical and so
natural that it has been presumed with little question. 164 Second, the Supreme
Court demonstrated in Central Bank itself that it is fully capable of changing
law that it dislikes regardless of whether or not the parties raised the issue
themselves.165
C. Analogous Statutory Provisions
Whether the respondeat superior question is an elements of liability issue,
where analysis begins with an attempt to infer what the 1934 Congress would
have intended, or a scope of conduct issue, where analysis begins and
theoretically ends with statutory interpretation (but inevitably proceeds further),
the next stage for this Article is to explore analogous securities law provisions
in an attempt to "infer 'how the 1934 Congress would have addressed the issue
had the lOb-5 action been included as an express provision in the 1934
Act.' 166
In undertaking this examination to establish the elements of liability for the
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 cause of action, the Supreme Court in Musick,
Peeler set out the following three goals: (1) "to ensure the action does not
conflict with Congress' own express rights of action," 167 (2) "to promote
clarity, consistency, and coherence for those who rely upon, or are subject to,
lOb-5 liability," 168 and (3) "to effect Congress' objectives in enacting the
§ 78p(b) (1981).164 See supra notes 41-42.
165 As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent,
instead of simply addressing the questions presented by the parties, on which the law
really was unsettled, the Court sua sponte directed the parties to address a question on
which even the petitioner justifiably thought the law was settled, and reaches out to
overturn a most considerable body of precedent.
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 194-95 (1994)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
166 Id. at 178 (quoting Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508
U.S. 286, 294 (1993)).167 Musick, Peeler, 508 U.S. at 295 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
210 (1976)).
168 Id. (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737-744 (1975)).
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securities laws."' 169 This section examines the statutory scheme with these
objectives in mind.
1. Conflict with Congress's Own Express Rights of Action
The most obvious question in this area is whether recognition of respondeat
superior liability under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 would conflict with section
20(a)'s controlling person provision. It clearly would if section 20(a) is to be the
sole means of imposing secondary liability under the 1934 Act. That critical
issue is reserved for flil discussion in Part III. Here, analysis focuses upon
other relevant express liability provisions.
The Central Bank majority concluded that because the express causes of
action in the 1933 and 1934 Acts did not explicitly impose aiding and abetting
liability, Congress would not have done so with section 10(b) either.' 70
However, the tale is quite different regarding respondeat superior liability. For
example, section 9(a) of the 1934 Act imposes liability upon any "person" who
manipulates stock prices.' 71 Section 18(a) imposes liability upon any "person"
who makes misleading statements in filed documents. 172 Because for both
provisions the term "person" is defined in section 3(a)(9) as including
companies that can be liable only on an agency basis, it appears that Congress
in 1934 did impose respondeat superior liability under these other provisions.
Therefore, one may infer that had they had the option, the 1934 senators and
representatives would have intended respondeat superior liability to apply in an
express section 10(b) cause of action. 173
Respondeat superior liability has been routinely applied in both section
9(a)174 and section 18(a)175 over the years, as well as under the express liability
169 Id. (citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977)).
17 0 See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 179.
171 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1981).
172 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1981).
173 Admittedly this argument entails some bootstrapping based on the arguments made in
Part II(B)(2). See supra notes 138-65 and accompanying text.
174 See, e.g., Sennott v. Rodman & Renshaw, 474 F.2d 32, 37-38 (7th Cir. 1973)
(defendant brokerage firm would be held liable for section 9(a) violation on agency principles
had wrongdoer had real or apparent authority, but he did not); R.J. Koeppe & Co. v. SEC,
95 F.2d 550, 552-53 (7th Cir. 1938) (brokerage firm enjoined for section 9(a) violation).
175 See, e.g., Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 551-52 (2d Cir. 1979)
(corporation held potentially liable under section 18(a)); SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407
F.2d 453, 457 (2d Cir. 1968) (same); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 788-
89 (2d Cir. 1951) (same); In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Sec. Litig., 416 F. Supp. 161,
191 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (accounting firm held potentially liable).
In many other section 18(a) cases courts exonerated defendants from liability for one
1997] 1359
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
provisions of the 1933 Act. 176 It would be inconsistent to read such liability out
of section 10(b) alone.
2. Clarity, Consistency, and Coherence for Those Who Rely Upon, or
Are Subject to, Rule 10b-5 Liability
Recognition of respondeat superior liability for the section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 cause of action promotes the clarity, consistency, and coherence desired
by the Supreme Court. It does so by conforming the rules of vicarious liability
under these provisions to the practices that are virtually universal in other areas
of Western law.
As noted earlier, the respondeat superior doctrine is ubiquitous in
American law, both state 177 and federal. 178 It is, indeed, widely recognized in
the entire Western legal world because it serves many important purposes of the
law. 179 It is so well affixed in the federal law in general and in the law of
reason or another, but clearly assumed the applicability of respondeat superior liability in
proper circumstances. See, e.g., hz re Penn Central See. Litig., 494 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1974)
(corporate defendant); Lindner Dividend Fund v. Ernst & Young, 880 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mass.
1995) (accounting firm defendant); Kennedy v. Chomerics, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1157 (D.
Mass. 1987) (corporate defendant); Dewitt v. American Stock Transfer Co., 433 F. Supp.
994 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (corporate defendant); Rich v. Touche Ross & Co., 415 F. Supp. 95
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (accounting firm defendant); Weisfeld v. Spartans Indus., 58 F.R.D. 570
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (retail store operator defendant). In none of these cases did any court hint
that a corporation would not be responsible for the fraudulent acts of its employees or that an
accounting firm would not be responsible for the fraudulent acts of its auditors.
176 See infra notes 350-59 and accompanying text.
177 See, e.g., Arbour v. Jenkins, 903 F.2d 416, 422 (6th Cir. 1990) (applying Michigan
law, principal is responsible for intentional acts of agent within scope of employment);
Hedges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991) (principal is liable for
agent's intentional torts); Effort Enterprises, Inc. v. Crosta, 391 S.E.2d 477, 479 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1990) (same); Country Roads, Inc. v. Witt, 737 S.W.2d 362, 364 (Tex. App. 1987)
(principal is liable for punitive damages generated by agent's fraud).
178 See Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118 (5th
Cir. 1980) ("Limiting secondary liability under the 1934 Act to that liability provided by
section 20(a) would contradict the pervasive application of agency principles in nearly all
other areas of the law."); see also Barbara Black, Application of Respondeat Superior
Principles to Securities Fraud Claims Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), 24 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 825, 837 (1984) ("There is a general
judicial acceptance for applying common law agency principles to federal statutes.").
179 Professor Conard has recently charted the "triumph" of respondeat superior in the
legal systems of the Western world. See Alfred F. Conard, Enterprise Liability and Insider
Trading, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 913, 915-17 (1992) [hereinafter Conard, Enterprise
Liability].
1360 [Vol. 58:1325
CONCEIVING THE INCONCEIVABLE
securities specifically that Professor Conard noted the startling peculiarity of a
provision of the Insider Trading Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988,180
which provided that employers would not be liable for insider trading offenses
of their employees if they acted in good faith and did not induce the
violation.181 This provision struck a discordant note because it "rejected not
only the rules of liability that most federal courts had applied under the
principal securities Acts, but also a centuries-old tradition of the common law of
torts." 182 Any attempt to eliminate respondeat superior liability under section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 should be just as disquieting.
The Supreme Court has faced a nearly identical issue in construing the
antitrust laws. Those laws also do not explicitly provide for respondeat superior
liability, yet the Court held in American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc.
v. Hydrolevel Corp.'83 that agency principles are applicable because "[tihe
apparent authority theory has long been the settled rule in the federal
system,"'1 84 citing at least two securities law cases in so ruling. 185 The Court so
ruled in a particularly unappealing setting where (a) defendant was a nonprofit
organization, 186 (b) the antitrust law's punitive treble damages provision was
applicable,' 8 7 and (c) the agent's act did not benefit the principal in any way. 188
Corporations, law firms, accounting firms, and underwriting firms would
be surprised, though no doubt pleased, to learn that although they are liable for
the torts of their agents under common law, under most nonsecurities federal
statutes, and under virtually all other federal securities provisions, strangely
they are not liable for the torts of their agents under section 10(b) or Rule lOb-
5. Such an incongruity would be shocking.
Those who rely upon section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to protect them from
securities fraud would be similarly startled by such a state of affairs. They rely
upon the doctrine of respondeat superior to impose liability upon the employers
of the agents with whom they deal under the common law, under other federal
statutes, and under other federal securities laws. Why, they might well wonder,
180 Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988).
181 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(b)(3) (1994).
182 Conard, Enterprise Liability, supra note 179, at 913.
183 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
184Id. at 567.
185 Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690, 695 (6th Cir. 1976) ("The Securities Acts
were not intended to preempt the operation of the doctrine of respondeat superior in a case
involving unlawful activities of a brokerage firm's employees."); Kerbs v. Fall River Indus.,
Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 741 (10th Cir. 1974) (holding company liable for the fraud of its principal
officer on grounds of apparent authority).
186 Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 558 (nonprofit defendant).
187 Id. at 574-76 (applying punitive treble damages).
188 Id. at 573-74 (benefit principal).
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should there be an exception under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5? No logical
reason appears.
In its discussion of analogous statutory provisions, the Central Bank
majority did make the point that reliance is an important element of Rule 10b-5
recovery and plaintiffs should not be allowed to recover from a mere aider and
abettor upon whose statements or actions they did not rely.189 This argument,
however, carries no weight in the respondeat superior context. Because of the
universal and long-standing acceptance of the doctrine of respondeat superior in
both the legal and business worlds, plaintiffs do and should be allowed to rely
upon the principals of those who defraud, both in general and in securities cases
specifically.
As will later be developed in more detail, 190 just as a consumer who shops
at Sears relies primarily on the company rather than upon the individual
salesperson with whom the consumer deals, an investor who walks into the
door of Merrill Lynch usually does so in large part because of the reputation of
the firm, rather than the reputation of the individual broker to whom she will be
assigned. When such an investor is defrauded by the individual broker,
naturally she believes that she can hold Merrill Lynch responsible. When an
investor reads a certified financial statement prepared by the employees of a Big
Six accounting firm, she does not rely upon the expertise of the individual
auditors who did the work. Rather, the investor relies upon the reputation for
expertise of the firm itself.
Continued recognition of respondeat superior under section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 serves the consistency value not only in terms of comparisons with
virtually all other areas of the law but also in terms of section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 practice for the past fifty years. As noted, respondeat superior liability
was assumed for approximately thirty years until the Kamen decision.
Thereafter there was some doubt for a while, but the recognition of respondeat
superior liability has been the nearly unanimous rule for some time now.
3. Effecting Congress's Objectives in Enacting the Securities Laws
The primary purposes animating passage of the 1934 Act, particularly its
antifraud provisions such as section 10(b), were elimination of securities fraud
and protection of investors from such fraud. And the words of a statute should
be viewed as containing "'meaning imparted to them by the mischief to be
remedied. "191
189 See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 180-
82(1994).
190 See infra notes 313-21.
191 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 545 (1978) (quoting
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When President Roosevelt sent to Congress the proposed legislation that
eventually evolved into the 1933 and 1934 Acts, he noted: "This is but one step
in our broad purpose of protecting investors and depositors.' 92 After that
proposed legislation had been partially enacted in the form of the 1933 Act, the
President submitted the remainder that became the 1934 Act, stating that he
recommended the legislation "for the protection of investors, for the
safeguarding of values, and, so far as it may be possible, for the elimination of
unnecessary, unwise, and destructive speculation.' 1 93 The primary purpose of
the 1934 Act, as stated in the Senate Report, was to eliminate, to the extent
possible, fraudulent securities transactions. 194 The Supreme Court has often
noted the investor protection policies that indisputably motivated Congress to
pass the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.195
Within the Act, section 10(b) is a broad, remedial statute, 196 and the case
law is clear that it should be flexibly and liberally construed to effectuate its
Duparquet, Huot & Moneuse Co. v. Evans, 297 U.S. 216, 221 (1936)).
192 Federal Securities Act Hearings, supra note 1, at 1 (emphasis added).
193 78 CONG. REc. 2264 (Feb. 9, 1934) (message from the president to the Senate)
(emphasis added).
194 See S. REp. No. 792, 73d Cong., 1-5 (1934); see also Brennan v. Midwestern
United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680 (N.D. Ind. 1966), aff'd 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir.
1969) (1934 Act "is directed toward the creation and maintenance of a post-issuance securities
market that is free from fraudulent practices.").
195 See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Bemer, 472 U.S. 299, 315 (1985)
(noting that objective of securities laws was "protection of the investing public and national
economy through promotion of 'a high standard of business ethics'") (quoting SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462, 475-76 (1977) ("'10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively' and
the statute provides a cause of action for any plaintiff who 'suffer[s] an injury as a result of
deceptive practices touching its sale [or purchase] of securities ... .'") (citations omitted);
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (stating that the main
purpose of the 1934 Act was "'to substitute a philosophy of fll disclosure for the philosophy
of caveat emptor'") (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186
(1963)); Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971);
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (holding that
fundamental purpose of securities laws is "to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the
philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the
securities industry.").
196 See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (observing that section 10(b) is
remedial legislation); McGann v. Ernst & Young, 102 F.3d 390, 396 (9th Cir. 1996)
(Congress had "broad remedial goals" in enacting section 10(b)) (quoting Pinter v. Dabl, 486
U.S. 622, 653 (1988)); Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 739 (10th Cir. 1974)
(same); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 235 (2d Cir.
1974) (same).
1997] 1363
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
compensatory purposes. 197 The obvious purpose for including a section
outlawing the use of manipulative and deceptive devices is to protect investors.
Indeed, Congress explicitly so stated in the very words of section 10(b) when it
predicated a violation of the provision upon the "contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors." 198
Section 10(b) was patterned, in part, upon the common law of fraud and
deceit. 199 Congress's goal in passing the 1934 Act was to ease, not increase, the
burdens of defrauded investors seeking recovery.200 Congress recognized "that
the common law and state legislation afforded the public insufficient protection
against plain fraud both in the issuance of securities and in postissuance
197 See Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12
(1971) (concluding that section 20(b) should receive flexible interpretation); In re American
Continental Corp., 49 F.3d 541, 543 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that section 10(b) should be read
flexibly to effect remedial purposes); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 806 (5th Cir. 1970)
(concluding that section 20(b) should receive flexible interpretation).
Admittedly, the Court has also stated that "generalized references" to the 1934 Act's
remedial purposes will not justify reading section 10(b) more broadly than its language and
the statutory scheme reasonably permit. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560,
578 (1979). However, if one considers the arguments made in this Article from the statutory
language and the statutory scheme, the suggested reading (that respondeat superior is
available) is not only reasonably permitted, it is almost mandated.
198 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court majority left the
words "for the protection of investors" out of the statute when quoting it in Central Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 171 (1994). One cannot help but
wonder whether this omission was deliberate. The rationale for gutting investor protection in
a statute is certainly not strengthened by reminding readers that the statute was passed for the
purpose of protecting investors.
199 See Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 224 (8th Cir. 1975) (noting that
common law fraud concepts undergird securities laws and provide guidance as to their scope
and applications); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855 (2d Cir. 1968)
(observing that section 10(b) should be construed to liberalize the common law in order to
effectuate its remedial purpose).
200 See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Bemer, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985)
(noting that Supreme Court has "eschewed rigid common-law barriers in construing the
securities laws"); Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 224 (8th Cir. 1975) (stating
that Rule lOb-5 offers greater protection to plaintiffs than does the common law of fraud);
Resort Car Rental System, Inc. v. Chuck Ruwart Chevrolet, Inc., 519 F.2d 317, 321 (10th
Cir. 1975) (same); James v. Gerber Products Co., 483 F.2d 944, 946 (6th Cir. 1973)
(concluding that Rule lOb-5 plaintiff does not face same limits to recovery as common law
fraud plaintiff); Kubik v. Goldfield, 479 F.2d 472, 476 n.6 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that to
recover under Rule lOb-5, plaintiffs need not prove all elements of common law fraud); SEC
v. Manor Nursing Ctr., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1096 (2d Cir. 1972) (same).
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trading." 201 The Supreme Court has concluded that Congress intended
provisions such as section 10(b) to "rectify perceived deficiencies in the
available common-law protections, '20 2 and to add to those protections, 20 3 in
part by substituting a philosophy of full disclosure for the old anti-investor
philosophy of caveat emptor.2°4 For that reason, the most liberal, pro-investor
views on the relevant issues should apply.205 Therefore, it is clearly wrong-
headed even to consider construing section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 as less
protective of investors than the common law. Respondeat superior liability was
available in the pre-1934 state common law 20 6 and in pre-1934 state blue sky
cases.207 Therefore, failure to recognize it under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
201 1 Louis Loss & JoEL SEuGMAN, SECURiTrFS REGULATION 27-28 (3d ed. 1989).
202 Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (citing SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)).
203 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244 n.22 (1988) ("Actions under lOb-5
are distinct from common-law deceit and misrepresentation claims... and are in part
designed to add to the protections provided investors by the common law.").
204 See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 171
(1994); Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); McGann
v. Ernst & Young, 102 F.3d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1996).
205 See Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 812 (1983). This
statement is especially true because as Justice Stevens pointed out in his Central Bank dissent:
[S]hortly before the Exchange Act was passed, this Court instructed that such
'remedial" legislation should receive "a broader and more liberal interpretation than that
to be drawn from mere dictionary definitions of the words employed by Congress."
Piedmont & Northern R. Co. v. ICC, 286 U.S. 299, 311 (1932). There is a risk of
anachronistic error in applying our current approach to implied causes of action... to a
statute enacted when courts commonly read statutes of this kind broadly to accord with
their remedial purposes and regularly approved rights to sue despite statutory silence.
Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 195-96.
206 See, e.g., Antinozzi v. A. Vincent Pepe Co., 166 A. 392 (Conn. 1933) (noting
master is liable for agent's torts within scope of authority, even if willful); Trico Coffee Co.
v. Clemens, 151 So. 175 (Miss. 1933) (same); Ciarmataro v. Adams, 176 N.E. 610, 612
(Mass. 1931) (same); Dickerson v. Atlantic Refining Co., 159 S.E. 446 (N.C. 1931) (same);
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Roch, 153 A. 22 (Md. 1931) (same); Johnson v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co., 140 S.E. 443 (S.C. 1927) (same); Son v. Hartford Ice Cream Co., 129
A. 778 (Conn. 1925); American Sec. Co. v. Cook, 176 S.E. 798 (Ga. Ct. App. 1934) (noting
master is liable for agent's torts within scope of authority, even if willful); Gulf, C. & S.F.
Ry. Co. v. Cobb, 45 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) (same).
207 Artificial entities that could be held liable only on a respondeat superior basis were
routinely sued under state civil and criminal securities laws in the 1920s and early 1930s. See,
e.g., People v. George Henriques & Co., 196 N.E. 304 (N.Y. 1935) (corporation); Ward v.
Home Royalty Ass'n, Inc., 50 P.2d 992 (Kan. 1935) (common-law trust); Stevens v. Rayon
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would move the law in exactly the opposite direction than was intended by
Congress, frustrating rather than effectuating Congress's goals in passing the
1934 Act.
D. Congressional Intent and Legislative History
The fourth stage of analysis in Central Bank arose from the respondents'
"broad-based notion of congressional intent." 208 Specifically, it was argued that
Congress passed the 1934 Act with "an understanding of general principles of
tort law and that aiding and abetting liability was 'well established in both civil
and criminal actions by 1934."'209 Therefore, the argument went, it should be
assumed that Congress intended aiding and abetting liability to be part and
parcel of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 liability. The Central Bank majority
rejected this argument on several grounds, most of which do not militate against
respondeat superior liability.
1. Uncertain Applications
First, the majority opinion noted that aiding and abetting had its roots in the
criminal law and even as of today "has been at best uncertain in
application." 210 Assuming the accuracy of this characterization, the contrast
between aiding and abetting on the one hand and respondeat superior on the
other is stark. Although respondeat superior's origins are unclear211 and it may
also have had its roots in the criminal law,212 its availability has been very
certain in Western law for a long time.
Wigmore wrote that as early as the late 1200s in English law the split
between criminal and civil applications of respondeat superior was
anticipated. 213 Most of the English cases that provided the genesis of the
Indus. Corp., 169 A. 717 (N.J. 1934) (corporation); Moos v. Landowners Oil Ass'n, 15 P.2d
1073 (Kan. 1932) (common-law trust); People v. Federated Radio Corp., 154 N.E. 655
(N.Y. 1926) (corporation); Stevens v. Atlantic & Sec. Mut. Ass'n, 166 A. 295 (N.J. Ch.
1933) (nonprofit corporation).
208 Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 180-81.
209 Id. at 181 (citing Brief for SEC at 10).
210 Id.
211 Wigmore traced the doctrine's roots to Germanic law while Holmes purported to
find those same roots in Roman law. Compare John H. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious
Acts: Its History, 7 HARv. L. REv. 315, 330 (1894), with Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., Agency (1),
4 IH-Iv. L. REy. 345, 349-51 (1891). What is more important for present purposes is when
and how concretely the doctrine entered English and American law.
212 See Wigmore, supra note 211, at 330-36.
213 See id. at 335 (Bracton's works indicate that in the late 1200s the master could
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modem respondeat superior doctrine were decided in the late 1600s and early
1700s.2 14 Blackstone expounded upon the doctrine at length in 1765.215
Notwithstanding Holmes's famous broadside upon the doctrine in the late
1800s,2 16 in 1916 Laski was able to note its "universality" 2 17 and in 1923
Smith noted that it was "now irretrievably rooted in the law of the English
speaking countries." 218
exonerate himself from criminal liability for his servant's deeds if he had not commanded the
wrongful act nor consented to it, but civil liability continued without regard to command or
consent).
214 Laski lamented that the doctrine did not have roots back as far as Richard I, but was
able to trace it to 1688. See Harold J. Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J.
105, 106 (1916). The most important early decisions approving vicarious liability were Jones
v. Hart, 90 Eng. Rep. 1255 (1698) (personal injury case) and Hem v. Nichols, 90 Eng. Rep.
1154 (1708) (fraud case). See also Young B. Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REv.
444, 449 (1923) (respondeat superior was well established in English law by 1796).
2 15 Blackstone noted:
As for those things which a servant may do on behalf of his master, they seem all to
proceed upon this principle, that the master is answerable for the act of his servant, if
done by his command, either expressly given, or implied: nam quifacit per al'wn, facit
per se. Therefore, if the servant commit a trespass by the command or encouragement of
his master, the master shall be guilty of it: not that the servant is excused, for he is only
to obey his master in matters that are honest and lawful. If an inn-keeper's servants rob
his guests, the master is bound to restitution: for as there is a confidence reposed in him,
that he will take care to provide honest servants, his negligence is a kind of implied
consent to the robbery; nam, qui non prohibet, cun prohibere possit, jubet. So likewise
if the drawer at a tavern sells a man bad wine, whereby his health is injured, he may
bring an action against the master: for although the master did not expressly order the
servant to sell it to that person in particular, yet his permitting him to draw and sell it at
all is impliedly a general command .... We may observe, that in all the cases here put,
the master may be frequently a loser by the trust reposed in his servant, but never can be
a gainer: he may frequently be answerable for his servant's misbehaviour, but never can
shelter himself from punishment by laying the blame on his agent. The reason of this is
still uniform and the same; that the wrong done by the servant is looked upon in law as
the wrong of the master himself; and it is a standing maxim that no man shall be allowed
to make any advantage of his own wrong.
1 Wuami BLACKSrONE, COMMEENTARIS 429-30, 432 (1765) (quoted in City of Oklahoma
City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 835-36 n.6 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
216 Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., Agency (1]), 5 HARV. L. REv. 1, 14-18, 22 (1891) (arguing
that much of agency law in general and respondeat superior in particular rests upon illogical
and inconsistent legal fictions).
217 Laski, supra note 214, at 111.
218 Smith's entire point was:
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As Justice Stevens has observed, long before 1934 "the doctrine of
respondeat superior was well recognized in the common law of the several
States and in England. ''219 It was firmly established in the federal courts as
well, even in cases of fraud by the agent,220 and it was widely applied in the
cases applying pre-1933 state blue sky laws,221 upon which Congress drew in
framing the federal securities laws.222 Similarly, the federal courts, beginning
in 1909, have applied the doctrine of respondeat superior even in criminal
cases, holding corporations liable for the crimes of their employees. 223
No legal doctrine has been so generally criticized and yet so generally adhered to by
courts as the doctrine of respondeat superior. Not only is it now irretrievably rooted in
the law of the English speaking countries but it also exists to some extent in the law of
Scotland, France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland and other countries.
Smith, supra note 214, at 452-53.
219 City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 835 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220 See, e.g., National City Bank v. Carter, 14 F.2d 940 (6th Cir. 1926) (holding bank
liable for its officer's assistance to swindlers); Kean v. National City Bank, 294 F. 214 (6th
Cir. 1923) (holding bank liable for its officer's theft of securities); Stewart v. Wright, 147 F.
321 (8th Cir. 1906) (holding bank liable when its president and cashier helped swindlers).
221 See supra note 207. In its hearings leading to passage of the 1933 and 1934 Acts,
Congress was provided with a report that clearly indicated that individuals and organizations
were the subjects of state blue sky antifraud statutes. "A Study of the Economic and Legal
Aspects of the Proposed Federal Securities Act," contained in Federal Securities Act
Hearings, supra note 1, at 95 (stating that state officials shall have authority to act "whenever
it shall appear that any individual or organization has engaged in, or is about to engage in,
fraudulent practices in the sale of securities").
222 See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 711 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("The problem of securities fraud was by no means new in 1933,
and many States had attempted to deal with it by enactment of their own 'blue sky' statutes.
When Congress turned to the problem, it explicitly drew from their experience."); SEC v.
Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 123 (1953) (stating that blue sky laws are "the statutory
antecedents of federal securities legislation"); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298
(1946) (using blue sky precedents in order to determine meaning of "investment contract"
term in 1933 Act). See generally Douglas E. Abrams, The Scope of Liability Under Section
12 of the Securities Act of 1933: "Participation" and the Pertinent Legislative Materials, 15
FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 877, 905 (1987) ("The Uniform [Securities] Act and the blue sky laws
remain instructive in 1933 Act interpretation because the initial federal act's drafters and
enactors examined these regulatory antecedents and were influenced by the strengths and
weaknesses they perceived.").
223 The first Supreme Court case establishing this rle was New York Central & Hudson
River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494 (1909). The Court analogized the
criminal liability to tort liability in which respondeat superior was already well-settled. Id. at
493. "It is now well established that in actions for tort the corporation may be held
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2. No General Civil Statute
A second point noted by the Central Bank majority in this connection is that
Congress has not enacted a general civil aiding and abetting statute, so there
exists no "general presumption that the plaintiff may also sue aiders and
abettors." 224 Rather, Congress has enacted aiding and abetting provisions on a
statute-by-statute basis.225
It is, of course, true that Congress has not enacted a general respondeat
superior liability statute either, but the fact remains that respondeat superior
liability is widely recognized throughout both federal statutes in general and the
securities laws specifically. This was the case in 1934226 and remains so today.
This statutory history should be more than sufficient to establish a general
presumption that injured investors may sue the principals of defrauding agents
notwithstanding that no such general statute has been enacted.
responsible for damages for the acts of its agent within the scope of his employment." Id.
The federal courts have repeatedly imposed such vicarious criminal liability in cases
where intent was an element as well as in regulatory offenses. See, e.g., New York Cent. &
Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909); Joplin Mercantile Co. v. United
States, 213 F. 926 (8th Cir. 1914), aff'd 236 U.S. 531 (1915). The agent's scienter is imputed
to the corporation for purposes of imposing such liability just as it is in civil tort cases.
Furthermore, the law recognizes the "collective knowledge" doctrine that imputes to the
corporation the total knowledge of all of its agents and will thereby impose liability upon the
finm when no single one of its agents had sufficient knowledge to fulfill the intent requirement
of the statute. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of New England, NA, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st
Cir. 1987); United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730, 738 (W.D. Va. 1974).
Congress apparently wished to do the same in the 1934 Act because section 32 imposes
criminal penalties upon any "person" who willfully violates any provision of the 1934 Act.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1994). Not only did Congress define "person" to include a "company"
that could act only through its agents and be liable only through respondeat superior in section
3(a)(9), see 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (1994), but it also provided for penalties for situations
"when such person is a person other than a natural person. .. " in section 32(a), see 15
U.S.C. § 78f(a) (1994).
224 Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 182
(1994).
225 Id.
226 See supra notes 220, 223 and accompanying text. Just five years before the 1934 Act
was passed, the Supreme Court held a principal liable under federal common law on a
respondeat superior basis for the fraud of its agent, noting "few doctrines of the law are more
firmly established or more in harmony with accepted notions of social policy than that of the
liability of the principal withont fault of his own." Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co.,
278 U.S. 349, 356 (1929).
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3. Controlling Person Provision
Third, the Central Bank majority noted the "controlling person" provision
of section 20, stating that when Congress wished to create secondary liability it
had no difficulty in doing so. 227 Discussion of this issue is deferred to Part III,
except to note that it can just as persuasively be argued that Congress knows
how to make a form of liability exclusive if it wishes, but did not do so in
section 20. More to the point, given the universal recognition of respondeat
superior liability in all contexts in 1934 and Congress's express provision that
"companies," which can be liable only through respondeat superior or similar
agency theories, are to be liable, these broadsides against aiding and abetting
liability carry little weight when launched against respondeat superior.
4. Uniform Sale of Securities Act
Finally, the Central Bank opinion noted that the 1929 Uniform Sale of
Securities Act ("USSA") contained an express private aiding and abetting cause
of action as did several state blue sky laws, apparently concluding that the
absence of such an express cause of action in the 1934 Act indicates that
Congress consciously chose to omit it.22 8 This is very thin evidence, and its
implications for respondeat superior liability are unclear. The USSA did not
carry an express respondeat superior liability provision, but clearly assumed its
applicability. Like the 1934 Act, the USSA defined "person" to include
corporations and other types of firms that can be held liable only upon agency
principles.22 9 It strongly appears that the drafters of the USSA, like the 1934
Congress, simply assumed the applicability of the nearly universal principle of
respondeat superior liability.
5. Congressional Reenactment
One other subject from this portion of the Central Bank opinion must be
addressed. The Supreme Court often adheres to a previously-established
consistent judicial construction of statutory language when that language has
227 Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 184 (citing Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 650 (1988)).
228 Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 184-85 (citing Abrams, supra note 222, at 945).
229 See UNiI. SALE OF Sac. Acr § 1(2) (1930), reprinted in HANDBOOK OF TBE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMSSIONERS ON UNIFoRM STATE LAws AND PROCEEDINGS
235 (1990). The USSA's antifraud provision, section 16(1), imposed joint and several liability
upon the "person" making sales violating the act and "every director, officer or agent [who]
shall have personally participated or aided in any way in making such a sale." Id.
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been reenacted by Congress. 230 However, no such reenactment had occurred in
Central Bank, and the majority was unconvinced by (a) "oblique references" to
aiding and abetting liability in 1983 and 1988 congressional committee
reports, 231 or (b) Congress's supposed acquiescence in the judicial recognition
of aiding and abetting liability during its various post-1966 amendments to the
securities laws,232 or (c) Congress's failure to enact bills in 1957, 1959, and
1960 that would have amended the securities laws to impose aiding and abetting
liability. 233
These arguments are not of great relevance here. Clearly, Congress has
amended the federal securities laws several times after it became apparent that
courts would impose respondeat superior liability. Congress has not acted to
specifically eliminate respondeat superior liability under section 10(b). Just as
clearly, the Supreme Court has announced that such a fact will not carry much
weight.
It is significant, however, that Congress has twice revised the insider
trading laws and explicitly eliminated respondeat superior in a narrow range of
situations. First, in 1984 Congress passed the Insider Trading Sanctions Act
("ITSA"), 234 which, among other things, authorized the SEC to seek treble
monetary penalties against inside traders. The law specified that the
"controlling person" provision of section 20(a) would not apply to this liability
and that "[n]o person shall be liable to a penalty under subsection (a) of this
section solely by reason of employing another person who is liable under such
subsection. "235
Second, four years later Congress passed the Insider Trading and Securities
Fraud Enforcement Act ("ITSFEA"),2 36 which did the following three relevant
230 See Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 209-10 (1993).
231 Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 185.
232 Me year 1966 is significant because that is the year that section 10(b) and Rule lOb-
5 aiding and abetting liability was first explicitly recognized by the lower courts in Brennan v.
Midwestern Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966), aft'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir.
1969).
233 Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 186-87.
234 Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984). See generally Daniel L. Goelzer et al.,
Insider Trading Legislation: A Review and a Preview, in INSmER TRADiNG: COPING wrrH THE
UsE & ABUSE OF MARKEr SENSrIvE INFORMATION 239 (Harvey L. Pitt ed., 1985).235 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(b)(2) (1994). During the course of the hearings on ITSA, at
least one representative indicated approval of respondeat superior in federal securities law
cases. See Insider Trading Sanctions and SEC Enforcement Legislation: Hearings on H.R.
559 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 47-48 (1983) (comments of
Representative Rinaldo).
236 Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988).
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things: (a) section 5 targeted broker-dealers and investment advising firms,
authorizing the SEC to impose fines upon their members who engaged in
insider trading and upon the firms themselves as "controlling persons" if certain
requirements were met,237 (b) while preserving all other causes of action
including those implied under section 10(b) and Rule l0b-5, 238 section 5
created a new private cause of action for damages on behalf of those who
traded contemporaneously with inside traders against those inside traders,
239
(c) because ITSFEA established standards different than those contained in
section 20(a) for "controlling persons," section 3 explicitly made the new
definition exclusive in this context and excluded liability under both section
20(a) and under respondeat superior.24°
Absent the presumptive availability of respondeat superior liability under
the federal securities laws, the provisions of ITSA and ITSFEA that expressly
excluded such liability would be superfluous. Together, these two congressional
237 See 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1994).
238 See 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(d) (1994) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit
or condition the right of any person to bring an action to enforce a requirement of this chapter
or the availability of any cause of action implied from a provision of this chapter.").
239 See 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(a) (1994). This provision was passed to overrule Moss v.
Morgan Stanley, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), which had held that plaintiffs who had sold at the
same time as a misappropriator lacked standing to sue the misappropriator for damages.
Congress explicitly provided that this express cause of action for "contemporaneous traders"
should not be construed to eliminate other causes of action implied from the 1934 Act. See 15
U.S.C. § 78t-(d) (1994). Regarding this nonexclusivity provision, "[i]n its Report the
Committee recognized that while there clearly are injuries caused by insider trading to others
beyond contemporaneous traders, section 10(b), Rule lOb-5 and other relevant provisions of
the 1934 Act have sufficient flexibility to recognize and protect any such defrauded person."
Theodore A. Levine et al., Supervisory and Compliance Procedures for Broker-Dealers, in
INSEER TRADNG AND SEcuRrrms FRAUD ENFORCEMENT Acr OF 1988, 234 (Gary Lynch &
Arthur F. Mathews eds., 1989) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. at 17
(1988)).
As Professor Conard has pointed out, ITSFEA's savings provision was not a boilerplate
disclaimer but a specific rejection of a draft of the bill that would have made the ITSFEA
cause of action exclusive and an invitation by SEC Chairman Ruder for Congress to so
provide. Conard, Enterprise Liability, supra note 179, at 944-45.
240 Section 3 of ITSFEA provides that:
No person shall be subject to a penalty under this section solely by reason of employing
another person who is subject to a penalty under this section, unless such employing
person is liable as a controlling person under paragraph (1) of this subsection. Section
20(a) of this title shall not apply to actions under subsection (a) of this section.
15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(b)(3) (1994).
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actions indicate that: (a) Congress supports an expansive application of Rule
lOb-5, 241 (b) Congress can and does recognize the existence of both section
20(a) controlling person liability and respondeat superior liability, but
distinguishes one from the other, (c) Congress presumes the general availability
of respondeat superior liability under the federal securities laws and eliminates
it when it wishes to do so, and (d) Congress has implicitly chosen to preserve
respondeat superior liability except in very narrow situations.
E. Policy Considerations
Although the Supreme Court has often noted the usefulness of policy
considerations in interpreting the federal securities laws,242 the Central Bank
majority stated that "[p]olicy considerations cannot override our interpretation
of the text and structure of the Act, except to the extent that they may help to
show that adherence to the text and structure would lead to a result 'so bizarre'
that Congress could not have intended it." 243 Given the analysis of language
and structure thus far presented, it is clear that respondeat superior liability
should be recognized under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 unless policy
arguments make it clear that such a conclusion would be "bizarre." Quite the
contrary is the case: Policy arguments generally support recognition of
respondeat superior liability.
1. The Court's Policy Considerations
a. Certainty and Predictability
The Central Bank majority cited two major policy considerations in its
opinion. First, in evaluating aiding and abetting liability, the Court, without
even noting the irony, overturned thirty years of settled precedent, citing a need
for "certainty and predictability" in the law. 244 Elimination of respondeat
241 See Thel, supra note 23, at 464 n.362 (stating that in ITSFEA "Congress more or
less ratified an expansive application of Rule lOb-5").
242 See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 653 (1988) (noting that policy concerns are
properly considered in construing federal securities laws); Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth,
471 U.S. 681, 695 n.7 (1985) (same); McGann v. Ernst & Young, 102 F.3d 390, 396 (9th
Cir. 1996) (same).
243 Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 188
(1994) (quoting Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 191 (1991)).
244 Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 188 (quoting Pinter v. Dahli, 486 U.S. 622, 652 (1988)).
Despite the Court's statement, as Professor Cox has noted: "What is most remarkable about
[Central Bank] is its poor timing. The Supreme Court discarded a doctrine that had not only
been accepted by all the circuits but had matured and become predictable, and there was no
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superior liability would cause an even greater upheaval than did elimination of
aiding and abetting liability. The supposed justification for eliminating aiding
and abetting liability was that the rules regarding aiding and abetting liability
were unclear, leading to uncertainty.245
The rules regarding aiding and abetting liability were in fact unclear and
varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.246 The availability of and general rules
for respondeat superior liability, on the other hand, are settled and have been
for decades. They display "a remarkable degree of uniformity throughout the
entire common law world. ' 247 This is not to say that there are not difficult
cases on the margin involving application of these rules,248 but that is hardly
grounds for scuttling a foundational rule of law.
b. Litigiousness
The Central Bank majority exposed its policy preferences in its second
policy argument-that securities litigation is excessive, dangerously vexatious,
costly, and perhaps counterproductive. 249 While it can be strongly argued that
these problems have been exaggerated,250 that is not really the issue.
Litigiousness implicates primarily the policy question of whether section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 causes of action should be recognized at all. This implication is
not surprising because Central Bank and other recent decisions emanating from
evidence the doctrine had created mischief in its wake." Cox, supra note 49, at 545.
245 Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 188.
246 See generally Prentice, supra note 17, at 51-78 (summarizing various views of the
elements of aiding and abetting under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5).
247 P.S. ATiYAH, VIcARIous LiABIT IN THE LAw oF ToRTs v (1967).
248 Admittedly, many persons believe that those margins are fairly broad and that much
of the law of respondeat superior is in need of clarification. See, e.g., Verkerke, supra note
94, at 290-305. There will always be difficult cases regarding whether an employee was,
under particular circumstances, acting within the "scope of authority," but the proper
approach is to attempt to clarify the boundaries of the "scope of authority," not to simply
eliminate the concept. In no other area of the law is respondeat superior being eliminated
because its elements are too difficult to apply.
249 Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 189.
250 See, e.g., Seligman, Central Bank, supra note 14 (concluding that complaints about
class action securities litigation have been overblown); Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter,
108 HARv. L. REv. 438 (1994) (debunking some myths about securities fraud litigation);
Adam F. Ingber, Note, 10b-5 Or Not lOb-5?: Are the Current Efforts to Reform Securities
Litigation Misguided?, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. S351, S352 (1993) ("[O]ne of the premises
underlying the [proposed securities law] reforms-that Rule lOb-5 encourages frivolous
litigation-is dubious at best."); Baruch Lev, Disclosure and Litigation, 37 CAL. MGMT.
REv., Spring 1995, 8, 9 (study showing that large stock price declines do not automatically
trigger filing of Rule 10b-5 suits).
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the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit, and other jurisdictions illustrate a
conscious attempt to restrict the section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 cause of action,
perhaps because some jurists do not like the litigation it engenders, especially in
light of the fact that Congress did not expressly create it. Justice Scalia has
admitted as much.251 Perhaps these jurists should alter their course given that
Congress has at least thrice specifically affirmed the existence of the section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 cause of action in the following situations: (1) in the
Insider Trading Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA), 252 (2) in
its action to restrict the retroactivity of the Supreme Court's statute of
limitations decision in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v.
Gilbertson,253 and (3) in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PSLRA).254 Especially in the PSLRA, Congress took the existing implied
251 See Virginia Bankshares Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1110 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring):
I recognize that the Court's disallowance... of an action for misrepresentation of belief
is entirely contrary to the modem law of torts, as authorities cited by the court make
plain... I have no problem with departing from modem tort law in this regard, because
I think the federal cause of action at issue here was never enacted by Congress .... and
hence the more narrow we make it (within the bounds of rationality) the more faithffil
we are to our task.
252 Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988).
253 501 U.S. 350 (1991). In Gilbertson, the Supreme Court erased 40 years of law by
holding that the Rule lOb-5 statute of limitations should be derived by analogy to other federal
securities law provisions rather than by analogy to state antifraud rules, see id. at 362, as the
Court had intimated in Holmberg v. Arnbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946). The limitations
period that the Court borrowed from section 13 of the 1933 Act, see 15 U.S.C. § 77m
(1981), was generally shorter than analogous state law causes of action that, if applied
retroactively, would lead to dismissal of cases that were timely under the law at the time of
their filing. It was applied retroactively, and Congress acted to reverse that situation. The law
passed to limit the retroactive effect is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (1994). However, that
law was later declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,
Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995). The important point here is that by enacting a law meant to impact
the statute of limitation in a section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 cause of action, Congress clearly
sanctioned the existence of that cause of action.
254 he entire thrust of the PSLRA was to reform litigation brought under various
federal securities law provisions, but most importantly section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The
entire Act was unnecessary unless Congress intended the cause of action to continue to exist.
Had Congress opposed the existence of the section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 cause of action, it
could have legislated one sentence: No private cause of action for damages shall be
recognized for violations of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. Instead, Congress
labored at length to make the cause of action operate the way the legislators desired in 1995.
1997] 1375
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
cause of action, reformed it to be what Congress wished it to be, and thereby
placed an implicit seal of approval.upon it.
In Musick, Peeler, the Supreme Court conceded that Congress has placed
its implicit stamp of approval upon the section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 cause of
action.255 Therefore, the fact that a cause of action meant to engender litigation
does so is not a terribly significant policy consideration. The real issue, given
the continued existence of the section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 cause of action, is
whether it should, like most other causes of action in the Western world, carry
a respondeat superior component.
2. Other Policy Considerations
The Central Bank opinion conceded that there were relevant policy
considerations other than the two it discussed.256 This concession is true, for the
Court ignored the most important relevant policy considerations-the purposes
Congress had in mind in enacting the 1934 Act generally and section 10(b)
specifically. Three of the most important purposes that Congress had for
enacting the Act are the following: (a) compensating defrauded investors, (b)
deterring fraud, and (c) advancing market efficiency. These purposes must also
be discussed.
a. Compensating Defrauded Investors
Respondeat superior is an obviously pro-victim doctrine that advances the
1934 Act's purpose of compensating defrauded investors in important ways.
i. Respondeat Superior Eases the Plaintiff's Burden of Proof
One of the classic rationales for the respondeat superior doctrine is that,
while firms are often careless in hiring and supervising employees, it is very
difficult for plaintiffs injured by the employees to prove that carelessness. 257
At a minimum, the PSLRA is a "partial codification" of the implied section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 cause of action. See Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Securities Litigation Reform
Law, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 21, 1995, at 5; Edward Brodsky, Assessing the Impact of 'Gustafson',
N.Y. L.J., Mar. 13, 1996, at3.
255 The Supreme Court stated in Musick that section 78aa-1, which was passed to
reverse the retroactive impact of Gilbertson's statute of limitations ruling, "treats the 10b-5
action as an accepted feature of our securities laws .... " Musick, Peeler & Garrett v.
Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 294 (1993).
256 Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 189
(1994).
257 See, e.g., ATIYAH, supra note 247, at 20 ("in this complex society it is often hard to
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Respondeat superior obviates the need for a plaintiff to produce such difficult-
to-discover evidence.258 Applied in the section 10(b) and Rule 10-5 context,
respondeat superior produces the same benefit that justifies its existence in other
areas of the law.
This benefit complements nicely the Supreme Court's holding in Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston259 regarding the burden of proof. In rejecting a lower
court ruling that plaintiffs in section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 suits should have to
prove their claims by clear and convincing evidence, which is the standard in
common-law fraud claims, the Court noted in Huddleston that although section
10(b) was patterned after the common-law fraud cause of action, "an important
purpose of the federal securities statutes was to rectify perceived deficiencies in
the available common-law protections by establishing higher standards of
conduct in the securities industry." 260 Thus, a lowering of the standard of proof
to the preponderance of the evidence standard was warranted:
The interests of defendants in a securities case do not differ qualitatively from
the interests of defendants sued for violations of other federal statutes such as
the antitrust or civil rights laws, for which proof by a preponderance of the
evidence suffices. On the other hand, the interests of plaintiffs in such suits are
significant. Defrauded investors are among the very individuals Congress
sought to protect in the securities laws. If they prove that it is more likely than
not that they were defrauded, they should recover.261
Because the interests of plaintiffs in securities fraud suits are significant and
defrauded investors are the very individuals Congress sought to protect in the
securities laws, it similarly makes sense that defendants that are subject to
respondeat superior liability under most other federal statutes, such as antitrust
or civil rights laws, should be similarly liable under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-
5. It is not as if plaintiffs are getting a free ride. In order to impose liability upon
the principal, they still must, consonant with Hochfelder, establish inter alia,
identify the individual person responsible for a tortious act .... [a]nd it is vicarious liability
which entitles the plaintiff to say that it suffices if the cause of the accident was some
operation under the control of the defendant's servants").
2 58 See Martin J. Weinstein & Patricia Bennett Ball, Criminal Law's Greatest Mystery
Thriller: Corporate Guilt Through Collective Knowledge, 29 NEw ENG. L. REv. 65, 80
(1994) (discussing analogous benefit of criminal liability based on respondeat superior given
difficulty prosecutors have in proving bad intent of multiple individual members of a
corporate entity).
259 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
260 Id. at 389 (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186
(1963)).
261 Id. at 390.
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that the wrongdoer acted with scienter;262 that an agency relationship existed;
and that the agent was acting within the scope of actual or apparent authority.
Fischel argued from Hochfelder that there is to be no liability when a firm's
agent commits intentional fraud within the scope of his authority against the
firm's customers unless the board of directors knows of the fraud, the
knowledge of which can then be imputed to the firm as a controlling person.263
In addition to the fact, pointed out above, that Fischel necessarily uses the
doctrine of respondeat superior to impute the board's knowledge to the firm,
this rule would render an injured investor's burden of proof unduly
burdensome.264 The Huddleston opinion noted that "the difficulty of proving
the defendant's state of mind supports a lower standard of proof."265 Consider
cases involving brokers and dealers. It is difficult enough to establish scienter of
the agent with whom the plaintiff has dealt; to establish scienter of high level
officers of the firm with whom plaintiffs have often not dealt will usually be
much more difficult, if not impossible. 266
The Supreme Court rejected an argument analogous to Fischel's in
Hydrolevel.267 The argument was that the nonprofit principal should be liable
for the antitrust actions of its agents only if it ratified them. The Court rebuffed
262 The Hochfelder scienter requirement is especially onerous for plaintiffs giving the
stringent pleading requirements imposed by the PSLRA. See generally Norman B. Arnoff,
The Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 8, 1996, at 3 (summarizing the
PSLRA's heightened pleading standards); Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Pleading
Fraud After Securities Reform Act, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 21, 1996, at 5 (same).
263 Fischel, supra note 11, at 107 n.145.
264 See Carol M. Lynch, Note, Rule lOb-5-The Equivalent Scope of Liability Under
Respondeat Superior and Section 20(a)-Imposing a Benefit Requirement on Apparent
Authority, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1383 (1982). Lynch states that
Under Professor Fischel's analysis the plaintiff must overcome a virtually
insurmountable burden to obtain recovery under the securities acts. How is the plaintiff
to prove that a board of directors knew of a lower-level employee's fraud? Indeed, how
might a board of directors, particularly one of a large corporation, ever be aware of such
activity? Without the availability of respondeat superior, the class of plaintiffs that could
sue under Rule lOb-5 would shrink to a size far smaller than the one that the Supreme
Court contemplated in Hochfelder.
Id. at 1411.265 Hermn & MacLean, 495 U.S. at 391 n.30.
266 It is similarly difficult for plaintiffs to establish the scienter of auditors who have
performed an audit and concomitantly more difficult to establish the scienter of the partners or
members at the upper echelons of firm management.
267 American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'r, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 573
(1982).
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the argument, stating:
[A] ratification rule would have anti-competitive effects, directly contrary to
the purposes of the antitrust laws. ASME could avoid liability by ensuring that
it remained ignorant of its agents' conduct, and the antitrust laws would
therefore encourage ASME to do as little as possible to oversee its agents.
Thus, ASME's ratification theory would actually enhance the likelihood that
the Society's reputation would be used for anticompetitive ends. 268
ii. Respondeat Superior's "Deep Pocket" Feature Helps Ensure
Comp ensation for Injured Victims
Imposing respondeat superior liability in securities fraud cases in situations
where the traditional elements of liability are present helps to ensure
compensation for defrauded investors,269 consistent with the remedial purposes
of the federal securities laws.270 The damages in major securities fraud actions
are often quite large; individual defendants will seldom have the funds to
2 68 Id. at 573.
269 Hackett argued long ago that the human desire to repair an injury underlies much of
the doctrine of respondeat superior. See Frank W. Hackett, Why is a Master Liable for the
Tort of His Servant?, 7 Hv. L. REv. 107, 111-12 (1893). Baty, after spelling out nine
separate grounds for justifying respondeat superior (control, profit, revenge, carelessness,
identification, evidence, indulgence, danger, satisfaction), several of which are actually
irrelevant to the doctrine, concluded that "the real reason for employers' liability is [that]
damages are taken from a deep pocket." THOMAS BATY, VICARIOUS LIMB.IRY 148-54
(1916).
The compensation rationale for respondeat superior is not necessarily rooted solely in a
compassionate desire to compensate injuries. It also has a very practical, business-oriented
basis. Laski has explained how such a doctrine became more necessary as enterprise grew
and became more depersonalized, noting:
In a world where individual enterprise is so largely replaced, the security of business
relationships would be enormously impaired unless we had the means of preventing a
company from repudiating its servants' torts. The reason is not that companies are well
able to pay; for it is not the business of the law to see that a debtor is solvent, but to
provide a remedy for admitted wrong.
Laski, supra note 214, at 123-24.
270 See, e.g., Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1119
(5th Cir. 1980) ("It is consistent with the remedial purpose of the federal securities acts to
require a brokerage firm that provides an employee with the means to carry out fraudulent
practices to pay damages to a victim of those practices when the employee it has chosen acts
within the course and scope of his employment.").
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compensate defrauded investors. 271 The fact that plaintiffs injured in securities
fraud suits are often large institutional investors does not minimize the
importance of this benefit of respondeat superior liability, especially if one
recalls the "little people" whose interests are served by most institutional
investors.272
Although it is true that the "deep pocket" rationale for respondeat superior
liability often leads critics to suggest that corporations are being victimized in
some vague fashion, "[firom a moral perspective, it may seem fairer to make
the enterprise bear the burden in preference.., to the outsider who has been
harmed. " 273
b. Deterring Fraud
As noted earlier, the main reason Congress passed the 1934 Act, and
especially section 10(b), was to protect investors from fraud and
manipulation. 274 It seems intuitively obvious that investor protection purposes
271 See Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on
Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 691, 707 ("We expect that
agents apprehended for fraud usually will be judgment proof, because the firm's value (and
thus the agent's wealth and ability to satisfy the optimal damages award) declines dramatically
when the fraud is revealed.").
272 For example, 63 million investors have placed $3.54 trillion in 6,270 mutual funds.
See Kevin G. DeMarrais, Welcome to the World of Mutual Funds, THE RECORD, Mar. 2,
1997, at BO. Pension fiuds handling the investments of millions of workers are another
major institutional investor.
273 Christopher D. Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate
Conduct, 90 YALE L.J. 1, 13 (1980).
Judge Friendly made the same point when he emphasized the ethical elements of
respondeat superior, noting in Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d
Cir. 1968), that the doctrine is based "in a deeply rooted sentiment that business enterprise
cannot justly disclaim responsibility for accidents which may fairly be said to be characteristic
of its activities." Id. at 171. See also Barbara White, Coase and the Courts: Economics for
the Common Man, 72 IowA L. REv. 577, 627 n.212 (1987) (referring to "the fairness values
inherent in respondeat superior").
The judgment to favor the innocent victim of the defrauder over the innocent principal of
the defrauder is certainly consistent with Congress's judgment in framing the securities laws.
See Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. GehlImann, Introductory Comment: A Historical
Introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 Oio
ST. L.J. 329, 345 (1988) (citing S. REP. No. 47 at 4-5 (1933)) ("Section 11 is based on the
legal principle that if one of two innocent persons must bear the loss, that person should bear
it who has the opportunity to learn the truth and has allowed untruths to be published and
relied upon.").274 See supra notes 191-207 and accompanying text.
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are advanced when courts recognize respondeat superior liability in the section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 cause of action. The Central Bank majority took the
position that making the remedy more far-reaching does not necessarily better
serve the objectives of the statute.275 However, there are some clear reasons
why the rationale undergirding the near-universal acceptance of respondeat
superior dovetails nicely with the policies of fraud deterrence. Together these
considerations provide persuasive support for respondeat superior's application
to section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
i. Respondeat Superior Induces Greater Care in Selection and
Supervision of Agents
One important rationale underlying respondeat superior has traditionally
been that it encourages employers and other principals to take care in choosing
and supervising their employees and other agents, thus reducing the overall
number of accidents and injuries.276 The Supreme Court itself has noted that a
275 Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 188
(1994). The Court made this point as an introduction to its discussion of the costs imposed by
a broader remedy, including the lack of certainty and the litigiousness. These have already
been demonstrated not to be particularly persuasive considerations regarding respondeat
superior liability. See supra notes 244-55 and accompanying text.
2 76 See Laski, supra note 214, at 113-14 (quoting Principles of Penal Law, in 1 JEREMY
BENTHAM, COLLECrED WoRKs 383):
The obligation imposed upon the master acts as a punishment, and diminishes the
chances of similar misfortunes. He is interested in knowing the character, and watching
over the conduct of them for whom he is answerable. The law makes him an inspector
of police, a domestic magistrate, by rendering him liable for their imprudence.
Laski argues that "[i]f we allow the master to be careless of his servant's torts we lose
hold upon the most valuable check in the conduct of social life." Id. at 106. See also ATYAH,
supra note 247, at 16 ("[Tlhe person in control is the person best placed to take precautions
against accidents."); 5 FowL V. HARPER Er AL., THE LAW Op TORTS § 26.3, at 15 (2d ed.
1986) ("Pressure of legal liability on the employer therefore is pressure put in the right place
to avoid accidents."); Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between
Enterprise and Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1345, 1380 (1982) ("[I]n
the private sector, enterprise liability produces greater levels of care [than personal liability of
agents]."); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U.
Cm. L. REv. 1311, 1332 (1989) ("The most efficient method of discouraging sexual
harassment may be by creating incentives for the employer to police the conduct of its
supervisory employees, and this is done by making the employer liable."); White, supra note
273, at 627 n.212 ("[R]espondeat superior contains its own aspects of risk reduction [by
creating] ... an incentive for the employer to scrutinize prospective employees for
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major justification for the doctrine of respondeat superior is "the common-sense
notion that no matter how blameless an employer appears to be in an individual
case, accidents might nonetheless be reduced if employers had to bear the costs
of accidents. 277
The courts have traditionally believed that "[t]he most effective means for
insuring adequate supervision is to impose liability for injury resulting from its
absence."2 78 There is every reason to believe that this rationale fits most
defendants in section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 cases as well as it fits defendants in
the general run of cases where respondeat superior liability has long been
applied. If they know that respondeat superior liability awaits them should their
agents commit securities fraud, accounting firms will be more careful in hiring
auditors; law firms will be more vigilant in supervising their young associates;
and broker-dealers will be more diligent in selecting and monitoring their sales
representatives and others.
This is one of the major rationales the Supreme Court used in Hydrolevel to
impose treble damages antitrust liability upon a nonprofit principal through
respondeat superior, even though the antitrust laws do not expressly or
impliedly provide for such vicarious liability. The Court reasoned that
imposition of antitrust liability upon not only the agents but also the principal
would advance the cause of avoiding anticompetitive practices:
[I]f... ASME is civilly liable for the antitrust violations of its agents acting
with apparent authority, it is much more likely that similar antitrust violations
will not occur in the future. "[P]ressure [will be] brought on [the organization]
to see to it that [its] agents abide by the law. United States v. A & P Trucdng
Co., 358 U.S. 121, 126 (1958). Only ASME can take systematic steps to make
improper conduct on the party of all its agents unlikely, and the possibility of
civil liability will inevitably be a powerful incentive for ASME to take those
steps. Thus, a Rule that imposes liability on the standard-setting organization-
which is best situated to prevent antitrust violations through abuse of its
reputation-is most faithful to the congressional intent that the private right of
action deter antitrust violations .279
Conard points out that, regarding a particular type of wrongdoing under
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5:
propensities toward safe and responsible behavior.").277 Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 693 (1978).
278 Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 439 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified
on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970) (quoting Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F. Supp.
724, 733 (E.D. Pa. 1966)).
279 American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'r, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556,
572-73 (1982).
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[E]xclusion of enterprise liability surrenders the most powerful weapon for the
deterrence of [insider] trading, which is the motivation of employers to prevent
their employees from committing it. Employers are far more able than are
their customers, unrelated investors, or the SEC to discover what their
employees are doing. The deterrent power of laws against [insider] trading
depends primarily on how these laws motivate employers to police the
activities of their employees.2 80
Although Conard made the point regarding only insider trading, it can be
generalized to corporate disclosure violations. Conard has further noted that
without respondeat superior liability, a profit-maximizing firm is not interested
in minimizing its employees' illegal acts but only in minimizing its own liability
for employees' illegal acts.2 81 Only respondeat superior liability can render
those interests relatively coextensive. 282
ii. Qualifications
Although respondeat superior liability should reduce the amount of
securities fraud by giving employers the incentive to carefully hire, supervise,
and monitor their employees, the results will be far from perfect. For example,
Croley has argued: "Finns-the complex constellation of actors that compose a
firm-exercise at best only imperfect control over their agents." 283 Nonetheless,
Croley concludes that even taling into account various psychological and
organizational factors that he believes are underrepresented in current tort and
corporate law thinking, enterprise liability still represents the most effective
system. 284
280 Conard, Enterprise Liability, supra note 179, at 947.
281 Id. (discussing provisions of the Insider Trading Securities Fraud Enforcement Act
of 1988).
282 The same rationale underlies the federal policy for imposing criminal liability upon
principals for the wrongful acts of their agents. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Corporate
Criminal Responsibility, in 1 Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice 253, 257 (Sanford H. Kadish
ed., 1983) ("[V]icarious [criminal] liability may well be closely related to the criminal law's
chief aim of prevention, both by deterring individual offenders and by encouraging the
corporation to install incapacitative monitoring controls."); Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A.
Groskaufinanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look at
Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1573 (1990) (noting that corporate criminal
liability arguably encourages closer supervision of employee conduct).
283 Steven P. Croley, Vicarious Liability in Tort: On the Sources and Limits of
Employee Reasonableness, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1705, 1737 (1996).
284 Croley oncludes:
In fact, to the extent that membership in a firm subjects individual decisionmaking
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Arlen and Carney argue that in fraud on the market cases, 285 imposing
liability solely upon agents probably achieves better deterrence than imposing
liability solely upon principals.286 However, that is not the relevant comparison.
The key question is whether agent liability and enterprise liability, together,
deter fraud better than agent liability alone.287 They probably do, and more
efficiently as well, as will be explained in the next section.
c. Advancing Market Efficiency
Easterbrook and Fischel have argued that the 1933 and 1934 Acts are all
about market efficiency because that is what protects investors. 288 This
argument should be turned around-the federal securities laws are all about
protecting investors because "[t]he strength and stability of our nation's
to various external checks, corporate liability might best promote reasonable
decisionmaking on the part of a corporation's agents. Corporations liable for the
behavior of their agents will tend to influence the decisions of those agents. Corporate
checks and balances thus will serve to provide ongoing external discipline over
individual decisionmaking-through recurrent exposure to care-promoting stimuli-that
individuals acting alone are not fully equipped to provide. Even though firms cannot
monitor their agents perfectly (to say the least), it seems possible that the palpable and
day-to-day influence that a firm would have on its individual agents would curb
unreasonable decisionmaking by those agents more than would the prospect of personal
tort liability. Or at least that is the question.
Id. at 1737-38.
285 For a general description of the "fraud on the market" theory, adopted by the
Supreme Court in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988), see Prentice &
Langmore, supra note 20, at 47-49.
2 86 Arlen & Carney, supra note 271, at 704-17.
287 Arlen and Carney set up the false dichotomy based on the notion that employers
seldom seek indemnity from employees whose wrongs cause them to sustain vicarious civil
liability. See supra note 271. However, that does not mean that the recognition of respondeat
superior liability means that there are no deterrents to agent fraud in the securities law
regime. See infra notes 301-07 and accompanying text.
2 88 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases,
52 U. Cm. L. REv. 611 (1985). They state: "True, people sometimes say that the function of
securities law is 'the protection of investors' or 'compensation for wrongs,' but these are just
restatements of the objective of efficient operation of the markets." Id. at 613 (emphasis
added). Easterbrook and Fischel perhaps need to be reminded that, among the "people" who
have stated that protection of investors is the function of the securities laws, are the 1934
Congress in the text of section 10(b) itself and the Supreme Court in numerous cases. Only an
extremely selective reading of the legislative history of the 1933 and 1934 Acts could provide
any support for Easterbrook and Fischel's conclusion.
[Vol. 58:13251384
CONCEIVING THE INCONCEIVABLE
securities markets depend in large measure on investor confidence in the
fairness and efficiency of these markets." 289 Evidence is clear from other
nations that legal regimes that allow investors to be defrauded and permit them
no effective recourse are inefficient and often collapse under their own
veight.290 Effective private remedies are essential to investor confidence in the
fairness of securities markets, and such confidence is a predicate of
efficiency. 291
Congress recognized this, as the House Report on the 1934 Act stated:
If investor confidence is to come back.., the law must advance. As a
complex society so diffuses and differentiates the financial interests of the
ordinary citizen that he has to trust others and cannot personally watch the
managers of all his interests as one horse trader watches another, it becomes a
condition of the very stability of that society that its rules of law and business
2 89 Statement of Mark J. Giffin before the Sec. Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, May 12, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Alnws File, Federal News Service.
29 0 See Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Detenminants of External Finance, 52 J. Fin.
(forthcoming) (showing in study of forty-nine countries that those with fewer legal investor
protections also have smaller and narrower capital markets). This overall study is borne out
by experience in specific countries. See, e.g., Dean Calbreath, Czechs Act to Beef Up
Securities Laws, But Some Worry Changes Are Cosmetic, WAu ST. J., Feb. 7, 1997, at
AllA (reporting that Czech Republic is attempting to create an SEC-like agency to improve
efficiency of securities market); Tom Hundley, Always Poor, Albanians Going for Broke in
Scam, Crmc. TRm., Feb. 3, 1997, at 1 (reporting that collapse of unregulated pyramid
schemes left Albania in chaos); Remarks of Lawrence Summers at the U.S.-Russia Business
Council Conference, Mar. 29, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File,
Federal News Service ("It is axiomatic that without clear securities laws and shareholders'
rights, Russia will not be able to draw in the foreign investment that it needs to prosper.").
291 See Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings on
the Impact of the Supreme Court's Decision in Central Bank before the Subcomm. on
Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. (1994)
(statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC); Loftus C. Carson II, The Liability of
Controlling Persons Under the Federal Securities Acts, 72 NOTRE DAME L. Rnv. 263, 268
(1997) ("The specter of persons reaping benefits from [fraudulent and manipulative] conduct
was perceived [by Congress in 1933] to be part of the reason for the erosion of confidence in
the securities markets."); Jorgenson, supra note 14, at 667 ("The stability of the United
States' securities markets is dependent in large part on the willingness of the judicial system to
maintain investor confidence in the fairness and efficiency of these markets."); Ramesh K.S.
Rao et al., Fiduciary Duty a la Lyonnais: An Economic Perspective on Corporate
Governance in a Financially-Distressed Finn, 22 J. CORP. L. 53, 62 (1996) ("To the extent
that courts do not consistently enforce the [directors'] fiduciary duty of care, investors'
perceived risks increase, and the price they are willing to pay falls.").
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practice recognize and protect that ordinary citizen's dependent position.2 92
i. The General Efficiency of Vicarious Liability
The superior efficiency of a regime of respondeat superior is generally
recognized, although there is considerable debate in economic circles regarding
the matter. Several economic arguments have been made for the efficiency of
the respondeat superior regime. Among other points, the "least-cost avoider"
test has often been used in economic analysis for determining the proper
parameters of strict liability. The least-cost avoider is the person who can most
efficiently prevent the loss by adjusting his level of care to the most efficient
point.293 There is every reason to believe that the lowest cost-avoiders are the
corporations, brokerage firms, and other organizations that hire and supervise
the defrauders, rather than members of the investing public.294 Generally,
imposition of respondeat superior liability motivates the employer, who "is
surely better situated... to identify what supervisory precautions are cost-
justified. "295
292 H.R. REP. No. 1383, at 5 (1934) (emphasis added). President Roosevelt had similar
concerns. See MICHAEL PARRISH, SEC E REGULATION AND THE NEV DEAL 3 (1970)
("For many New Dealers like Frankfirter, and for Roosevelt himself, financial regulation
was central to the New Deal. Maling capitalism live up to its pretensions necessitated a
restoration of public confidence in the governing symbols and basic currency of the economic
order-investment securities.").
293 See generally GuiDo CALABRSI, THE CosT OF AccIoDENS 135-39 (1970); Stephen
G. Gilles, Negligence, Strict Liability, and the Cheapest Cost-Avoider, 78 VA. L. REv. 1291,
1292-93 (1992).
294 See James L. Bums, Note, Pruning the Judicial Oak: Developing a Coherent
Application of Common Law Agency and Controlling Person Liability in Securities Cases, 93
COLUM. L. REv. 1185, 1220 (1993) (arguing that firms, which as a matter of good business
practice and SEC regulation must already perform background checks, review all incoming
mail, and monitor employees' financial transactions in and out of the firm, are the least-cost
avoiders).
Bums's argument is especially true in recent years because of the SEC priority in
requiring brokerage firms to supervise their employees properly and punishing them if they do
not. See generally Joseph A. Ingrisano & Susan A. Mathews, After the SEC's Crackdown on
In-House Attorneys and Compliance Officers, Broker-Dealers Need to Take Affirmative Steps
to Be Sure They Are Within the Law, NAT'L L.J., June 6, 1994, at B5 (describing SEC
crackdown on securities industry supervisors); Michael F. Siconolfi & Jeffrey Taylor,
Brokers Aren't Being Reined In, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 1996, at Cl (reporting on joint
SEC/NYSE/NASD report "taking to task" the brokerage industry for failure to adequately
supervise); Andrew W. Sidman, Who's in Charge?, Bus. L. TODAY, July/Aug. 1995, at 44
(describing regulatory crackdown on securities industry supervisors).
295 Seiter, supra note 7, at 1531 n.98 (concluding that Seavey's suggestion in Warren
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In a recent symposium, one expert argued that placing liability solely on
agents and not on the principal would be generally ineffective. 296 Another
claimed that a system of pure vicarious liability coupled with immunity for the
wrongdoing agent would be most efficient because it would avoid a perceived
tendency of agents to be overly cautious in order to avoid personal liability. 297
This is a very interesting debate, but most of it takes place in the context of
claims of negligence, where any enthusiasm for respondeat superior must be
tempered by a concern that it might generate excessive levels of care by the
firm. However, section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 are not a negligence-based cause
of action. Section 10(b) remedies fraud, and excessive deterrence of fraud is not
a significant concern. As Arlen and Carney have noted, securities fraud
"produces substantial social costs and yields no social benefit... [and]
therefore should be deterred completely."298
The concept of efficiency entails more than just deciding what system will
do the most to reduce the number of acts of fraud, but respondeat superior's
general superiority in performing that task, discussed above, is a large part of
its claim for efficiency. However, detailed arguments have been made that this
efficiency cannot be presumed in all circumstances.299 Sykes has argued that
respondeat superior's strict liability is likely to be efficient if two conditions are
present: (a) the tort is causally related to the principal's business, and
(b) imposition of liability does not lessen the employee's incentive to avoid
tortious conduct. 300 Both conditions are present in the section 10(b) and Rule
Seavy, Speculations as to "Respondeat Superior," HARvARD LEGAL ESSAYS 433 (1934),
"that respondeat superior but not a negligence standard can generate the optimal level of
employee tort prevention is well-motivated").296 See Croley, supra note 283, at 1730 n.85 (dipping into psychology literature to show
that individuals are frequently irrational and therefore cannot easily be induced to take optimal
due care measures, and arguing further that placing liability upon agents will be ineffective
where (a) the agents are judgment-proof, (b) the agents demand liability insurance, creating
moral hazard problems, and (c) firms and not individuals bear the costs of care because
individuals may be excessively careful (citing Bruce Chapman, Corporate Tort Liability and
the Problem of Overcompliance, 69 S. CAL. L. Ray. 1679, 1681 (1996)).297 See Chapman, supra note 296, at 1681.
2 98 Arlen & Carney, supra note 271, at 705-06 (emphasis added).
299 See generally Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J.
1231 (1984) [hereinafter Sykes, Economics]; Note, An Efflciency Analysis of Vicarious
Liability Under the Law of Agency, 91 YALE L.J. 168, 196-97 (1981) (noting that the key
factors in determining whether respondeat superior will be efficient include "the existence of
an opportunity for conscious allocation of tort risks between the principal and the agent, the
effects of financial incentives on precautionary behavior, and the ability of the principal to
monitor the precautionary behavior of the agent").300 See Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of
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the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 581-88
(1988) [hereinafter Sykes, Boundaries].
Arlen argues that, in the criminal context, another concern is that strict vicarious liability
for firms actually lessens the firm's incentive to police illegal acts and therefore can lead to
more illegal acts being committed. See Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of
Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 833-67 (1994). She reasons that
crimes are often better detected by the corporation than by the government and that strict
liability gives the corporation the incentive to spend less on detecting and investigating crimes
so as to minimize its liability by minimizing its own detection of its agents' crimes. Arlen's
arguments are interesting, but not ultimately persuasive in the current context.
First, Arlen focuses only on vicarious liability's incentives to detect and report
wrongdoing. Id. at 836. She completely ignores the incentive to prevent wrongdoing that
vicarious liability provides to the firm, except to say that this might not be the most efficient
use of its resources. Id. at 861.
Second, one of Arlen's basic assumptions-that the wrongdoing is difficult for any entity
other than the company to detect-is dead wrong in the securities field, at least according to
Arlen herself. She pointed this out in her earlier article with Carney. See Arlen & Carney,
supra note 271, at 701 ("[S]ecurities fraud is a tort (and a crime) that is peculiarly susceptible
to ultimate detection when committed by agents of publicly held corporations.").
Third, another of Arlen's basic assumptions-that crimes are committed primarily by
employees of closely held corporations-does not apply to the most important category of
securities fraud cases, the fraud on the market cases that Arlen discussed in her article with
Carney. Id. at 841 n.31. This distinction is important because Arlen is using pure economic
reasoning to conclude that a corporation will not spend money to detect wrongdoing because
that will cost the corporation more in fines, but the money for the fines comes out of the
shareholders' pockets, primarily. The decision to detect and prevent made in public
corporations is made by employees. These employees will often know about the fraud
because of their position in the firm. They will have incentive to prevent and detect fraud
because of their own innate honesty (usually ignored by economists) and because of their self-
serving desire to be associated with a company with a reputation for honesty that will not
suffer the often-devastating reputational and economic losses that often are the consequence of
fraudulent schemes. If the employees do know about the fraud, they (unlike the shareholders)
have every personal incentive to report it, as Arlen herself admits. See id. at 858 ("[Pjowerful
incentives exist for innocent corporate managers who discover evidence of crime to report
them.").
Fourth, Arlen arguably underestimates the incentive to enforce that is built into various
mitigation provisions in the law that functionally reward firms for policing their own. See,
e.g., United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that a
jury may consider corporate compliance programs in deciding whether a corporation is liable
for its agents' crimes); United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1979)
(same). See generally Dan K. Webb et al., Understanding and Avoiding Corporate Executive
Criminal Liability, 49 Bus. LAW. 617, 619 (1994) (explaining how effective corporate
compliance program can minimize a firm's liability in criminal cases under the Organizational
Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
Fifth, Arlen herself seems to limit her analysis to the criminal setting, distinguishing it
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lOb-5 context. The causal relationship is established by the requirement that for
respondeat superior liability to apply, the agent must be acting either within the
scope of actual authority or within apparent authority supplied by the principal.
Furthermore, imposition of liability upon the principal does not lessen the
employee's incentive to avoid tortious conduct. The employee who commits
securities fraud in violation of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 continues to face,
in addition to employment penalties imposed by the employer,30' at least the
following: (a) joint and several liability to injured plaintiffs,302 (b) a potential
indemnity or contribution action by the principal, 303 (c) civil liability including
from civil tort law. See Arlen, supra, at 842. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, of course, carries
both civil and criminal liability.
301 These penalties can include ostracism, "passing over" at promotion or raise time,
and dismissal. Stone, supra note 273, at 29.
Sykes believes that these employment penalties, standing alone or coupled with
indemnity actions, do not always sufficiently encourage employees to avoid committing torts.
See Sykes, Boundaries, supra note 300, at 570. However, Sykes was not considering a
situation such as securities fraud under section 10(b) and Rule 10-5, which carries a whole
host of other incentives for employees to do the right thing.
302 Although Arlen and Carney argue against vicarious liability in fraud on the market
cases and stress that plaintiffs almost always sue the firm and seldom sue only the agents and
not the firm, their own numbers show that in the vast majority of cases plaintiffs sue both the
firm and the wrongdoing agents. See Arlen & Carney, supra note 271, at 739 (Table 6).
Of course, the agents, if they are high-level corporate officers, usually have liability
insurance. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 550 (1991) (noting that 94% of public
companies have directors and officers liability insurance). However, such policies typically
have exclusions for wrongs based on dishonest behavior such as securities fraud. See Dale A.
Oesterle, Linits on a Corporation's Protection of Its Directors and Officers from Personal
Liability, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 513, 549-50.
303 Admittedly, studies show that employers generally do not avail themselves of the
right to collect indemnity from their employees. See Fleming James, Jr., Vicarious Liability,
28 TuL. L. REv. 161, 162 (1954); Fleming James, Jr., Accident Liability Reconsidered: The
Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549, 556-57 (1948). In part this decision may be
reflective of a broad trend in the law to expand the range of situations in which agents can be
indemnified by their employers and to narrow the range of circumstances under which
employers can be indemnified by their employees. See Stone, supra note 273, at 46.
Schwartz, however, offers four common-sense reasons arising from the nature of the
employment relationship. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1764-67. In addition, both the
courts, see Globus v. Law Research Serv., 418 F.2d 1276, 1287-89 (2d Cir. 1969) and the
SEC, see Regulation S-K, Items 702, 510, and 512, 17 CFR § 229 (1996), are generally
hostile to complete indemnification in such cases.
Of course, the mere fact that few such actions are filed does not mean that the potential
for their filing does not have a deterrent effect. One recent study shows that although only
about 2% of all directors are sued, 70% of those surveyed seriously considered the potential
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huge fines in an SEC action,304 (d) potential jail time and additional large fines
in a criminal action, 305 (e) loss of the opportunity to practice one's
profession, 306 and (f) the stigma of being the subject of civil or criminal
action.3 07 So, to repeat, the choice is not individual liability of the agent versus
for liability in deciding whether to serve as directors (and presumably in deciding how
seriously to take their responsibilities as directors). See Mary Colby, The Risky Business of
Fintding Community Bank Directors, BANK MGMT., Jan. 1993, at 14 (citing Huggins &
Assoc. survey).
Furthermore, the right to contribution was clearly established in Musick, Peeler, &
Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 294-98 (1993). That right has been
statutorily confirmed by the PSLRA.
304 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (Supp. I 1997) (providing for civil fines of up to $100,000
for a natural person and $500,000 for any other person, per violation).
305 See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (Supp. I 1997) (section 32 provides for penalties of up to ten
years injail and a $1,000,000 fine for natural persons and fines of up to $2,500,000 for other
persons for intentional violations of any provision of the 1934 Act).
In addition to the penalties included in the securities statutes, most securities fraud
violations are simultaneous mail and wire fraud violations that carry additional criminal
penalties. In one recent case, a violator of section 10(b), Rule lOb-5, and other provisions was
sentenced to twenty years in jail; ordered to make restitution of $462,556,436; ordered to pay
a fine of $1,000,000; and ordered to pay a special assessment of $250. See United States v.
Hoffenberg, 1997 WL 96563, Nos. 94 Cr. 213 (RWS) and 95 Cr. 321 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y.,
Mar. 5, 1997).
306 Being subject to administrative or injunctive orders for securities fraud may also
result in the defendant being barred from serving as an investment advisor. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-3(e) (Supp. 1 1997).
Also, under Rule 102(e) [formerly known as Rule 2(e)], the SEC can and often does bar
lawyers and accountants who have violated SEC Rules from practicing before the
Commission. See 15 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (1996). See generally Marie L. Coppolino,
Checkosky, Rule 2(e) and the Auditor: How Should the Securities and Exchange Commission
Define Its Standard of Improper Professional Conduct?, 63 FoRDI-m L. REv. 2227, 2227-
63 (1995) (criticizing SEC's active use of Rule 2(e) to punish auditors); Christine Neylon
O'Brien, SEC Regulation of the Accounting Profession, 21 GoNz. L. REv. 675, 675-90
(1985-1986) (summarizing grounds upon which accountants have been punished under Rule
2(e)).
Furthermore, under powers granted to the SEC by the Securities Enforcement Remedies
and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. at 933, the SEC can
seek from a federal court an order barring egregious wrongdoers from ever again serving as
officers or directors in public companies. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) (Supp. 1 1997). The SEC has
used this power. See, e.g., Wade Lambert, Posner, Son Barred From High Positions At
Public Companies, WAIL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1993, at A3 (reporting on case involving infamous
Posner family).
307 Arlen and Carney suggest that "agents are stigmatized more by civil judgments than
they are by sanctions imposed privately by firms." Arlen & Carney, supra note 271, at 709
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vicarious liability of the firm, as is often assumed. Rather, the choice is
individual liability of the agent versus a combination of individual liability of the
agent and respondeat superior liability of the firm. There is every reason to
believe that the latter regime is both more of a deterrent to fraud and more
efficient than the former.
Looking at the issue from another angle, Kramer and Sykes have argued
that if an employee is judgment-proof (and few individual employees will have
the funds to pay the often huge damages caused by large-scale securities
fraud), 308 then a system based solely on personal liability of the employee is
clearly inefficient in that it allows a firm to "externalize" costs of doing
business by passing off all or part of the losses to the victim, leading to the
following inefficiencies: (a) inadequate incentive to avoid the occurrence of
torts, (b) inefficient allocation of risk, and (c) distortion in the scale of
activity. 309
Strict liability regimes have been criticized generally because they minimize
the incentives of potential plaintiffs to protect themselves from harm to the
(citing John R. Lott, Jr., An Attempt At Measuring the Total Monetary Penalty From Drug
Convictions: The Importance of an Individual's Reputation, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 184-85
(1992) (suggesting that white collar criminals face higher collateral penalties-lost wages,
etc.-than blue collar counterparts)).
30 8 In the situation where an agent can pay all judgments against him, many believe that
a rule of pure personal liability of the agent is as efficient as a rule of joint and several liability
of agent and principal under respondeat superior. See Kornhauser, supra note 276, at 1358-
60; Sykes, Economics, supra note 299, at 1241.
309 See Kramer & Sykes, supra note 109, at 277-78; see also Sykes, Boundaries, supra
note 300, at 1246.
Long ago Calabresi spoke of the need to force firms to internalize their costs in order to
maximize efficient resource allocation:
Equally strong allocation-of-resources arguments can be made... [The failure to show
injury costs means that the prices of the goods the industry sells understate their true
costs, and that too much is produced in that industry compared to those which are less
accident prone... [R]espondeat superior would tend toward a better allocation of
resources.
Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Toils, 70 YALu L.J.
499, 544 (1960).
Kramer and Sykes also demonstrate that the first two of these inefficiencies also result
when the employer is a municipality, see Kramer & Sykes, supra note 109, at 278-83; hence,
they suggest that a more efficient system would result from replacing Monell's "policy" rule
with a standard respondeat superior regime, or, even better in their eyes, a negligence
approach to municipal liability for egregious torts committed in bad faith by underlings. Id. at
301.
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extent that they eliminate contributory or comparative negligence defenses. 310
This minimization may be a legitimate concern in the products liability area.
However, in the section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 context, plaintiffs often have no
realistic opportunity to protect themselves from securities fraud, 311 and, if they
do have such an opportunity and fail to do so, they may be denied recovery by
the due diligence defense. 312
ii. Legitimate Expectations of Business
Elimination of respondeat superior liability would likely cause, rather than
avoid, inefficiencies. The intertwining world of public corporations and the
securities industry is extremely complex. Corporate and other artificial entities
must and do carry out their activities through agents. For business to be
conducted in an efficient manner, investors dealing with agents must be able to
hold principals accountable for agents' securities law violations just as they can
hold them responsible for any other legal infractions by agents. 313
310 See Verkerke, supra note 94, at 324.
311 See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
312 See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Herzog, 2 F.3d 135, 141 (5th Cir. 1993); Zobrist v. Coal-
X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1515-19 (10th Cir. 1983); White v. Sanders, 689 F.2d 1366, 1369
(11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68, 78-79 (2d Cir.
1980); Holmes v. Bateson, 583 F.2d 542, 559 (lst Cir. 1978); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d
1005, 1014 (5th Cir. 1977); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1048
(7th Cir. 1977); McDaniel v. Compania Minera Mar de Cortes, 528 F. Supp. 152, 166-67
(D. Ariz. 1981); National Bank v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 528 F. Supp. 940, 949 (E.D.
Mich. 1981). See generally Margaret V. Sachs, The Relevance of Tort Law Doctrines to Rule
10b-5: Should Careless Plikntiffs Be Denied Recovery?, 71 CORNEmLL L. REv. 96 (1985)
(criticizing use of the doctrine to bar recovery); William H. Mohr, Caveat Emptor Resufaces
In Securities Rulings, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 4, 1993, at 5 (analyzing recent application of the
doctrine).
To some extent, at least, this due diligence defense has morphed into the "bespeaks
caution doctrine" defense that has been widely and successfully used by defendants. See
generally Royce de R. Barondes, The Bespeaks Caution Doctrine: Revisiting the Application
of Federal Securities Laws to Opinions and Estimates, 13 IowA J. CoRP. L. 244 (1994)
(summarizing applications of the doctrine); Dennis J. Block et al., Court Defines Scope of
Bespeaks Caution Doctrine, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 18, 1993, at 5 (same). This doctrine has been
partially codified in the PSLRA.
313 See William H. Kuehnle, Secondary Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws-
Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, Controlling Person, and Agency: Common-Law Principles
and the Statutory Scheme, 14 J. CORP. L. 313, 367 (1988) [hereinafter Kuehnle, Secondary];
Vincent P. Liberti, Joint and Several Liability Under Rule 1OB-5: The Apportionment of
Liability for Contribution Claims Involving Non-Settling Defendants, 7 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 45,
57 (1994); Bart McKay, Note, Inherent Agency Powers: Does Celtic Life Insurance Co. v.
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This is only fair, but more importantly, it encourages investors to "play the
game," to invest, and to engage in securities transactions. Firms in the
brokerage industry, where the greatest complaints against respondeat superior
liability arise, constantly advertise in order to establish and bolster the
reputation of their firm for honesty and reliability. 314 The typical investor relies
on the reputation of the firm with which he deals more than the reputation of
the particular employee, 315 as the SEC has explained:
Many, probably a majority, of the frauds practiced by securities firms involves
conduct by employees -typically sales representatives who make false or
unfounded representations with respect to securities. It is the Commission's
experience that from time to time salesmen actually whet the appetites of
gullible public customers by representing that they are breaking their
employers' rules by giving them a special deal; for example, by giving them
more than the prescribed quota of a new issue of securities. But, whatever the
representations made by the salesmen or other employees of the broker-dealer,
we have found that investors customarily rely primarily on the integrity,
reputation, and responsibility of the firm itself rather than on the character of
the particular employee with whom they happen to be dealing. It is the firm
that is accepting and retaining the profits from the transactions... and it is the
firm to whom the customer should be permitted and expected to look if his
trust has been abused. 316
The same holds true for accounting firms, especially the Big Six firms,
which also trade on their reputation for reliability:
Coats Open the Door to a New Theory of Vicarious Liability in Texas?, 46 BAYLOR L. REV.
449, 451 (1994) (explaining that part of the rationale for Restatement (Second) of Agency
section 257's provision for apparent authority liability is that "[the commercial world must be
able to rely to a great extent on the appearance of things, without having to constantly check
on whether an agent is deviating from his authority").3 14 See, for example, "E.F. Hutton makes money the old-fashioned way; they earn it."
3 15 See Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1119 (5th
Cir. 1980) (investors rely on reputation of firm, not individual employee); Holloway v.
Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690, 696 (6th Cir. 1976) (same); Haynes v. Anderson & Stmdwick, Inc.,
508 F. Supp. 1303, 1313 (E.D. Va. 1981) (same); see also Note, Vicarious Liability for
Securities Law Violations: Respondeat Superior and the Controlling Person Sections, 15 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 713, 719 (1974) ("The average investor, however, is entitled to, and
customarily does, rely on the integrity, reputation, and responsibility of the brokerage firm
itself, rather than the particular employee with whom he deals.").
3 16 SEC Brief in Kamen & Co. v. Pau H. Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir.
1967), at 23 [hereinafter Kamnen Brief] (quoted in David S. Ruder, Multiple Defendants in
Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pai Delicto,
Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597, 607 n.41 (1972)).
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The mere fact that a firm doing an initial public offering (IPO) has a Big Six
firm as its auditor provides credibility, attracts more investors, and allows the
issuer to charge more for its shares than it otherwise could. The Big Six firm is
paid for its work but receives a premium for its reputation as well. In part, this
is true because information asymmetries make it very difficult for shareholders
and auditors to assess the accuracy of any given audit, so the auditor's
reputation must serve as a proxy for the quality of any given audit. 317
The same "reputation renting" phenomenon occurs regarding auditors'
work in the secondary markets and the work of underwriting firms, investment
banks, and law firms. 318 In all these situations, investors rely upon the
reputation of the law firm, the accounting firm, and the underwriting firm,
rather than that of the individual lawyers, accountants, and underwriter
employees. If these firms are not liable for fraudulent statements, then their
reputations mean nothing; their statements are largely empty; and their role as
information verifiers in a complex economy is badly damaged. Such a
development would ill serve the cause of efficiency. It would require investors
to verify for themselves information that is more easily and inexpensively
verified by these firms, 319 or to do less investing because, it has been posited,
"investors cannot, even by diligence, protect themselves against [the risk of
securities fraud] except by doing less investing." 320 This statement may
overstate the case slightly, but probably not too much given the difficulty of
discovering securities fraud committed by a clever perpetrator. Simply being
more vigilant will seldom protect an investor from any but the most blatant
fraudulent schemes. Even if detection of such fraud by investors is possible, too
little compensation under the securities laws will lead, at best, to an inefficiently
high level of private investigation by investors who cannot rely upon the
companies and accounting firms that produce audited financial statements. 321
iii. Respondeat Superior Enables Our Legal System to Spread Costs
Another efficient aspect of respondeat superior liability is that it allows for
the spreading of the risk of loss. 322 The Supreme Court has recognized cost-
317 Prentice, supra note 17, at 740 (footnotes omitted).
318 Id. at 740-46.
319 See generally Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills
andAsset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 290 (1984) (discussing how reputational intermediaries
reduce information costs); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of
Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 621 n.197 (1984) (same).
320 Conard, Enterprise Liability, supra note 179, at 954 (discussing ITSFEA).
321 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 288, at 620.
322 See Pitt & Groskaufinanis, supra note 282, at 1563 ("Loss distribution is the most
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spreading as a major justification for respondeat superior.323 If both an
employee and his firm err, it certainly is fair to impose the loss on the firm,
which can then shift the loss at least to its customers and more likely to its
insurance company, which can spread the loss around the economy. 324 If the
firm is not at fault, then the question becomes which of two innocent parties
(the victim of the fraud or the firm) should bear the loss. To place the entire loss
on the innocent victim, who cannot spread it, is obviously unfair. To place the
loss instead upon the good faith firm that often could have prevented the loss by
more carefully choosing and supervising its employees and, failing that can still
spread the loss, is clearly the better system. Furthermore, the deep pocket
defendant's superior ability to spread losses similarly reduces the likelihood that
adverse secondary economic effects will arise from the loss.325
The risk-spreading facets of respondeat superior liability have in recent
years been viewed as less important than they once were in the areas of the
greatest tort litigation-automobile accidents and products liability-because
drivers, passengers, and consumers of products can buy medical insurance. 326
This trend, for example, has led to calls for no-fault insurance plans.327
However, investors cannot as effectively insure themselves against loss caused
by securities fraud;328 therefore, the loss distribution features of a respondeat
superior system remain desirable in the securities industry. 329
widely accepted justification for the doctrine of respondeat superior."); Smith, supra note
214, at 456 (noting "the belief that it is socially more expedient to spread or distribute among
a large group of the community the losses which experience has taught are inevitable in the
carrying on of industry, than to cast the loss upon a few"); see also Horn v. Duke Homes,
755 F.2d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 1985) (explaining that employer should bear the cost of sexual
harassment by supervisor because it is a more efficient risk bearer than the victim).
323 See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 693-94 (1978).
324 See Calabresi, supra note 309, at 543 ("The master is the best insurer, both in the
sense of being able to obtain insurance at the lower rates and in the sense of being most aware
of the risk. Consequently, he is the best primary risk spreader.").
325 See id. at 527.
326 See Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 645, 645-69 (1985).
327 See, e.g., PErER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND rrs
CONSEQUENCES 193-206 (1988) (arguing for increased use of direct insurance and reduced
use of tort law); STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW: NEW
COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR VICaMS, CONSUMERS, AND BusINEss 127-48 (1989)
(advocating replacement of tort liability with social insurance and regulatory system). See
generally George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Law, 96 YALE
L.J. 1521, 1553-60 (1987) (noting that the administrative costs of a strict liability regime will
usually exceed those of first-party insurance).
328 They may, of course, minimize their risk of loss by diversifying their portfolios.
329 See Conard, Enterprise Liability, supra note 179, at 948-49 ("[E]mployers in the
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In short, the same policy considerations that have led to the almost
universal adoption of respondeat superior throughout Western jurisprudence
also weigh heavily in favor of its application in section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
cases, as even some of its harshest opponents admit. 330 Those policies are the
same today as they were in 1934, five years after the Supreme Court had
recognized that respondeat superior was a basic feature of federal law, at
bottom, because of "accepted notions of social policy." 331
]I. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR AND SECTION 20(A)
Much of the analysis of Part 11 is directly relevant to the basic issue
discussed now in Part III: Should section 20(a)'s controlling person provision be
recognized as the exclusive means of imposing secondary liability for securities
fraud under the 1934 Act? Therefore, not only will the method of analysis
suggested by Central Bank be applied here just as it was in Part 11, but many of
the specific arguments will be much the same as well. In essence, Part III's
discussion revisits the long-standing debate regarding the exclusivity of section
20(a) to determine whether the majority of courts was correct in rejecting
exclusivity and whether anything in Central Bank should change those courts'
minds. The answers to those two inquiries are, respectively, "yes" and "no."
A. Statutory Language
Proponents of exclusivity argue that because the good faith defense of
section 20(a) is expressly made available to all controlling persons and the 1934
Act contains no express provision for respondeat superior liability, "the
language of the statute appears to preclude" the latter form of liability. 332 This
view ignores all the arguments made in Part II(B) of this Article; those
arguments indicate that the language of the 1934 Act does indeed strongly
indicate that respondeat superior liability is to be available. Why else would
Congress have defined "person" to include a "company" that can only act
through agents? What other meaning is it possible to give to the "directly or
securities industry are likely to have the necessary resources to compensate losses and a
continuity of activities that enables them to spread the costs across a large number of
transactions.").
330 Fitzpatrick and Carman strongly oppose the availability of respondeat superior
liability on grounds of text and legislative history, but admit "[t]aken alone, policy
considerations might suggest that the [respondeat superior] doctrine should be applied in civil
fraud actions brought under the federal securities laws." Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 7,
at 28.
331 See Gleason v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 278 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1929).
332 See, e.g., York, supra note 7, at 354.
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indirectly" language of the statute?
Focusing just on the issue of exclusivity, other evidence arises. First and
foremost, nowhere in the language of section 20(a) does Congress ever state
that its provisions for controller liability are to be the sole means of imposing
secondary liability. When sitting on the First Circuit, Justice Breyer noted in
this connection that "section 20(a) does not say that it is exclusive; and its
proviso ('unless') is naturally read as referring to the (potentially nonexclusive)
liability which section 20(a) itself provides." 333 The language of section 10(b)
does not include "respondeat superior," but neither does that of section 20(a)
include "exclusive."
Congress knows how to create a private cause of action when it wants to do
SO, 334 so it presumably also knows how to make a liability provision exclusive
if it wishes. Given that respondeat superior was the established rule at the time
Congress enacted section 20(a), a fact that Congress well knew, 335 one would
expect that if Congress had any desire to eliminate such liability it would have
said so in the statute.336
A potential rejoinder is that the Central Bank majority also pointed out that
Congress knew how to impose aiding and abetting liability when it wanted to do
SO, 337 citing various non-securities statutory provisions.338 Perhaps this means
that Congress did not wish to impose respondeat superior liability because it
was not expressly mentioned either. However, two obvious answers to this
argument that have already been lodged are that Congress did indeed provide
for respondeat superior liability both by use of the "or indirectly" language 339
333 In re Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc., 784 F.2d 29, 33 (1st Cir. 1986).
334 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734 (1975) ("When
Congress wished to provide a remedy to those who neither purchase nor sell securities, it had
little trouble in doing so."); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11,
21 (1979) (stating that when Congress wishes to create a private cause of action, it knows
how to do so).
335 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
336 See Musewicz, supra note 7, at 780 ("Congress's failure to forbid applying
common-law concepts to section 10(b), though it acted in a legal context in which the general
application of such concepts to federal statutory violations was known, is additional evidence
that Congress intended their application to section 10(b) violations.").
337 Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 179
(1994).
338 See, e.g., Packers and Stockyards Act, ch. 4, sec. 202, 42 Stat. 161 (1921) (as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 192(g) (1980)).
339 If section 20(a) is the sole means of imposing secondary liability under the 1934 Act,
then the "or indirectly" language of section 10(b) is rendered superfluous. To assume that
Congress used these words but accorded them no meaning, when a perfectly logical
meaning-that it was a mechanism for recognizing the viability of respondeat superior
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in section 10(b) and by its definition of "person" in section 3(a)(9), 340 and that
almost nowhere in the United States Code does Congress provide expressly for
respondeat superior liability because it need not do so. Such liability is well-
established and universal in application even without express Congressional
references. It is nearly universal in federal law despite seldom being expressly
provided for statutorily.
Admittedly, the issue is not free from doubt. For example, section 15 of the
1933 Act specifically includes agency relationships as examples of "control"
relationships. 341 Therefore, it can be asserted that section 15 was Congress's
explicit provision for all liability to arise from agency relationships. A counter
argument could be that Congress's omission of the "agency" term from section
20(a) indicates that it meant to exclude such relationships from the scope of this
1934 Act provision. However, the House Report on section 20(a) also names
agency as an example of control.342
Nonetheless, most courts have agreed that these references alone are
insufficient to overcome all the other evidence that Congress intended to retain
agency liability in addition to controlling person liability. 343 It is unlikely, given
the complete lack of other evidence to support the conclusion, that section 15's
use of the term "agency" was meant to deliberately exclude respondeat
superior liability. 344 Nor does the "inconspicuous embedding of the word
liability-is available, is not sound statutory construction.
340 See SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 812 (2d Cir. 1975) ("Were
§§ 15 and 20(a) the sole measures of corporate liability.... the inclusion of corporations
under the definitions of 'person' would be not only unnecessary but also misleading.").
341 The strongest textual argument for exclusivity comes from the very words of section
15, which applies to "[e]very person who, by or through stock ownership, agency or
otherwise controls any person liable under sections [11] or [12]." 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1981)
(emphasis added).
342 See H.R. Rep. No. 1383, at 26 (1934):
In this section... when reference is made to "control," the term is intended to include
actual control as well as what has been called legally enforceable control... It would be
difficult if not impossible to enumerate or to anticipate the many ways in which actual
control may be exerted. A few examples of the methods used are stock ownership, lease,
contract, and agency.
(emphasis added).
343 See Seiter, supra note 7, at 1515 n.18 ("Though the term 'control' in section 20(a) is
broad enough to comprehend employment relations, it does not appear that Congress designed
the section with employers in mind.").
344 See id. at 1526 ("It is improbable that Congress intended the bare term 'agency' as
an allusion to the doctrine of respondeat superior, which applies not to all principal-agent
relations but only to employer-employee relations under limited circumstances.").
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'agency' in the House Report on section 20(a) carry much weight." 345
Section 20(a) itself requires recognition of respondeat superior liability any
time it is applied to organizational defendants, as it often has been.346 A
corporation or other artificial legal entity cannot in any real sense "control" its
employees. To speak of a corporation "controlling" its executives creates a
definite circularity problem when, as a matter of physical reality, executives
control the corporation. 347 To the extent that Congress wished to have
corporations held liable as "controlling 'persons,'" remembering that "person"
is defined to include companies, Congress necessarily must have desired that
those corporations be held liable for the controlling acts of their executives and
directors, which can only be done by invoking agency principles such as
respondeat superior.348 Exclusivity is, therefore, impossible by section 20(a)'s
own terms.
Finally, a Congressional intent that section 20(a) be the sole mechanism for
imposing secondary liability would have been dispositive of the aiding and
abetting issue in Central Bank. Therefore, one would suppose that the Supreme
Court would have mentioned that fact in Central Bank. It did not.
B. Analogous Statutory Provisions
As noted in Part II(C) above, in Musick, Peeler, the Supreme Court stated
that one of its goals was to ensure that its interpretation of the elements of
liability under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 did not conflict with Congress's
345 See id.
346 See, e.g., Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 974 F.2d 873, 883 (7th Cir.
1992) (imposing controlling person liability on a brokerage firm); HoUinger v. Titan Capital
Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1567 (9th Cir. 1990) (en bane) (brokerage firm); Sharp v. Coopers &
Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 181 (3d Cir. 1981) (accounting firm); Richardson v. MacArthur, 451
F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1971) (insurance company).
In terms of consistency of statutory scheme, consider this scenario: Corporation A,
which is actively managed and owned 90% by Corporation B, issues fraudulent financial
statements. If section 20(a)'s controlling person provision provides the sole form of secondary
liability under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, then Corporation A cannot be liable for the false
financial statements that its officers issued because respondeat superior is not available.
However, Corporation B is arguably liable as a controlling person of Corporation A even
though Corporation B, like Corporation A, can act only through human beings who are its
officers, directors, and other agents. The anomaly is obvious.
347 Bums, supra note 294, at 1195.
348 See In re Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc., 784 F.2d 29, 34 (1st Cir. 1986) ("[S]ince
corporations can act only through agents, how, without principles of vicarious liability....
could this ordinarily be done?").
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own express causes of action.349 The discussion in Part II(C) demonstrated that
inclusion of respondeat superior in the implied section 10(b) cause of action
does not conflict with section 9 or section 18 of the 1934 Act. Therefore,
imposition of respondeat superior liability under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
creates such a conflict only if section 20(a) is the sole mechanism by which
Congress intended to impose secondary liability under the 1934 Act. As just
noted, the language of the statute does not support section 20(a)'s exclusivity.
Neither does the structure of the Act.
1. Section 15
Because section 20(a) is patterned after section 15,350 if the latter is not the
exclusive means of imposing secondary liability under the 1933 Act, then to
preserve structural consistency, the former should not be the exclusive means of
imposing secondary liability under the 1934 Act. And, indeed, the entire
structure of the 1933 Act seems to presume application of agency principles.
First, section 11 imposes liability upon the issuer, which is usually an entity
that can be liable only upon agency principles.351 Second, section 11 also
imposes liability upon various "persons," which the 1933 Act defines to include
corporations, partnerships, associations, joint-stock companies, trusts, and other
artificial entities that can act only through agents and therefore can be held
liable only on a respondeat superior basis.352 Third, section 11 accords
defendants other than the issuer a "due diligence" defense. 353 A corporate
underwriter or an accounting firm could meet this requirement only through its
employees, requiring application of agency rules. 354 Fourth, section 12 imposes
liability upon any "person" (already defined to include artificial entities) who is
a "seller" of securities that has violated section 5355 or that has made
misrepresentations. 356 The "seller" includes anyone who transfers title, 357
349 See Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Insurance of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286,
295 (1993). Other goals were to promote clarity, consistency, and coherence for those who
rely upon or are subject to Rule lOb-5 and to effect Congress's objectives in enacting the
securities laws. Id.
350 See In re Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc., 784 F.2d 29, 33 (1st Cir. 1986) ("Section
20(a) was modeled on section 15 of the 1933 Securities Act... and it has an identical
purpose.").
351 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1981).
352 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2) (1981).
353 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1981).
354 See Bums, supra note 294, at 1213.
355 Such a violation is actionable under section 12(a)(1). See 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(1)
(Supp. 1 1995).
356 Such a misrepresentation is actionable under section 12(a)(2). See 15
1400 [Vol. 58:1325
CONCEIVING TlE INCONCEIVABLE
which will often be an artificial entity such as the issuing company, an
underwriter, or a broker-dealer.
Artificial entities have traditionally and uncontroversially been held liable,
necessarily on agency grounds, under both section 11358 and section 12359 of
the 1933 Act.
2. Section 28(a)
Congress enacted section 10(b) and other securities provisions against a
backdrop of state common law that included respondeat superior liability.
Because enactment of the 1934 Act also predated the Erie doctrine, 360 a body
of federal common law that clearly included respondeat superior liability also
existed. 361 It is therefore arguable that Congress did not enact section 10(b) with
the intent of replacing state and federal common law remedies and doctrines
because section 28(a) of the 1934 Act explicitly provides that "[t]he rights and
remedies provided by this [title] shall be in addition to any and all other rights
and remedies that may exist at law or in equity." 362 It may further be argued
that it is the attempt to eliminate respondeat superior liability in clear
contravention of section 28(a)'s explicit wording that upsets the statutory
scheme. 363 Section 28(a) of the 1934 Act and the analogous savings clause in
the 1933 Act, it has been argued, "are eloquent testimony to the absence of any
intent to preempt common law secondary liability." 364 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has stated that section 28(a) and a parallel savings provision in the 1933
U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (Supp. 1 1995).
357 See, e.g., Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 642-47 (1988) ("seller" may also include
"persons" in addition to those who actually transfer title).
358 See, e.g., Escott v. BarChris Construction Co., 283 F. Supp. 643, 643-707
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (imposing liability upon an issuing corporation, an underwriting firm, and
an accounting firm).
359 See, e.g., Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690, 690-95 (6th Cir. 1976) (brokerage
firm); Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1052 (7th Cir. 1974) (same); Lewis v. Waston
& Co., 487 F.2d 617, 623-24 (5th Cir. 1973) (same).
360 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (restricting use of federal common law).
361 See supra notes 219-21.
362 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1981). Several lower courts have read section 28(a) as
providing evidence that Congress did not intend section 20(a)'s controller liability provision to
exclude respondeat superior liability. See, e.g., Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce
Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118 (5th Cir. 1980); Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d
705, 716 (2d Cir. 1980).
363 See Commerford v. Olson, 794 F.2d 1319, 1323 (8th Cir. 1986); Marbury
Management, 629 F.2d at 716.
364 IX Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 201, at 4477.
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Act365 "confirm that the remedies in each Act were to be supplemented by 'any
and all' additional remedies." 366
Although a strong argument can thus be made that section 28(a) preserves
state and federal common law remedies, including respondeat superior, the
counterargument is that section 28(a) is merely an indication that federal law
does not preempt the field and that there is still room for state law causes of
action:
The House Committee which drafted the bill stated that section 28 (then
section 27) "reserves rights and remedies existing outside of those provided in
the act." Section 28 simply does not support the proposition that the common
law doctrine of respondeat superior can be mixed with federally created rights
to impose vicarious liability on a brokerage firm for violations of section 10(b)
by its employees. This section merely preserves the state or common law
remedies in existence when the federal securities laws were enacted or which
were created after its enactment.367
Thus, section 28(a) serves as the basis for two arguments against
exclusivity. The stronger form of the argument is that section 28(a) preserves all
state law remedies such as respondeat superior and somehow incorporates them
into the 1934 Act. The weaker form of the argument is that section 28(a)
merely prevents the 1934 Act from preempting state law and thereby preserves
respondeat superior as a state law remedy. While the more persuasive view is
the weaker form of the argument, that section 28(a) was merely meant to avoid
preemption of state law remedies, 368 its wording nonetheless gives clear
evidence that Congress did not intend to contract or to merely retain the status
quo regarding remedies for defrauded investors.369 Rather, Congress intended
365 Me savings provision of the 1933 Act is contained in section 16. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 77p (1981).366 Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 383 (1983).
367 See Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 7, at 24 (footnote omitted).
368 The case for this narrower reading of section 28's purpose is strengthened by the
subsequent wording of the statute that refers specifically to state securities commissioners
retaining authority to enforce state blue sky laws and self-regulatory organizations such as
exchanges retaining authority to punish their members. Several courts have inferred the
purpose of section 28 to be the avoidance of preemption of state laws rather than the
incorporation into the 1934 Act of any outside remedies. See, e.g., Leroy v. Great W. United
Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 182 n.13 (1979); Mite Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 491 n.5 (7th Cir.
1980), aff'd sub nom. Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982). See generally Musewicz,
supra note 7, at 790-91 nn.218-19.
369 At the very least the existence of section 28(a) helps to fend off criticisms that
imposing respondeat superior liability is some unconstitutional creation of a federal common
law. See, e.g., Duggan, supra note 7, at 482-88 (making this argument). As noted earlier, the
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to provide new remedies that would be more protective of investors than the
state law remedies had been. 370 To hold that section 20(a) precludes application
of respondeat superior liability is to provide a remedy that is less, not more,
protective of investors. This is inconsistent with the overall congressional
purpose and with the structure of the 1934 Act, especially (but not only) if
section 28 is considered. 371
3. The Good Faith Defense
Exclusivity proponents also argue that statutory construction should never
render any part of a statute ineffectual and that such occurs if respondeat
superior's strict liability is allowed to nullify section 20(a)'s good faith
defense. 372 However, no such nullification exists. As the Ninth Circuit held in
Hollinger v. Titan Capital Co/p.,373 a melding of respondeat superior and
section 20(a) controlling person liability creates a neatly-constructed statutory
scheme that provides primary liability for an agent who commits a section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 violation and secondary liability for the principal under
respondeat superior principles when an agency relationship exists and for a
"controlling person" under section 20(a) when it does not.374 Strict agency
liability continues to exist under all circumstances under which it would have
existed pursuant to the well-established common law in place before the 1934
Act was passed, but a good faith defense exists for the nonagency situations to
which section 20(a) extended secondary liability beyond where it had existed
previously (using a term, "controlling persons," that had not previously existed
either).375 The fact that "controlling persons" are often not employers with the
Supreme Court's decision in Hydrolevel is a rousing rejection of this argument as well. See
supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.370 See IX Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 201, at 4477 ("[These [controlling person]
provisions were aimed at extending liability.") (emphasis in original).
37 1 See Note, Vicarious Liability for Securities Law Violations: Respondeat Superior and
the Controlling Person Sections, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 713, 719 (1974) ("The character
of the harm the securities statutes were enacted to remedy indicates, however, an equal or
greater likelihood that Congress, in fact, intended to increase the employer's exposure to
liability.").
372 See York, supra note 7, at 355.
373 914 F.2d 1564, 1566-79 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
374 See id. at 1577.
375 The novelty of the "controlling person" provision was noted in the debates over the
1934 Act:
Mr. HOLLISTER. What would constitute such control? Can the gentleman define
to me any legal way a man can decide whether he has such control? Suppose a
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opportunity to exercise care in hiring the direct wrongdoers or the ability to
spread the risk presents a logical policy reason for Congress to have drawn this
distinction. 376
C. Congressional Intent and Legislative History
How does the legislative history of section 20(a) inform the debate about
the role of respondeat superior? Unfortunately, reasonable minds will not agree
as to what the legislative history has to say, but will probably concur that the
history is not conclusive. 377 Nevertheless, that history provides some evidence
that, like the language and structure of the 1934 Act, points away from a
conclusion of exclusivity for section 20(a).
Section 15 had been enacted a year earlier without a "good faith" defense.
In 1934, the 1933 Act was amended to add the good faith defense to section 15,
and section 20(a) of the 1934 Act was framed to include a similar good faith
prominent stockholder names a director and then goes to Europe and the director does
something illegal, would the gentleman say that the person who named the director
should be held responsible?
Mr. LEA of California. It is a question of fact to be determined by the issues
presented in the case. This is not a new question from a legal standpoint.
Mr. HOLLISTER. It is a very new question from a legal standpoint.
Mr. LEA of California. I believe it is a very well-known question in corporate law.
Mr. HOLLISTER. I wish the gentleman would refer me to any such precedent.
There is no such law in any State of the Union and no law of the United States to find out
what a controlling person is, and I do not believe that the gentleman or any member of
the committee can refer me to any such law. I would be pleased to have it stated if there
is one.
Mr. LEA of California. The gentleman does not doubt that one man controlling
another in a corporate enterprise is a very common thing.
Mr. HOLLISTER. I know there is the test of agency, and I know of no other test
which would make a person responsible criminally. We are going far beyond any
precedent in providing for ciminal actions in this way. It is part and parcel with a
number of things that have been put in this bill which are absolutely contrary to all the
principles of American jurisprudence.
Mr. LEA of California. It is simply a question of putting the responsibility on the
man who is really responsible.
78 CONG. REc. 8095 (1934) (emphasis added).
376 See Seiter, supra note 7, at 1535-36.
377 See York, supra note 7, at 316 ("[S]ome analysts have concluded that the legislative
history is too indefinite to be of practical interpretive value."). Even the strongest proponents
of the exclusivity of section 20(a) admit that the legislative history does not directly answer
the question. See Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 7, at 22.
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defense. 378 Despite the fact that there is precious little support for the
exclusivity of the section 20(a) remedy in either the language of section 10(b) or
the structure of the 1934 Act, proponents of exclusivity argue that because of
the good faith defense, to allow respondeat superior liability, which imposes
strict liability without a good faith defense, would undermine congressional
intent. They argue that section 15's "controlling person" provision, enacted in
1933, was to provide the only form of secondary liability and when, in 1934, it
was amended to include the "good faith" defense and section 20(a) was enacted
containing the same defense, Congress clearly rejected the strict liability
approach of respondeat superior. 379
This argument is vulnerable on several grounds. First, remember from Part
II(A)(2) that respondeat superior presents an elements of liability issue.
Therefore, the fact that Congress rejected an insurer's standard of liability
regarding the scope of conduct issue is "in reality not inconsistent with
employing respondeat superior to resolve which party should bear the loss."380
Furthermore, if section 15 was not intended to be the sole form of
secondary liability under the 1933 Act (or section 20(a) for the 1934 Act), but
was instead meant to expand the available remedies beyond respondeat
superior, then the whole premise of the exclusivity argument collapses. While
the issue is close, the legislative history of section 20(a), like the language and
structure of the provision, argues against exclusivity.
Most importantly, the legislative history seems to indicate that respondeat
superior liability and controlling person liability are essentially aimed at
different types of acts. According to the only Congressman who spoke on the
subject during the debates leading to passage of section 20(a), its controlling
person provisions were aimed at catching the person who stands behind the
scenes and controls the person who is in a nominal position of authority. 381 This
interpretation is consistent with the 1933 Act's section 15, which apparently
was aimed largely at preventing the true directors of a corporation from
evading liability by acting through "dummy directors." 382
378 These amendments were made in response to criticism and industry lobbying in the
wake of the passage of the 1933 Act. See Ralph C. Ferrara & Diane Sanger, Derivative
Liability in Securities Law: Controlling Person Liability, Respondeat Superior, and Aiding
andAbetting, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1007, 1009 (1983).
379 See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 11, at 98-99.
380 Gottesman, supra note 121, at 207.
381 See 78 CONG. REc. 8095 (1934) (Congressman Lea); Paul F. Newton & Co. v.
Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1115 (5th Cir. 1980).3 82 See S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. Sees. 2(k), 4, 13 (1933); S. REP. No. 47, 73d
Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1933); see also Paul F. Newton, 630 F.2d at 1115-16. The proposed
Senate version of section 15 of the 1933 Act provided:
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It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, [or] corporation... to employ any
"dummy" ... or to engage in any transaction... relating to the interstate purchase or
sale of any securities which operates as a fraud on the purchaser. The director or other
person for whom any "dummy" shall act shall be held responsible under this Act for any
unlawful conduct by such "dummy[.]"
S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. section 13 (1933), reprinted in 1 Federal Securities Laws-
Legislative History 1933-1982, at 27, 82-83 (Federal Bar Ass'n See. L. Comm. ed., 1983).
As explained by Ferrara & Sanger, the explicit "dummy" language was deleted in
conference committee. See Ferrara & Sanger, supra note 378, at 1008. Still, the wording of
section 15 is consistent with such a purpose, and no other purpose seems readily apparent. See
also SEC's Kamen Brief, supra note 316, at 13-14 (quoted in Ruder, supra note 316, at 606
n.37):
The legislative history of the controlling-persons provisions supports this analysis of their
precise focus. The original Senate version of the 1933 Act contained a number of
provisions designed "to aid in preventing directors from evading the liabilities incident to
signing the registration statement***." This draft of the Act dealt with the use of a
"dummy" signer of a registration statement and made the fraudulent use of a "dummy"
unlawful. The House version, which contained registration and antifraud provisions very
much like those eventually adopted, contained no sections expressly dealing either with
"dummies" or with controlling persons. In conference these "'dummy' provisions,
which were calculated to place liability upon a person who acted through another,
irrespective of whether a direct agency relationship existed but dependent upon the actual
control exercised by one party over the other *** [were] welded into one and
incorporated as a new section in the substitute." The "new section" is what is now the
controlling-persons provision of Section 15. Thus, that section was the result of
congressional concern with the special problem presented by the use of "dummies", and
was not designed to govern the usual employment situation.
During the debate, the following exchange occurred:
Mr. LEA of California. The object of this provision is to catch the man who
stands behind the scenes and controls the man who is in a nominal position of
authority. The man in control is just as well known as a dummy on a directorate. If
a case went into court, of course, it would be necessary to establish the charge of
control by the evidence ....
Mr. HOLLISTER. Would not an ordinary agency provision cover that? A man is
either an agent or he is not an agent.
Mr. LEA of California. There would be no contractual relation, necessarily. It is
just the same position as in the control of a dummy on a directorate. The man who
stands behind the scenes and dominates the dummy ought to be responsible because he is
the real party in interest.
78 CONG. REc. 8095 (1934) (House debate).
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In counterargument, Fitzpatrick and Carman contend:
Upon closer examination it appears that these remarks [made during legislative
debates] were primarily addressed to section 20(b), not 20(a). When referring
to the two sections, the report of the Committee on Interstate Commerce stated
that section 20(a) makes "a person who controls a person... liable to the
same extent as the person controlled unless the controlling person acted in good
faith and did not induce the act in question,' while section 20(b) "makes it
unlawful for any person to do, through any other person, anything that he is
forbidden to do himself." It appears then that Exchange Act section 20(b), not
20(a), was specifically aimed at the "dummy" situation.383
The fatal flaw in this argument is that all the "dummy" references in the
legislative history of the 1933 Act were to section 15. Section 15's analogue is
section 20(a). Section 20(a) was drawn nearly verbatim from section 15 and
was adopted for exactly the same reasons as section 15.384 There is no section
20(b) parallel provision in section 15. Section 20(b) remains a mysterious
provision that, although it has been seldom invoked, 385 seems on its face to
contradict any claim that section 20(a) provides the only form of secondary
The House Report indicates that the "dummy provisions" of section 15 were "calculated
to place liability upon a person who acted through another, irrespective of whether a direct
agency relationship existed but dependent upon the actual control exercised by the one party
over the other." H.R. REP. No. 152 at 27 (1933). See also Letter from James M. Landis,
Commissioner of the F.T.C., to Senator Duncan Fletcher, Chair of the Senate Banking and
Currency Committee (May 2, 1934), reprinted in 78 CoNG. REc. 8717 (1934), stating:
"According to the Bar Association report, the proposed changes which are made in section 15
are intended to make that section applicable only to prevent the use of dummies in order to
evade liability."
See generally Carson, supra note 291, at 271 (explaining "dummy director"
phenomenon and Congress's response to it); Note, Legislation-The Securities Act of 1933,
33 COLUM. L. REV. 1220, 1230 (1933) (concluding that section 15 was passed to abolish
"dummy" directors "and [that] the scheme of business organization based on control without
responsibility [will be] severely shaken.").
383 Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 7, at 26. Section 20(b) provides: "It shall be
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to do any act or thing which it would be
unlawful for such person to do under the provisions of this [title] or any rule or regulation
thereunder through or by means of any other person." 15 U.S.C. § 78t(b) (1981).
384 "[Section 20(a)] is taken verbatim from the Securities Act. The purpose is to prevent
evasion of the provisions of the section by organizing dummies who will undertake the actual
things forbidden by the section." Stock Echange Practices: Hearing on S. Res. 84 (72d
Cong.) and S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97 (73d Cong.), Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 73d Cong. 6571 (1934) (Statement of Thomas G. Corcoran).
385 See Cohen v. Citibank, 954 F. Supp. 621, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("Few reported
cases discuss the applicability of Section 20(b) .. ").
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liability. Indeed, section 20(b) can plausibly be read to authorize imposition of
respondeat superior liability, although no court has so held. 386
It appears that in draffing section 15 and section 20(a), Congress was not
even thinking about the liability of employers for their employees. 387
Corporations, accounting firms, and law firms do not "stand in the shadows"
manipulating their agents. They do not act through "dummies." The investing
public rightfully expects corporations and firms to answer for the torts of their
agents irrespective of the existence of section 20(a). Rather, in enacting section
20(a), Congress was trying to extend liability beyond the master-servant
relationship, where respondeat superior liability already universally applied, in
order to reach additional, hidden malefactors.
As Professor Conard has explained, 388 this extension of liability was
necessary because the common law at the time could not reach those behind the
scenes unless they had provided grounds for piercing the corporate veil 389 or
had personally participated in the fraud.390 The former doctrine was only in its
formative stages at the time and typically allowed piercing only where the
wrongdoing entity was no more than a mere sham.391 Section 15 was enacted
386 See Comment, Secondary Liability of Controlling Persons Under the Securities Acts:
Toward An Improved Analysis, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 1345, 1351 (1978) ("Moreover, the
potential sufficiency of section 20(b) of the 1934 Act as a vehicle to serve the rule of
respondeat superior has apparently been ignored.").
387 See generally Alfred F. Conard, Control, Responsibility, and Abdication: A
Dilemma of Securities Regulation, 17 J. CoRP. L. 539, 551-53 (1992) [hereinafter Conard,
Control] (reviewing legislative history and noting that Congress probably did not have in mind
the employer-employee relationship in enacting the various control provisions of the 1933 and
1934 Acts); Conard, Enterprise Liability, supra note 179, at 919-20 (same); Levin, supra
note 7, at 622-26 (same).
388 See Conard, Enterprise Liability, supra note 179, at 920-21.
389 See SEC Kamen Brief, supra note 316, at 12. As Professor Conard has put it,
"[w]hen the New Deal lawmakers adopted a program of 'truth in securities,' they were
determined to prevent the officers and directors, the major shareholders, the financiers, and
other dominant figures, from shielding their frauds behind the barrier of corporate entity."
Conard, Control, supra note 387, at 541-42.
390 At common law, for example, directors and officers were not liable on an agency
basis for the torts of other officers and directors unless they participated in the fraud
themselves. See, e.g., Rives v. Bartlett, 109 N.E. 83, 83-85 (N.Y. 1915). If they did so
participate, naturally they would be held liable. See, e.g., Powers v. American Traffic Signal
Corp., 209 N.W. 16, 16-17 (Minn. 1926) (whoever participates in a fraud is liable); Orlann
v. Laederich, 92 S.W.2d 190, 194 (Mo. 1936) ("Any one or more of several persons
participating in the perpetration of an actionable fraud becomes a fraud-feasor, and ... is
liable.").
391 See Conard, Control, supra note 387, at 552 ("IT]he case law of the time provided
no basis for [piercing the corporate veil] as long as the malefactor was more than a mere
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to change this situation by expanding liability to those not reached by
respondeat superior.392 Section 15, it was said at the time, "almost completely
voids the effect of the corporate entity as a nonconductor." 393
Section 20(a) was enacted for the same reason. In addition to "dummy
directors," section 20(a) allows plaintiffs to reach stock exchanges for the acts
of brokerage houses they have registered;394 brokerage firms for the acts of
non-agent correspondent brokers 395 and investment advisers on the firm's
approved list;396 corporations for certain acts of their employees apparently
outside the scope of employment;397 brokerage firms for their employees'
misappropriation of clients' funds under circumstances that appeared clearly
beyond the scope of their employment;398 and directors and officers for the
torts of other managers in which they did not participate399 and in situations
where they would not have been viewed as principals in a master-servant
relationship. 4°° Section 20(a) could also allow plaintiffs to reach defendants that
control wrongdoers through holding companies, by family connections, or in
sham.-).
392 See George J. Feldman, The New Federal Securities Act, 14 BOSTON U. L. REv. 1,
12-13 (1934) (noting that it "destroys to a considerable extent the utility of the holding
company device"). Id. at 13.
393 Id. at 12-13.
394 See, e.g., Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94,133 at 94,540 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 1973), aft'd, 534 F.2d 156 (9th Cir.
1976).
395 See Levin, supra note 7, at 631-32. A strong argument has also been made that
although agency liability did not attach to a brokerage firm in Sennott v. Rodnan & Renshaw,
474 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1973), because plaintiff was attempting to buy what turned out to be
nonexistent options by dealing with a particular employee outside normal firm channels,
controlling person liability should have been imposed. See Gottesman, supra note 121, at
189-90 (arguing that 'control" definitely existed and the firm's alleged good faith was
questionable).
396 See, e.g., Kaufman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 464 F. Supp.
528, 538-39 (D. Md. 1978).
397 See, e.g., Gordon v. Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156, 169-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (dicta), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part 506 F.2d 1080 (2d Cir. 1974).
398 See, e.g., Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 974 F.2d 873, 875-76 (7th Cir.
1992) (plaintiffs sent funds directly to broker); Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d
1564 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (same).
399 See, e.g., G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 957-58 (5th Cir.
1981); Holmes v. Bateson, 583 F.2d 542, 560 (1st Cir. 1978); Stadia Oil & Uranium Co. v.
Wheelis, 251 F.2d 269, 274-76 (10th Cir. 1957) (applying section 15); Moerman v. Zipco,
Inc., 302 F. Supp. 439, 447 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd on other grounds 422 F.2d 871 (2d Cir.
1970).
40 See, e.g., G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 959 (5th Cir. 1981).
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other nonagency ways.401 Controlling shareholders could be reached in
situations where piercing the corporate veil was not available.4°2
In other words, respondeat superior already governed the responsibility of
principals for their agents. Congress was well aware of the fact403 and would
not have given it another thought.4 4 The controlling -person liability provisions
of the 1933 and 1934 Acts were aimed primarily at situations of control over
firms (and others) by behind-the-scenes actors. 40 5 To repeat, enactment of the
controlling person provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts "was motivated by a
fear that traditional theories of secondary liability, such as agency, would not
prove adequate, in every case, to extend liability to those who were 'really
responsible' for violations of the securities laws."'40 6 Those, like Professor
Fischel, who argue that section 20(a) renders agency liability theories "mere
surplusage" assume a coextensiveness of the two categories that simply does
not exist.
It seems unlikely that Congress would have attempted to effectuate its
purpose of increasing investor protection by passing a statute that provided in
almost all situations less rather than more protection. As Justice Breyer wrote
when he sat on the First Circuit: "Though the relevant written history [of
section 20(a)] is sparse, it is significant, for it makes clear that the section was
401 See IX Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 201, at 4476. Other nonagency methods of
control have been suggested as well. See Gottesman, supra note 121, at 202 n.93 ("[A]
creditor holding a substantial amount of pledged stock, a majority shareholder, a 'dummy'
corporation, or a firmer employee whose opinions are valued greatly and followed, might be
considered a control person, without there being an agency relationship.").
402 See, e.g., Whittaker v. Wall, 226 F.2d 868, 871-72 (8th Cir. 1955) (substantial
shareholder and president); Schilner v. H. Vaughan Clarke & Co., 134 F.2d 875, 879 (2d
Cir. 1943) (sole shareholder).
403 See supra note 2. As noted in the introduction, during the hearings a key witness
carefully explained to the House Committee that "it is a principle that runs all through the law
that we are responsible for the acts of our agents." Federal Securities Act Hearings, supra
note 1, at 122 (statement of Ollie N. Butler, Dept. of Commerce).
404 Conard, Enterprise Liability, supra note 179, at 921 (footnote omitted):
JIThe liability of employers, unlike that of officers, directors, and shareholders, had long
been established in both state and federal courts. If legislators or their scriveners gave
any thought to the liability of employers for securities frauds, they would naturally have
expected courts to apply enterprise liability [respondeat superior] to securities frauds as
courts had done in other fraud cases.
405 See Conard, Control, supra note 387, at 551-53 ("[T]he legislators of 1933 and
1934 designed their control provisions to address the control exercised by holding companies,
major shareholders, financiers, and others over corporations that issue securities.").
406 Levin, supra note 7, at 626.
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aimed at expanding liability, rather than contracting it. ,407
Professor Musewicz has demonstrated that the legislative history shows that
one of the few representatives to comment specifically upon section 20(a),
Representative Hollister, argued that it was too broad and should be deleted
from the bill as an undefinable extension of common agency law principles: "It
would be a strange and unexpected result if opponents of section 20(a), who
sought its deletion because of their view that section 20(a) expanded secondary
liability, discovered that in fact their fellow legislators were limiting secondary
liability." 40 8
In the hearings over the 1933 Act, there was much concern expressed that
individual directors' liability be minimized, 40 9 but none that corporate
respondeat superior liability be minimized. Elimination of respondeat superior
liability would have been a big deal. Surely somewhere in the legislative
debates there would have been some note taken of this sea change in the law.
Before Central Bank, lower courts had taken just this argument, applied it to
the differing facts regarding the origins and status of respondeat superior
liability, and held that "given the pervasive applicability of agency principles
elsewhere in the law, it would take clear evidence to persuade us that Congress
intended to supplant such principles by enacting the 'controlling person'
provisions." 410 It makes much more sense to conclude that the good faith
defense of section 20(a) was included as a way of buffering a new extension of
liability beyond what had existed before.
407 In re Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc., 784 F.2d 29, 33 (Ist Cir. 1986); see also Paul
F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118 (5th Cir. 1980)
(concluding that the 1934 Act's legislative history does not reflect any congressional intent to
restrict secondary liability for violations of the Act to the control person formula of section
20(a)); SEC Kamen Brief, supra note 316, at 12-13 (Section 20(a) was passed to extend
investor protection by "reach[ing] situations in which there are technical barriers between the
persons in fact responsible for violations of the securities acts and those injured by the
violations ....").
408 Musewicz, supra note 7, at 787.
40 9 See Federal Securities Act Hearings, supra note 1, at 15 (Statement of
Representative Parker). Furthermore, when the representatives debated the bill that enacted
section 20(a), they seemed to presume the viability of agency principles. See Musewicz,
supra note 7, at 786-87 (one of the few explicit exchanges regarding controlling person
liability-between Representatives Hollister and Lea-seemed to presume continued existence
of agency liability).
410 S.E.C. v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 812 (2d Cir. 1975).
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D. Policy Considerations
1. Certainty and Predictability
As noted earlier, changing a long-established and nearly unanimous rule of
law by making section 20(a) the exclusive form of secondary liability under
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 does little to aid certainty and predictability of the
law. To the extent that clarity is a related policy consideration, "controlling
person" jurisprudence is just as confusing as the jurisprudence of aiding and
abetting about which the Supreme Court complained in Central Bank.411
Indeed, few areas of federal securities law are more confusing than "controlling
person" jurisprudence. 412 Thus, exclusive reliance on this section 20(a) for
imposition of secondary liability under the 1934 Act will do little to advance the
cause of certainty, predictability, or clarity.
2. Litigiousness
Recognizing vicarious section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability under
respondeat superior will encourage more defrauded plaintiffs to seek
compensation for their losses than would a regime consisting solely of
"controlling person" secondary liability. To that extent, such recognition
encourages litigation. Although the current majority of the Supreme Court may
411 See, e.g., Ferrara & Sanger, supra note 378, at 1010 (discussing varying views
regarding who is a "controlling person").412 See A.A. Sommer, Jr., Who's "in Control"?-S.E.C., 21 Bus. LAw. 559, 563
(1966):
Alas, [certainty and precision are] rarely the case with key concepts in the structure of
federal securities law, and this is particularly true in the case of the concept of "control".
Like so many key notions the imprecise limits of the term have been limned through the
pain-staking process of rule, interpretation, judicial decision and ad hoe determinations
in "no action letters". Out of these there has come no mathematical standard, no slide
rule computation, no certain rule which can infallibly guide counsel and client in making
this most important determination-a determination which can be costly if wrongly
made.
See also Carson, supra note 291, at 266 ("[A] great deal of uncertainty surrounds the
scope and proper application of the [controlling person provisions] more than sixty years after
their enactment."); Comment, Secondary Liability of Controlling Persons Under the
Securities Acts: Toward an Improved Analysis, 126 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1345, 1346 (1978)
(stating that section 20(a) "is plagued by vague holdings, questionable statutory interpretation,
and disregarded distinctions.").
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disagree, given the 1934 Congress's strong intent to compensate defrauded
investors for their losses, more litigation is not necessarily a bad development.
Less litigation means less deterrence, which translates into more violations and
more investor losses 413 of the type Congress meant to prevent when it passed
the 1934 Act.
To the extent that the cost of litigation is the Court's concern, the strict
liability feature of respondeat superior should produce cheaper litigation than
the controlling person provision, which requires litigation of the controlling
person's state of mind.414
3. Compensating Defrauded Investors
a. Burden of Proof
The "good faith" defense of section 20(a) arguably encourages defendants,
such as brokerage firms, to maximize "cosmetic value" rather than the actual
effectiveness of their controls. 415 In terms of prevention as well, there is a
distinct difference between an incentive to make it appear that one tried hard
and an incentive to actually get the job done. Any conclusion that section 20(a)
is exclusive "would in effect give blessing to a hear-no-evil, see-no-evil
approach" 416 by defendant firms.
The problem is magnified in jurisdictions that require plaintiffs to prove the
controlling person's intentional participation as a prerequisite to imposing
liability under section 20(a):
Congress provided investors a cause of action for losses caused by fraudulent
activities to restore investor confidence in the integrity and stability of the
securities markets. Requiring proof that the controlling person orchestrated or
intentionally furthered the fraud imposes an evidentiary burden virtually
impossible to satisfy. In most cases the investor deals exclusively with the
413 See Conard, Enterprise Liability, supra note 179, at 952 ("If fewer employers are
liable, the number of suits filed will probably diminish. While litigation expenses fall,
deterrence will also diminish, and the frequency of violations and resulting losses will
increase.").
414 On the other hand, the strict liability approach may encourage more litigation and to
that extent increase litigation costs overall. See Verkerke, supra note 94, at 312.
415 See Seiter, supra note 7, at 1534 (making the additional point that "[r]espondeat
superior is actually more fair to truly well-run firms, because although firms are held liable
without fault for employee fraud, their aggregate judgment costs will presumably be lower the
more carefully they actually supervise their employees.").
416 Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165, 1212 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd in
part and rev'd inpart 422 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1970) (referring to section 15 of the 1933 Act).
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controlled person and will not have met or even dealt indirectly with the
controlling person. As a result, it is difficult for an investor to uncover proof
that the controlling person intended to defraud her, and proof that the
controlling person only knew of the fraud will be insufficient to impose
liability. Requiring proof of intentional participation, therefore, effectively
shields a controlling person from liability and prevents investors from
recovering losses.4 17
b. Ensuring Compensation
To the extent that compensating defrauded investors is one of the purposes
of the federal securities laws, the most expeditious course is to provide for both
respondeat superior and controlling person liability.41 More deep pockets
mean more compensation for defrauded investors.
4 19
4. Deterring Fraud
In terms of the policies underlying investor protection, controlling person
liability is certainly superior to a system of no secondary liability whatsoever,
but it is demonstrably inferior to a regime that includes respondeat superior
liability as well.
Whether respondeat superior or controlling person liability is applied, the
prudent employer must decide how much in the way of resources to devote to
minimizing employer wrongdoing. That decision will arguably be affected by
the employer's level of liability, and it intuitively seems that the employer
would devote more effort and resources under a controlling person regime than
under a system of no vicarious liability whatsoever, but less than under a
respondeat superior regime. 420 Furthermore, respondeat superior gives
employers the incentive to choose and supervise carefully, whereas
4 17 Staudt, supra note 40, at 950-52 (footnotes omitted).
418 See Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1577 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc)
("Only if both respondeat superior and § 20(a) are available is the statutory scheme
comprehensive and the public protected by the federal securities laws.").
4 19 See generally supra notes 269-73 and accompanying text.
420 See Conard, Enterprise Liability, supra note 179, at 947. However, this is not
certain, because an argument can be made that similar precautions are taken under regimes of
strict liability (respondeat superior) and negligence (controlling person). See Steve Shavell,
Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STuD. 1, 1-25 (1980). Conard, however,
further argues that this traditional rationale in favor of respondent superior liability has even
more force in the securities industry than in the personal injury cases from which it arose
because "employers and employees alike in the securities industry have economic incentives
to commit the offenses. A vigorous desire of employers to eliminate violations is essential to
deterrence." Conard, Enterprise Liability, supra note 179, at 948.
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nonprincipal defendants in section 20(a) cases often neither hire nor supervise
the wrongdoing agents.421 Thus, the incentive is wasted on them.
5. Advancing Market Efficiency
Again, a controlling person system of liability is likely more efficient than a
system of no enterprise liability, but probably less efficient than a system of
respondeat superior. For securities firms to be allowed to advertise their
reputation and then hide behind the "hear-no-evil, see-no-evil" defenses of
section 20(a) radically undermines the integrity of the securities industry 422 and
the public's confidence in it. The arguments from Part II(E)(2)(c) need not be
repeated here.
Furthermore, to the extent that respondeat superior contributes to efficiency
by spreading the risk, principals are typically employers that can spread the
risk, as noted above. Controlling persons are typically not employers and will
be less likely to be able to spread the risk.423
IV. CONCLUSION
Respondeat superior is a foundational principle of tort law and is ubiquitous
in Western legal systems. It seems surpassingly odd that out of the entire
American legal system respondeat superior liability under section 10(b), and
only under section 10(b), should be targeted and eliminated. Yet, Justice
Stevens and the commentators agree, that is the result compelled by the logic of
the Central Bank majority opinion. Regrettably, some courts are already
implementing this logic.
This Article demonstrates that a closer examination of the statutory
language, the structural scheme, the legislative history, and the policies
underlying the 1934 Act in general and section 10(b) specifically indicates that
respondeat superior liability, a fixture of all realms of federal securities law,
including section 10(b) for sixty years, should remain available in such actions.
421 See, e.g., Seiter, supra note 7, at 1535-36.
422 See Note, Vicarious Liability for Securities Law Violations: Respondeat Superior and
the Controlling Person Sections, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 713, 719 (1974) (citing Johns
Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165, 1212 (D. Md. 1968)).
4 23 A reasonably strong argument has been made that Congress intended section 20(a) to
apply only to individual defendants, leaving organizational defendants liable solely under
respondeat superior. See Bums, supra note 294, at 1222 ("[Cjourts can eliminate the existing
incongruity, comply with Congress'[s] original intent, and achieve the goal of increasing the
protection provided to investors, by confining the application of the controlling person
provisions to individuals while applying agency principles in their traditional manner."). The
SEC itself maintained this position until around 1982. Id. at 1208-09.
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Respondeat superior is in many ways different than aiding and abetting, and the
Supreme Court's elimination of the latter theory in Central Bank does not, in
fact, compel elimination of the former. Analysis of the key factors-statutory
language, structural scheme, legislative history, and policy-also demonstrates
that section 20(a) controlling person liability should supplement, not supplant,
respondeat superior liability in section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 causes of action.
Vicarious liability, such as respondeat superior, is such a settled feature of
American tort law that large corporations and accounting firms that have
lobbied so vigorously and successfully for protective amendments to the federal
securities laws, and to federal and state tort law in general, are not seeking
elimination of respondeat superior.424 It is simply unthinkable, even to these
potential defendants, that a company would not be held liable under section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 for fraudulent statements issued by employees in
connection with the sale or purchase of securities or that an accounting firm
would not be liable for the fraudulent acts of its auditors. Yet this is the result
that must follow if respondeat superior liability is eliminated.
This state of affairs is so unthinkable that commentators have suggested that
perhaps elimination of respondeat superior pursuant to Central Bank would not
be so bad because courts might soften the blow by continuing to hold
corporations liable for the actions of their top officials. 425 There is some
precedent for this approach because some courts have imposed what they called
"primary" liability upon companies acting through their top executives. 426
42 4 See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1744-45.
425 See Langevoort, supra note 36, at 894 (citing Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649
F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981), as an example of a case holding a corporation "primarily" liable for
acts of its executives); Steinberg, supra note 14, at 502 (claiming that a corporation may be
held primarily liable when its executive officers act improperly).
426 Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981), is the leading case for
this proposition. However, upon reflection it should be clear that even where a company's
CEO or Chairman of the Board or entire board of directors acts tortiously, the company's
liability is secondary, being necessarily based on agency principles.
As authority for its position, the Sharp court cited Holmes v. Bateson, 583 F.2d 542 0st
Cir. 1978), apparently completely misapprehending its holding. Sharp cites Bateson as
holding that when a company is liable because its top officers have committed fraud, this is
primary liability as distinguished from respondeat superior's secondary liability. What
Bateson says is that when a corporation's "officers and employees," id. at 560, commit a
fraud, the company is liable. This interpretation is traditional respondeat superior theory, and
it does not matter whether the malfeasors are top officials or not. The Bateson court used the
term "primary liability" loosely, just to indicate that although a corporation may have a right
of indemnity against the wrongdoing employee, it "cannot escape its primary liability to the
party defrauded." Id. at 561. In other words, the Bateson court did not use the term
"primary" meaning to contrast it to "secondary" liability. Its reasoning is very clear that
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Indeed, one of the lower court cases to hold that respondeat superior liability
under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 was eliminated by Central Bank held,
contradictorily, that for purposes of the "group pleading" doctrine, the
corporate defendant was responsible for the fraudulent statements of one of its
officers. 427 Even the Supreme Court in Monell refused to impose respondeat
superior liability upon municipalities under section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act, yet concocted an artificial doctrine whereby such municipalities could
nonetheless be held vicariously liable for the acts of their agents if those acts
represented "official policy" stemming from someone with "final authority." 428
However, to simultaneously eliminate respondeat superior liability yet
construct some sort of faux primary liability by pretending that holding a
corporation liable for the acts of its upper level agents is not a form of vicarious
liability is simply an anthropomorphizing delusion:
Corporations are a legal fiction representing a network of legal, usually
contractual, arrangements. "Corporations" thus do not act, do not make
contracts, sell property, or commit torts; their agents do. For convenience, we
sometimes describe the acts of such agents as acts of the corporation. But if an
agent commits a tort and the tort is said to have been committed by the
corporation (meaning that damages will be paid out of the corporate treasury),
the corporation's liability is necessarily vicarious. 429
Congress passed the 1934 Act against the background of a common law
that imposed respondeat superior liability for the torts of all agents acting within
the scope of authority, not just upper echelon agents.430 Section 3(a)(9) of the
"primary" liability was being imposed on the corporation through respondeat superior.
Therefore, the Sharp court's holding was a simple invention and clearly wrong.427 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
428 See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
429 Kamer & Sykes, supra note 109, at 249; see also Sharon Tompkins, Note,
lightening Gatekeeper Liability: Should Officers' and Directors' Wrongdoing Be Imputed to
the Corporation in Suits Against Third-Party Professionals?, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1883, 1885
(1996) ("A corporation cannot have knowledge in any real sense because it cannot see, know,
feel or think. It must derive its knowledge and intelligence from the eyes, ears, and bmins of
its agents.").
430 Even the criminal law imposes liability upon principals for the acts of lower level
agents. See Kathleen F. Brickley, Corporate Criminal Liability: A Primer for Corporate
Counsel, 40 Bus. LAw. 129, 131 (1984) ("A corporation may be held [criminally] liable for
the acts of its agents without regard to their status in the corporate hierarchy.") (footnotes
omitted); Samuel R. Miller, Corporate Criminal Liability: A Principle Extended to its Linits,
38 FED. B.J. 49, 53 (1979) ("Courts have searched deep into the corporate hierarchy to
pinpoint an employee whose criminal acts may be imputed to the company."); Pitt &
Groskaufinanis, supra note 282, at 1572 ("Even low-level, 'menial' employees can expose
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1934 Act defines "person" to include "company," not "company, but only if it
acts through designated high-level officials."431
To recognize a bastardized form of respondeat superior liability that
imposes liability upon the principal only when the wrongdoing agents are top-
level employees would not only be inconsistent with the common law that the
1934 Congress recognized and the definitional provisions it provided, but it
would also invite the same sort of disaster that the Supreme Court created in
Monell when it felt constrained to eliminate respondeat superior liability under
section 1983. The Supreme Court could not stomach the result and had to
devise the "final authority" test for liability, which was "strewn with obstacles
not presented by respondeat superior," 432 and further created a nightmare of
their employers to criminal liability."); Michael E. Tigar, It Does the Crime But Not the
7me: Corporate Criminal Liability in Federal Law, 17 AM. J. Cam. L. 211, 212-27 (1990);
Webb, supra note 300, at 623 ("Even the acts of the lowest-level employees may be imputed
to the corporation, provided the acts occur within the scope of the employee's authority.");
Weinstein & Ball, supra note 258, at 67 ("[Elven where low level employees carry out
intentional criminal acts on behalf of the corporate organization, courts have routinely
attached corporate liability."); Kevin B. Huff, Note, The Role of Corporate Compliance
Programs in Determining Corporate Criminal Liability: A Suggested Approach, 96 COLuM.
L. REV. 1252, 1253 (1996) ("Corporations are held liable even where lower-level employees
commit crimes without the knowledge of upper management and contrary to express
corporate policy or instructions."); Seth Maxwell, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
and Other Arguments Against a Due Diligence Defense to Corporate Criminal Liability, 29
UCLA L. Rmv. 447, 463 (1982) ("The federal courts have led the way in refusing to limit
enterprise liability to the crimes committed by higher-echelon personnel.").
431 There are cases that impute individual agents' intent to the firm only when those
individuals are upper level employees. For example, in Nordstrom, Inc. v. Chubb & Son,
Inc., 54 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit held that a corporation cannot
be liable unless there is substantial scienter among its upper echelon agents. In so doing, the
court created several problems. First, its ruling was inconsistent with traditional common law,
which imputes the knowledge of all agents to the corporation. See Musewicz, supra note 7, at
764 n.79 ("Such analysis overlooks that ordinarily employees are, for most purposes, agents
of their employers."). Second, the ruling provided no rationale for departing from the
common law tradition, nor any clear guidelines for doing so. Should the courts draw the line
at the board of directors? Officers? Supervisors? Third, the court did not justify giving the
corporation a pass when its lower level employees commit securities fraud, but not when they
commit other types of fraud or other torts such as assault and battery or careless driving.
Fourth, the court seemed to be implying that a company's liability is secondary when it is
based on the bad faith acts of lower-level employees, but that the company itself in some
fashion acts with bad intent when its upper-level employees engage in fraud. This distinction
is rooted in fantasy.
432 Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Theodore Y. Blumoff, Reshaping Section 1983"s
Asymmetry, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 755, 797 (1992).
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confusion that is still not sorted out.433
Full-blown respondeat superior liability should attach in section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 cases. Stock brokerage firms should be liable for the lies of their
sales representatives. Accounting firms should be liable for the lies of their
auditors. Corporations should be liable for the lies of their lower-level
employees. Although many current Supreme Court members are clearly not
thrilled that a cause of action was ever implied under section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5, this is now afait accompli; it is not sensible to twist this cause of action
so torturously that it retains little or no utility.434
433 See generally George D. Brown, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983 and the
Ambiguities of Burger Court Federalism: A Comment on City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle and
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati-The "Official Policy" Cases, 27 B.C. L. REv. 883, 884
(1986) (citing Supreme Court's decision to reject respondeat superior and impose a rule
where municipalities are liable only for acts of employees when the acts involve "official
policy" is, when operationalized, "a quicksand of uncertainty"); Kit Kinports, The Buck Does
Not Stop Here: Supervisory Liability in Section 1983 Cases, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 147, 192
(stating that "inconsistencies... plague this area of the law..."); Kramer & Sykes, supra
note 109, at 250 ("The policy rule has been extremely difficult to apply coherently, and there
is no reason to continue the exercise."); Lewis & Blumoff, supra note 432, at 790 (referring
to "mischievous consequences" of the "policy" requirement); Comer, supra note 105, at 344
(noting that the Supreme "Court has been unable to reach [a] consensus on how the [final
authority doctrine that it substituted for respondeat superior] should be applied"); David P.
Strauss, Comment, Vicarious Municipal Liability: Creating a Consistent Remedial Policy for
Local Government Violations of Civil Rights, 16 CAL. W. L. REv. 58, 86-87 (1980) (stating
that Monell leaves citizens without adequate redress for the wrongs of governmental officials
and draws lines between who will be compensated and who will not be compensated based on
arbitrary and fortuitous grounds).
In its 1997 term, the Supreme Court had yet another opportunity to clarify Monell when
it decided Bryan County v. Brown, 117 S. Ct. 1382 (Apr. 29, 1997). Unfortunately, its
decision did not clarify the existing confusion, and four dissenters called for a complete re-
examination of the Court's approach to the problem, see Martin A. Schwartz, Claims of
Wrongfid Hiring, N.Y. L.J., June 17, 1997, at 3 (summarizing the various Justices' views),
and Professor Nahmod, author of a treatise on section 1983 litigation, was prompted to ask
why the Court does "not go with a straight respondeat superior approach?" See Marcia
Coyle, High Court: Cities Get Wider Shield, NAT'L L.J., May 12, 1997, at A10 (quoting
Professor Nahmod).
434 See Musewicz, supra note 7, at 777-78 ("Once the law admits of a remedy, its
boundaries must be drawn reasonably, not arbitrarily.").
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